

THE MONIST

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

I. WHAT IS MEANT BY PHILOSOPHY

IN GENERAL, it may be described as "the thinking consideration of things" (*denkende Betrachtung der Gegenstände*), said Hegel. It is, however, neither the only nor the earliest form of thinking: thinking in the first instance, and still for the most part, is practical or rather instrumental to practice. But thinking is prompted at length by the curiosity which leisure brings: necessity may be the mother of invention but "wonder is the mother of Knowledge" as an end in itself.¹ Science and philosophy are alike in so far as, in both, truth for its own sake is said to be what we pursue. Nevertheless, neither the end nor the motive in the two cases is quite the same. In the sense in which we talk of many sciences we do not talk of many philosophies, and in the sense in which we talk of many philosophies we do not talk of many sciences. There are several sciences, because each has a restricted domain, deals with some special class or aspect of things; whereas in that sense philosophy is one, for it purports to embrace the whole of things. On the other hand, while we recognize only one science of physics or chemistry or biology, we find almost as many philosophical systems as there have been philosophers: all of them striving to present an intelligible *Weltanschauung* or "synoptic view" of the concrete whole. It might strike one as odd, but for the familiarity

¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b, 10-27.

of it, that philosophies are often named after their authors, Platonism, Epicureanism, Cartesianism, Spinozism, Hegelianism, etc., while no science ever bears a human name. This difference we may find presently to be due to the fact that philosophy is primarily a personal matter. Science seeks to know the *what* and the *how* of this or that: philosophy seeks to know the *why* or *meaning* of the whole. And meaning in experience varies with the experient: to no two men is the world quite the same.

But much as philosophies have varied, "the philosophic spirit" has been always essentially the same—the habit of reflecting upon one's stock of knowledges² in the hope of unifying them all in one concrete "intuition" or "Idea." And to "knowledge" here we must give a wide meaning, including whatever is accepted as true, whether actually true or not. Thales did not philosophize the less, because he regarded the magnet as alive; or Plato, because he believed in the pre-existence of souls; or Aquinas, because he held the doctrine of transubstantiation; or Schelling, because he believed in *clairvoyance*. Given certain materials—knowledges or what are reputed such—the philosophic habit is a species of mental rumination in which the mind endeavors to elaborate the various items of experience into such form and order as to render them an intelligible and organic whole. It is important, then, to distinguish between the "informing" or organizing spirit of philosophy and the outcome in a particular instance: for the latter is often so crude and imperfect that we, with our wider knowledge and clearer insight, may fail to see anything in it deserving to be called philosophic at all. Few, we may suppose, nowadays begin the study of early Greek philosophy without feeling this. Most of us found it hard to see

² This "term in frequent use by Bacon (and others), though now obsolete should be revived" (Hamilton, *Metaphysics* I., p. 57 fin.)—a proposal which Herbert Spencer seconded, and which has moreover the support of French and German usage.

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anything but absurdity in the doctrine of Thales for instance, that the principle or ἀρχή of all things is water; or in the doctrine of Anaximenes that all the variety of nature is due to a thickening or thinning of another primeval element, *viz*, air. Even the more abstract speculation of the Pythagoreans—of whom Aristotle tells us that they regarded number as the essence of all things, and the organization of the universe as but a harmonious system of numbers and their relations—even this will appear as barren and empty from excess of abstraction as the Ionian philosophies seemed crude and confined from defect of it. But very much the same feeling might possess us on observing the earliest attempts at pictorial representation, the rude scratches on mammoth tusks, for example, no more like a man than the conventional diagrams of *Homo sapiens*—full face and profile combined—which school-children draw on their slates. But the point is, both *are* pictures, however bad as likenesses: they are the outcome of the idea of pictorial representation, the result of an artistic purpose. So it was with the earliest attempts at philosophy. Here, too, we must distinguish between the idea and its execution: all the pregnant worth of these primitive essays lay in the idea that there is an ἀρχή or first principle; so that all the diversified plurality of the world may be traced to some fundamental One.

II. PHILOSOPHY AND MYTHOLOGY

We may realize the significance of this early philosophy more clearly by contrasting it with the mythology that preceded it. In that imagination was dominant, and there was no tendency to generalize: behind the concrete facts of sense there were only the concrete creations of fancy. "Mythology ran riot in a plurality or multitude of powers

which it invoked, and to which it assigned the government of the universe; but philosophy, on the contrary, aimed at a unity of agency or causation in all things. [Thus] the very conception of reducing the diversified exuberance, the infinite plentitude, of nature to the unity of one principle, showed a speculative boldness which proved that a new intellectual era was dawning on mankind."³ Still we must not forget that unity here implies continuity and in fact, looking closer, we find a certain continuity even between mythology and philosophy.

The savage, too, has his metaphysics: as Andrew Lang has well said, "The chief distinction between his mode of conceiving the world and ours is his vast extension of the theory of personality. To the savage . . . all nature was a congeries of animated personalities."⁴ This anthropomorphism, so flagrant in the theogonies and cosmogonies of polytheism, we still recognize without difficulty as shaping the literature as well as the art of religion even in the present day.⁵ But the like is equally true, though less obvious, in the case of philosophy. Thales for instance not only, according to Aristotle, connected his doctrine with the ancient myth that Oceanus was the father of gods and men, but supposed all things to be full of gods.⁶ Even Plato turned old myths to account and invented several new ones, if what is deliberately invented by one man may be called a myth. Altogether, Plato is credited with some dozen myths of one sort or another.⁷ We seem justified, then, in maintaining the presence of anthropomorphism or "poetical metaphysics" not only in the speculation of primitive man but even in those of philosophers down to our own time. But "dogmatic anthropomorphism," as Kant called it—which had lingered on both in theology and

³ J. F. Ferrier, *Lectures on Greek Philosophy*, 1875, pp. 41, 40.

⁴ Andrew Lang, "Mythology," *Ency. Brit.*, 11th edn., xix, 132.

⁵ Cf. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*, 1837, II, pp. 13ff.

⁶ *Metaphysics*, 983a; *De Anima*, I, v. 411a.

⁷ Cf. J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, 1905.

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philosophy, though assuming ever worthier forms as humanity itself advanced—was finally rejected as “not proven” in Hume’s famous *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. Admitting this, Kant nevertheless maintained that “symbolic anthropomorphism,” an anthropomorphism that is to say, based on analogy, is still necessary as furnishing us with “regulative Ideas.”⁸ But the philosophies of the Absolute that have been in vogue since Kant’s day and flourish still, claim—at any rate as “barely theoretical”—to have eliminated all such analogies.

Granting this and leaving aside for the present the question how far philosophy can be called “barely theoretical,” we may still point out that the “real categories”—substance and attribute, cause and effect, end and means—which even these philosophies recognize, are themselves anthropomorphic.⁹ But here what philosophy has failed to do, positive science claims to have now done. This brings us to a new point.

III. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Here again we are reminded that unity implies continuity, and again, in fact, we find it. Philosophy presupposes knowledges, even when it essays to take the royal or *a priori* road; but it does not necessarily presuppose science. In western thought indeed philosophy is comparable to a primitive nebula from which the sciences in a certain order were gradually set loose as satellites.

The need for that division of labor which the advance of knowledge has involved was hardly felt before the six-

⁸ Cf. his *Prolegomena*, 1783, Secs. 57, 58, pp. 173ff.

⁹ Cf. The writer’s *Psychological Principles*, 1918, ch. xiii, sec. 6; and on the question generally, the late F. Paulsen’s essay “Die Zukunftsaufgaben der Philosophie” in *Systematische* (edited by P. Hinneberg), 1908, pp. 407ff.

teenth century. The ancient philosophers in particular were all more or less polymathic: all the general knowledge of their time they knew, and to systematize and extend it was the main business of their lives. But some knowledges took scientific form sooner than others; and there were two sciences in particular—mathematics and logic—which, though developing alongside of philosophy are really, and were from the first, largely independent of it. This independence they owe to their purely abstract form and exact character which seemed to betoken a certain transcendence, complete freedom, in other words, from all the presuppositions which concrete things imply. In consequence, they have themselves powerfully influenced the course of philosophy down to our own day; for reality without restriction is its theme; and logic and mathematics seem to cover everything and yet, as formal, to depend on nothing. It was this exaltation of the exact sciences that led Greek philosophy to disregard the empirical and historical—a strange outcome of the desire to find the meaning of *things*.

Let us try briefly to note how the philosophic spirit was thus first diverted from thinking about things to thinking about *thoughts*. It is perfectly possible, however, to think about both without inverting their relations. But this is not what happened in Greece, where our western philosophy took its rise. Had civilization begun in England or Holland, for example, where industrial and mercantile interests are so absorbing, the history of this philosophy would have been vastly different from what it is.¹⁰ The *intellectus sibi permissus*, that wrong way of attaining truth which Bacon exposed, might then not have retarded the progress of empirical knowledge for two thousand

¹⁰ F. A. Lange thought that even as it was, from the standpoint of Sophists like Protagoras a development of Knowledge was already possible that would have obviated or short-circuited "the great digression (*Umschwendung*) which led the world for thousands of years into the false path of the Platonic idealism." *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 3rd ed., 1875, i, pp. 41-43. Cf. J. Herschel, *Preliminary Discourse*, 1838, pp. 105ff.

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years. As it was, while the natural sciences were still unborn, the Greek mind gave birth to what is known as dialectic.

1. *Logic*. Beginning with this we may consider first the influence on philosophy of logic, which in fact was the offspring of dialectic. According to Aristotle, dialectic was the invention of the Eleatic philosopher, Zeno: in fact, however, it seems to have been for him a necessity of the situation rather than a method deliberately devised. He was bent on refuting the pluralists who were his philosophical opponents, and he developed the contradictions implicit in their doctrines simply as the most effective way of refuting them. But his negative results were so imposing that it is no surprise to find Socrates—and Plato, still more consciously—employing this dialectical method with the positive aim of eliciting knowledge by turning thought inwards “to recollect itself.” In doing so they exerted an influence on the future of philosophy second to none beside. Ignorant alike of psychology and philology—professing, in fact, to know nothing—nevertheless, Socrates in his endeavor to evoke the meaning or definition implied in words helped at once to prepare the logical instrument of knowledge and to prevent its efficient use. Misconceiving the relation of words to thoughts and of thoughts to things, Plato, the disciple whom he inspired, then propounded his famous “realism”—commonly called the Platonic idealism—thereby inaugurating a philosophical mythology that in one form or another lasted on till its consummation in the *Logic* of Hegel.¹² Plato maintained that “universals” were *entia* prior to and independent of *fientia*, the particulars perceived by sense.¹³

¹² In the preface to the second edition of his *Logic*, written within a week of his death, Hegel himself refers sympathetically to Plato as his forerunner. Cf. p. 13.

¹³ Cf. G. Grote's *Aristotle*, 2nd. ed., 1880, App. I. “The Doctrine of Universals.”

More than that, he also maintained that the one way to knowledge of *entia*, to philosophy that is to say, was the dialectical way of immanent logical development: to empirical knowledge no philosophical validity was to be allowed at all. So, from that day to quite modern times, philosophy, as Bacon said, was engrossed with its own *anticipatio mentis* and diverted from the *interpretatio naturae*; while the empirical sciences, so long as they remained under its step-motherly tutelage, scarcely progressed at all. There were, it came to be assumed, two sources of knowledge, reason and sense, and two kinds of knowledge, that of noumena and that of phenomena—to use the old terminology which Kant revived—the one constituting what he at one time called the *mundus intelligibilis*, the other what he called the *mundus sensibilis*. The former had come to be spoken of as the world *sub-specie aeternitatis*, beyond not merely time but space as well;¹⁴ this was the world of ideas, where alone according to Plato truth could dwell. The latter was the world of nature, the empirical world of change in space and time: this for Plato was the sublunary abode of passing shadows, the domain of opinion and probability at the best.

After all, it may be said, the intelligible world seen by the light of reason, is surely the world that philosophy should strive to understand; can it be that the pursuit of such knowledge will ever be abandoned? At any rate the dialectical method of attaining it has come to be regarded more and more as delusive and unsubstantial—negatively in consequence of continual crises in the history of philosophy itself, and positively in consequence of the progress of science in spite of it.

The first great crisis in the development of philosophy began at once with Plato's own disciple, Aristotle. Dialec-

¹⁴ As regards space, however, perhaps all rationalists were not equally clear—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, for example, held conflicting views.

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tic never meant for Aristotle what it meant for his master. Nevertheless, he improved the imperfect instrument that Socrates and Plato had made out of it. But it is a mistake, although a common one, to identify logic as Aristotle conceived it with the so-called formal logic into which it was ultimately transformed.¹⁵ Aristotle's Logic was no mere instrument (or organon) of that *maieutic* art which Socrates professed; and Aristotle never regarded it as such. It was that, but it was much more.¹⁶ True, he raised the standard against the Platonic realism, but he only modified it: he never broke with it altogether. As Prantl has said, he was still Platonic, and without Plato would be unintelligible. He still admitted the reality of universals; and denied only that they were independently and antecedently real: their reality for him consisted in their embodiment in particulars. On the other hand, even Plato allowed that the particular had a certain semblance of reality, because it participated in or adumbrated a universal.

As regards particulars then, the two philosophers had some common ground; yet their methods were different: Aristotle started where Plato ended, that is to say, with the actual things with which he found himself surrounded. These were either natural or artificial: he began with the latter first of all as the better known, for man had made them. So he came by his famous doctrine of the four causes—the material, the formal, the efficient and the final. But in the case of artifacts, the three latter are connected together in the individual artisan, who for the sake of the *end* devises the *form* and *effects* its embodiment or materialization. In this *συνθετόν* as Aristotle called it, the form is the determining factor, but the artisan is the indispensable agent or "moving cause." But Aristotle left the effi-

¹⁵ Cf. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, I, pp. 135-140.

¹⁶ No sharp line can be drawn between the subject-matter of Aristotle's so-called Logic and that of his metaphysics or "first philosophy"; nor in fact between this and what he called physics. (Cf. Grote's *Aristotle*, pp. 62, 422.)

cient agent—for a time at all events—out of account, and regarded the universal or form as if it were what Prantl describes as *ein schöpferische Wesensbegriff*, or had itself “notional causality,” as Grote translates the term. If we stop here, many thinkers have felt that after all Plato’s position was the better of the two: for according to that, the “ideas” were real anyhow; whereas, according to Aristotle, the forms not being real *per se*, but only notional, could surely not effect their own realization. Merely to deny Plato’s position did not help him to establish his own; for it is inconceivable how two non-entities can effect the synthesis whereby they become *τόδε τί, hoc aliquid*.

So far, Aristotle’s procedure had been primarily analytic. It is, however, only fair to him to say that he did not ignore this further problem concerning the synthesis itself which the particular as compound (*σύνολον*) implies. Accordingly the correlatives, matter and form, are now supplemented by another pair—bringing the moving cause again upon the scene—*viz.*, potentiality (*δύναμις*) and actuality or energy (*ἐνέργεια*). The former correlatives, matter and form, were relevant to the question what the concrete particular is; the latter, potentiality and energy are concerned in the question how it comes to be. The *venue* is thus completely altered: Aristotle now for a time leaves the domain of “logic,” to which change and process are altogether foreign, for that of “physic” or nature,¹⁷ where they are always dominant and at home. The new terms, as we have seen, found their clearest exemplification in mankind; for potentiality means power or faculty, as “latent,” and energy faculty or power, in overt action. Now—since any movement suggests some prior potentiality—we may bring the changes in nature into line with the changes we make.

¹⁷ Etymology, often helpful in revealing conceptual along with lexical roots, may be usefully appealed to here. Cf. *φύσις* and *natura*.

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But potentiality in Greek has another meaning which Aristotle expressly distinguished, *viz.*, possibility. The two meanings are indeed connected, since potentiality as such implies logical possibility; and Aristotle plays fast and loose with the two. "We must not seek a definition of everything," he says, and here "must be content to grasp the analogy."¹⁸ But what is this analogy? The statue is to the marble block as the man actually studying to the man when he is not. But the relation of the statue to the block of marble is the relation of form to matter, while the relation of the man when he is studying to the man when he is not is the relation of energy to potentiality. The man not studying can study if he likes: the process here starts from the faculty. But the shapeless block cannot begin of itself to take on form: the so-called potentiality then is here no faculty; it is just bare possibility—a fact which Aristotle himself brings out when he follows back the notion of matter to its limit. So far as becoming a statue goes, the block can do nothing. But as mere matter, matter as such is not potential; so pure form, form as such, cannot be actual: to be that it must be real.¹⁹

How then could Aristotle assume any inherent efficiency in form, and yet refuse to recognize the independent "reality" which Plato attributed to it? This question still awaits an answer. Meanwhile several of Aristotle's ablest commentators have pointed out that his analogy so far from dispensing him from definition hampers him with contradictions of which he seems dimly conscious and yet does not seriously face²⁰—contradictions so glaring that a well-meant attempt has recently been made to relieve him of

¹⁸ *Metaphysic IX, vi, init.*

¹⁹ These two pairs of correlatives pre-eminently characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy have remained fundamental in the terminology of philosophy till our own day without ever being adequately scrutinized.

²⁰ Cf. Heyder, *Aristotelische u. Hegel'sche Dialektik*, 1845, i, pp. 181ff.; Bonitz, *Aristotle's Metaphysica*, ii, 1849, pp. 379, 395, 569; Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. trans., 1897, pp. 373ff.; Gompertz, *Greek Thinkers*, iv, 1912, pp. 85f.

them by attributing all the confusion to his editor.²¹ Instead then of demolishing the Platonic structure, Aristotle only remodelled it on the old foundations: he too was still a "realist" but less thorough than his master and less consistent. In short, in a case of "either-or" he was something of a trimmer.

No wonder, then, that this difference between the two master minds lingered on for centuries unresolved by the comparatively feeble thinkers who followed them: no wonder that Platonists and Aristotelians came alternately to the fore, till at length it was assumed that every man must be one or other: no wonder that the chief gain to philosophy of ages of scholastic wrangling was only a certain "precision and analytic subtlety" of language which the ancients did not possess.²² Words still masked the face of things with a veil like that of Isis, which—till the modern era—there was scarcely an attempt to uplift.

2. *Mathematics.* We come now to the influence on philosophy of the other exact science, that is mathematics. Mathematics is historically the oldest science; and it is the first that everybody has to *learn*—hence perhaps its name, commonly attributed to the Pythagoreans. Like logic it is beyond scepticism and beyond cavil: in this respect it is—conjoined with logic—science as nothing else is. That it should have influenced the course of philosophy profoundly is therefore not surprising: it has, in fact, done so; and that in two ways. First, in respect of *method*—of such influence the classic instance is that of Spinoza; this, however, which we may call its epistemological result, does not for the present concern us. But, secondly, it helped to determine the *content*, the subject matter of philosophy,

²¹ Cf. W. Freytag, *Die Entwicklung der griechischen Erkenntnistheorie bis Aristotles*, 1905, p. 85.

²² A gain, however, that has been generally under-rated. But cf. the mottoes at the beginning of Mill's *Logic*.

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notably in the case of Plato. This we may call its ontological result: a remark or two on this seems here in place.

As Plato regarded "ideas" of which things are only imperfect semblances—so the Pythagoreans regarded the numbers of the decad and the geometrical forms which they imagined these to imply. The whole sum of things, modelled accordingly to the principles of number, was a cosmos, as Pythagoras is said to have first called it.²³ Indeed, the similarity between "ideas" as Socrates had led him to conceive them and "numbers" as conceived by the Pythagoreans it was—some have supposed—that finally led Plato to his so-called realism. At any rate he eventually included the Pythagorean theory within his own. So the two so-called "rational sciences" seem to be enthroned as presenting the essence of all things; and Hegel's *dictum*, "all that is real is rational" to have been anticipated. Yet, in fact, the true meaning of reason was thereby only obscured. But of this later. Meanwhile the important point is this syncretism of Plato and Pythagoras, of logical form and mathematical form, which claimed to be in one respect the last truth of things; as if indeed God, as Plato said, "always geometrizes." So we are led naturally from mathematics to physics, where mathematics is "applied."

3. *Physics*. Here Plato's *Timaeus* has an interest for us that is unique; since, as Grote remarked, it is "the earliest physical theory that has come down to us in the words of its author." Having elsewhere expounded his philosophy of what always is and has no becoming—the world of ideas or forms—he here attempts to face the problems of the sensible world with all its bewildering multiplicity of

²³ His discovery of the mathematical proportions of musical intervals as exhibited in the length of the strings producing them (1:2 for the octave, 2:3 for the fifth, 3:4 for the fourth) revealed the connection between number and harmony, which he boldly generalized and applied in all directions. Regarded in the light of number not only was there a "music of the spheres" beyond our sensible ken, but the very chaos of sense itself became a cosmos. Shall we with Bacon call this a *superstitio crassa*; or, reminded of Galileo watching the swinging lamp and Newton the falling apple, shall we call it "a flash of genius"?

transient appearances, where as Heraclitus maintained, all is flux. Certainty is no longer possible, but problems are there none the less. *Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung aufs Sein*, said Herbart; and Plato, unable to deny this implication of being in the phenomenal world, as the Eleatics affected to do, casts about to determine wherein this implication or *Hindeutung* lies. What he required was, so to say, a mediating term between *Sein* and *Schein*, the eternal world of ideas (or *entia*) and the endless diversity of the world of fleeting show (or *fientia*). With such a clue the Pythagoreans provided him through mathematics. The sensible world was rational just so far as "God had ordered all things in it by measure and number," as Lotze said.

There was, however, a still older physical theory that bore considerable resemblance to the theory of Plato's *Timaeus*. viz., the atomic theory of Democritus, a man whom Plato never mentions and is said to have detested. According to Democritus the world of the naive man is to be explained by the configurations and motions of innumerable, invisible and unchangeable elements variously aggregated or combined in the sensible objects which are all that he actually perceives.²⁴ This Democritean world, though unmistakably implied in Plato's *Timaeus* was there so smothered by the myths and fanciful conjectures with which it was overlaid that it could never have been taken for genuinely Platonic doctrine, even if Plato himself had treated it quite seriously. In fact, however, he allowed that imaginary world building was at best a pastime; but one permissible enough when dealing with what after all were only probabilities.²⁵ But the rejection by Democritus of all teleology marked off his philosophy as essentially mechanical, that is as materialistic: whereas the cornerstone of all Plato's thinking, the idea of the Good as the

²⁴ These elements or atoms Democritus oddly enough also spoke of as *σχήματα* or *ἰδέαι*.

²⁵ Cf. *Timaeus*, 59c. Jowett's *Plato* ii, 553.

alpha and omega of his cosmos defined his philosophy as through and through spiritualistic in intent. Again, Aristotle's entire rejection of atomism—the chief defect of his physics—and his own strenuous advocacy of teleology, conjoined with Plato's, sufficed to arrest the steady development of mechanical theories till comparatively modern times—to the great detriment of science, it is needless to say.²⁶ Nevertheless, during all this long period Democritean revivals, so to call them, occurred at irregular intervals²⁷ till Newton's *Principia* led back to atomism as one of the problems involved in what he called natural philosophy. But it was a problem which he himself did nothing to solve. He too was content to deal with the *phenomena* of nature according to mechanical, *i. e.*, mathematical principles, leaving philosophy strictly so-called entirely aside.²⁸

4. *Psychology.* The sharp distinction between matter and mind, though now a commonplace, is nevertheless quite a modern acquisition. In the crude anthropomorphism of primitive man, as we have already noted, everything is animated. At the same time, the etymology of such words as *ψυχή*, *anima*, *πνεῦμα*, spirit, clearly shows that mind was regarded as but a subtler form of matter: while objects were personified, subjects were reified. In short, the Cartesian dualism, round which so many of our problems nowadays revolve, was at first unknown.

Even for Aristotle, with whom empirical psychology as a science is supposed to have begun, *ψυχή* answers more nearly to life in a wide sense than to the subjective factor in experience, as now commonly understood. Like the modern biologist, Aristotle contemplates living organisms as advancing from the purely physiological functions of

²⁶ The use of the term *physicus*, which long prevailed to denote not a physicist, but a *medicus* or physician, as we still call one who prescribes "physic," is a curious confirmation of this fact.

²⁷ As chief in this catena Epicurus and Lucretius may be mentioned, and then skipping the darkness of the Middle Ages—Giordano Bruno, Galileo and Descartes. (Cf. Lasswitz, *Geschichte der Atomistik*, 1890.)

²⁸ Cf. *Prim.*, Bk. III, init.

plants at one extreme to the purely intellectual functions of man at the other. Again he differs from the modern materialist only in the use he makes of his *Machtspruch*—as a German might call it—his famous doctrine of the four causes, that is to say. The term $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ for him connotes formal, efficient and final, but *not* material, cause. Insofar as cause implies efficiency, and that surely is its primary meaning, matter is neither a cause nor yet an effect. How what according to Aristotle is in itself so entirely negative, can have any part in the wonderful series of definite transformations which in his *De Anima* it is said to undergo, he appears never to have thought of inquiring. However, so long as the organism is concerned—when, that is to say, sense-data are in any way involved, the account given is physiological or rather, strictly speaking, physical. But on reaching intellection as a faculty, Aristotle's definition of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ gives out; for intellection, he maintained, has no bodily organ. Soul instead of being the form of the living body becomes something—or perhaps we should say is replaced by something—essentially disparate from the living body. So Aristotle seems to end where Descartes began, but only by traversing the wide gulf between matter and mind.

For Plato this rational soul was the real soul and immortal, its temporary connection with the body being not a help but a hindrance. So he perhaps might, on account of his semi-mythical speculations, be called the father of "rational psychology"; but that is not science.

For empirical psychology, on the other hand, which aims at being scientific, he had, as has been well said, only a step-motherly regard.²⁹ His handling of sense-data and whatever is connected with them is more crudely physical than that of Aristotle, as a reference to *Timaeus*, where mainly they are dealt with, would suffice to show.

²⁹ Cf. J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Cognition*, 1906, p. 42.

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5. *Epistemology*. As regards physics and psychology, then, the two main divisions of empirical science, we find that little or no progress was made till they succeeded in liberating themselves from the thralldom of philosophy—to the great advantage of themselves and of it. In the wake of this advance the discussion of questions as to the validity and the limits of knowledge, which had long been debated in a more or less inchoate fashion, at length began to take shape as an independent theory of knowledge or epistemology. This science is often called the propaedeutic of philosophy, since it is now recognized as an indispensable preliminary of philosophy in the stricter sense: the two, however, must obviously be closely connected.

IV. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO HISTORY

History is still frequently and at first was universally regarded as outside the circle of the sciences, and so, as beneath the notice of philosophy. All historical knowledges were merely empirical—confined to “the that” (τὸ ὅτι) but never explaining “the what” (τί ἐστὶ) or “the why” (διότι) of things. “Aristotle therefore calls his empirical work on animals, *History of Animals*; Theophrastus, his empirical work on plants, *History of Plants*; Pliny, his empirical book on nature in general, *Natural History*.”³⁰

Similarly Bacon regarded history, both natural and civil, as non-scientific, because it pertains to memory and not to reason;³¹ and Hobbes, because “such knowledge is but experience, or authority, and not ratiocination.”³² Locke and Hume relegated historical knowledge to the region of unphilosophical probability exposed to the devouring tooth of time, from which certain knowledge “depending on the

³⁰ Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, i. 56.

³¹ *Advancement of Learning*, I, i, i-iii, 5.

³² *Computation or Logic*, i. 8.

agreement or disagreement of ideas" is free.³³ Kant too distinguishes historical knowledge as *cognito ex datis* from rational knowledge as *cognitio ex principiis*, and Schopenhauer contrasts history, confined to particulars, as ever crawling along on the bare ground of experience, while the genuine sciences, embracing universals, soar above it.³⁴ Finally, Dr. Bosanquet has recently told us that "History is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of 'being or trueness'."³⁵

On the one side were principles, reasoning and "law"; on the other particulars, conjecture and "chance"; there we could know and predict, here we must wait and can only rarely foresee. In a word, even when narrating facts and not telling "stories," history was too like the hurly-burly that Schopenhauer had called it, to engage the attention of philosophers. Not till the eighteenth century was nearing its close do we find a philosophy of History beginning to take its place beside the long standing philosophies of Nature and of Mind. But once in being the progress of this latter-day philosophy was rapid: by the middle of the nineteenth century the new "historical method" was already invading and transforming all departments of thought; and before the century closed, a very competent observer pronounced "a belief in this method" to be "the most widely and strongly entertained philosophical conviction" of the day.³⁶

"Nature's routine," its perfection viewed statically as a closed mechanism, has had in fact to yield in importance to the continual "novelty" which the world viewed historically presents. Here it is the open possibilities for development which *der Trieb der Perfectibilität*, the striving for betterment, as Hegel called it, involves, that are being continu-

³³ Locke, *Essay* IV, xv.; Hume, *Treatise* I, iii, 13.

³⁴ *Welt als Wille u. s. w.*, Bd., ii, ch. 38.

³⁵ *Individuality and Value*, 1912, p. 78.

³⁶ Cf. H. Sidgwick on the Historical Method, *Mind*, 1886, p. 203.

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ally realized.³⁷ In short, what history presents is what we nowadays call *epigenesis*, or creative synthesis. So far then as the historical extends, not chance indeed but certainly contingency, enters into the very heart of things—the contingency, that is to say, of the actions of one free agent, relatively to those of others, all alike bent on self-conservation and animated by some idea of the Good. Here first we reach the standpoint whence at length we can see that the world has a meaning which we can understand; whereas from the standpoint of a philosophy of Nature alone it has none: only when regarded as subservient to mind does Nature become intelligible. Here then—and this above all, it is important to remember—the *entia* are not Platonic ideas but living agents, and the *fientia* are not primarily phenomena, but the actual deeds of such agents. How far this historical domain extends, we have no means of empirically deciding. It remains an open question whether there are any *entia* devoid all together of that striving which characterizes life. This is one side of the things which philosophy has to consider.

JAMES WARD.

³⁷ Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, 1837, p. 51.

WARD AS A PSYCHOLOGIST

INTRODUCTORY

WARD has dealt with all the main problems of general Psychology; and he has thrown fresh light on every one of them. To do justice to his work it would be necessary to follow him carefully and critically in his treatment of each of these special topics. This is a task which ought certainly to be undertaken soon by some enlightened critic. I hold it to be especially needful, because I am convinced that there is much that is of permanent value in Ward's detailed work which has not yet been assimilated and utilized by others.¹ But within my present limits I cannot attempt anything of the sort. I must confine myself to his general *Psychological Principles*, to the central scheme which gives so remarkable a unity and coherence to his whole procedure.

There are some psychologists of the present day for whom this central scheme is a stumbling block on the threshold which more or less bars understanding and appreciation of Ward's work as a whole. The present article will have fulfilled its purpose if it helps to remove or mitigate difficulties of this sort—at least for those who are not dogmatically prepossessed with the view that Psychology must be merely a special development or application of biology or physiology or any other physical science.

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THE DISTINCTIVE AIM OF PSYCHOLOGY

According to Ward the psychologist is always concerned with some concrete individual experient—"man, mouse or monkey"—who feels, knows, and is active in the way of attending, striving and willing. It is the exclusive business of psychology "to analyze and trace the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual"²—the psychological subject. The very being of such an individual experient consists in being cognitive, in being active and in being pleased or the reverse. It is therefore with the knowing, feeling, and striving of the psychological subject that the psychologist is primarily concerned. If he could deal with these alone without reference to anything else, they would by themselves constitute the whole subject matter of his science. But this is essentially impossible. It is even more impossible than it is for the biologist to treat of living organisms without taking account of environing conditions, e. g., food and air. To know is to know something: action presupposes not only a real being which acts but a real being which is acted on and reacts; in feeling we are aware of something as agreeable or disagreeable. Thus psychology no less than common sense and the physical sciences is bound to take account of the objective world. But it considers this world from a standpoint peculiarly its own. The term "objective" tends to be ambiguous—it has two meanings or rather two sides to its meaning, which, though they are mutually complementary, may be and have been each of them one-sidedly emphasized to the exclusion of the other.

² *Psychological Principles*, p. 104.

In its most familiar use at the present day, "objective" means what really is in contrast to what appears, but does not appear as it really is. In this sense, the primary qualities of matter have been held to be objective and the secondary to be mere subjective appearances. One-sided emphasis of this meaning easily leads to a second step, in which appearance is not only distinguished from reality but divided from it. "Objective" is taken to mean what really exists independently of its appearing truly or falsely, obscurely or distinctly, to any mind, so that it would have been equally objective if there had been no such thing as mind at all. Whether or not there is any such reality, to call it an object or objective is to do violence to the use of the word object in ordinary language. For common sense, an object is always some one's object: it is the object of some one's attention, desire or aversion, hope or fear, pursuit, or avoidance, etc. It is perceived or thought of by some one; in some way it appears or is presented to them. It may not indeed appear as it "objectively" is. To understand this we must recognize that, to be an object at all is to appear in some fashion to someone, yet the object is not simply identical with its appearance. It is rather that which appears. Hence when it does not appear as it really is, we may say that the appearance is not true to the real nature of the object, i. e., is not "objective."³

What Ward means by object is fundamentally the same. He starts from Common-Sense. "Wherever experience is inferred, Common Sense is right in positing a real agent answering to what we know as Self and interacting with another reality which we know as the World." But the object, so concerned, has two aspects. It is (1) something real and really distinct from the self or any modification

³ Though this use of "objective" is explicable it should be noticed that it is not the original meaning of the word. "Objective" existence in the schoolmen and in Descartes is existence in a mind as distinguished from formal or actual existence.

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of the self: but, in order to be an object, it must (2) appear or be presented to a knowing, willing, and feeling subject. There are therefore two ways in which it may be considered according as our leading interest is in the one aspect of its being or in the other. Wherever the interest is not psychological it is directed to objects as these really are; we seek to make appearance more true and adequate, or at least safer guides to efficient action. On the contrary, psychological interest centers in the fact of appearing as such. The psychologist is concerned with the objective world as it is variously presented to different individuals, men or animals, and variously presented to the same individual in different stages and phases of his life history. Ward uses the general term "presentation" to indicate that objects are considered from this point of view. But a presentation is for him always the real object considered as it appears to this or that individual subject. He is therefore untouched by the criticism implied in Professor Strong's epigram: "When I present a lady with a bouquet of flowers, I do not present her with the presentation of the flowers, but only with the flowers."⁴ Ward would agree; but he would still insist there is a vital difference between considering the flowers as, e. g., botanical specimens and considering them as a present to a lady. It is only from the second point of view that we have to take account of how the lady as an individual subject is affected by them and how she reacts. It is only from this point of view that the terms present and presentation are properly applicable.

Objects, as presented to an individual subject, undergo changes and enter into relations with each other of which they are otherwise incapable. Inasmuch as they are his objects they have a history which is inseparably one with his history and cannot belong to them independently of him

⁴ *The Origin of Consciousness*, p. 37. Quoted by Prof. Dawes Hicks to reinforce a criticism of his own. I do not know whether Strong himself meant to refer to Ward.

as their owner. In asserting that "this house is built of brick," I assert what might be true if I had never existed. It is otherwise if I asserted that "this house reminds me of my home." Here there is a "multiple relation" which essentially involves not merely "this house" and "another house," but also my mind. It is therefore distinctively a psychological fact. So in general are retention, reproduction, assimilation, association, etc. Objects are retained, reproduced, assimilated, associated; but only inasmuch as they are someone's objects—so that what occurs to them occurs to him. Conversely also, "whatever admits of psychical reproduction and association" may be regarded as "an object presented to a subject."⁵ From this point of view, different kinds of objects have been distinguished as "sensations, movements, percepts, images, intuitions, concepts, notions."⁶ All of these are (1) "more or less attended to and (2) can be variously combined together and reproduced." Ward comprehends all of them under the common term *presentation*.

In Locke, Descartes, and other writers, the term idea was similarly used, but with a very important difference. In them the term idea is initially connected with a theory of knowledge, which not only distinguishes but divides appearances from the reality which appears. So ideas for them are subjective modifications or mere contents of consciousness, and, as such, contrasted with a real existence which they are supposed to represent. The impossibility of finding any satisfactory bridge between such ideas and real existence then leads naturally, as in the transition from Locke to Berkeley, to subjective idealism, for which the distinction between a real existence and appearance to an individual subject is lost and *esse* is identified with *percipi*. Now those who held this "epistemological" doctrine, finding an impasse in other directions, were driven,

⁵ *Psychological Principles*, p. 48.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

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through sheer helplessness, to pursue psychological inquiries and, in large measure, to substitute psychology for philosophy. Hence, "however surely their philosophy was foredoomed to failure, there is no denying a steady psychological advance as we pass from Locke to Hume and his modern representatives."⁷

Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were driven, owing to their philosophical preconceptions, to adopt the standpoint proper for psychology. It by no means follows that the psychologist, as such, is bound to accept their philosophical doctrine or even to use it as a working hypothesis. Certainly Ward does neither: otherwise his fundamental view of subject and object as two real factors really interacting with each other would be impossible. Such criticism as Mr. Pritchard's⁸ is therefore based on sheer misunderstanding. When Ward asserts that "of all the facts with which he deals the psychologist may truly say that their *esse* is *percipi*, in so far as such facts are facts of presentation,"⁹ it is plain that the statement is essentially qualified by the last clause which I have italicised. It is as if one should say that for an arithmetician the *esse* of things is to be numerable, or that for an election-candidate the *esse* of men and women is to be voters.

I am, however, far from denying that there are difficulties in Ward's position which make misunderstanding excusable. What these are, and how far they can be met, I shall presently consider. But first I must say more about the "standpoint proper for psychology."

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁸ *Mind*, N. S. XVI. Dawes Hicks partly corrects this misunderstanding (*Mind*, N. S., p. 117). But he himself, as I shall point out later, is not free from it.

⁹ Italics mine.

THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBJECT

There is a fertile source of psychological error, named by James "the psychologist's fallacy," which had previously been defined by Ward as "a confusion between the standpoint of a given experience and the standpoint of its exposition."¹⁰ This fallacy has two forms, one direct and the other inverse. In the first, the psychologist unguardedly transfers to the psychological subject knowledge and experience which belong not to it, but to himself. This is exemplified by any attempt to substitute for a psychological treatment of sensation an account of the physiological conditions under which it occurs. The properly psychological question is what sensations are for the individual who experiences them; but for him they are not initially the effect or sequel of a train of antecedent events; they are primary beginnings. They are "what comes first in the individual's experience and is there simply and positively real." Substituting the physiological for this psychological standpoint leads to the view that sensations are modifications of the subject or, at any rate, that they are, like their nervous correlates, inside the body. It then becomes a problem admitting of no solution how the psychological subject can ever know the world outside him and his own body as part of it. Physiology itself therefore ought to be impossible and the physiologist in substituting his own standpoint for that of psychology has committed logical suicide. It is by no means implied that physiological data and conceptions are not in any way useful in psychology. On the contrary, they are very useful indeed. To

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

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deny this is to fall into the inverse form of the psychologist's fallacy, which arises in an uncritical attempt to avoid the direct form. The exclusive business of the psychologist is to give a coherent and truthful account of "the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual." But there is an essential difference between this experience itself and what the psychologist knows and seeks to know about it. His standpoint and outlook cannot be identical with those of the individual he is studying. Otherwise, in order to study a baby's mind he must himself become a baby and so cease to be a psychologist. No data, conceptions, distinctions, hypotheses are illegitimate in psychology, if and so far as they help relevantly to answer properly psychological questions.

It is only at an advanced stage of mental development that the intensity, quality, and extensity of sensations are distinguished from each other. None the less the psychologist is justified in making the analysis which his psychological subject does not make. He is justified, because the sensations as immediately experienced really have this sort of complexity. Psychological analysis is by no means coincident with psychical analysis.¹¹ According to Ward the same fallacy is committed by those who deny that the contrast of subject and of object is primordial, on the ground that the two are not distinguished by the primitive mind. Because "a subject whose presentations were all sensations would know nothing of the difference between subject and object" it is urged that no such difference would be there.¹² Ward replies that though "we are bound to describe an infant's state of mind truthfully, that is no reason for abandoning terms which have no counterpart in his consciousness, when these terms are only used to depict that consciousness as it is."

¹¹ "By *psychological* analysis we mean such analysis as the psychological observer can reflectively make, by *psychical* analysis only such analysis as is possible in the immediate experience of the subject observed." *Ibid.*, p. 105 note.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Professor Dawes Hicks is unconvinced by this reasoning.¹³ I presume that according to him the difference as well as the recognition of it is of such a nature that it cannot be primordial. "For my part," he says, "I find it well nigh impossible to assign any meaning to the phrase 'awareness of an object' which does not involve applying to that of which there is awareness a number of predicates—e. g., independence of the act of apprehending—that even in their crudest forms must obviously be altogether beyond the range of the primitive mind." This seems to miss the point at issue. The primitive mind does not apply the predicate. The individual does not initially say to itself: "What I am now aware of may exist when I cease to be aware of it." None the less if what he perceives is such for him that, when due motive and occasion arise, he can regard it as persisting in the intervals of perception and if he can never come to regard pleasure or pain as persisting when they are not felt, we may truly say that from the outset there is a difference for psychological, though not for psychical, analysis between subjective feeling and presented object.

I would add that the most primitive distinction between self and not-self takes the form of a rudimentary distinction between the individual's own body and other things. It must be a very primitive stage of development, indeed, in which this distinction is not apprehended at all. As for a supposed stage in which there is not only no distinction but no experienced difference between the embodied self and its environment, I would not deny that this is abstractly possible. But there is no evidence that it ever exists. Further, if it did exist, there would be an absolute breach of psychological continuity between it and the higher stage at which the difference emerges. Thus the difference would after all be primordial in the sense of

¹³ *Mind*, N. S., 117, pp. 16-17.

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PLASTICITY OF THE PRESENTATION CONTINUUM

There is much in Ward's account of the development of individual experience which naturally suggests that he regards presentations as a *tertium quid*, having a separate existence of their own, intervening between the knowing mind and the real world. I am convinced that this is a misunderstanding. But it is one from which, until recently, I was not myself free. I am, therefore, not surprised that even so careful a student of Ward as Dawes Hicks also shares it.

As Dawes Hicks has clearly shown, the question is one which vitally concerns psychology. The psychologist is not indeed bound to have a theory of knowledge which will at all points stand the test of philosophical criticism. It would be rash to assert that any philosopher is in possession of such a theory. But the psychologist must at least have a view which really works in his own undertaking. He sets out to trace the development of the knowledge of the world as it now is for common sense and science. He therefore stultifies his whole procedure if he assumes that the mind cannot apprehend this world and what it contains, but is throughout dealing with an intervening veil. Does Ward really make this suicidal assumption?

All depends on the view taken of sensation as "what comes first, immediately, and alone, in the individual's experience"¹⁵ and answers to reality in the primary sense of

¹⁴ Dawes Hicks, of course, regards sense-experience if it is not a presented object and a *fortiori* does not consist in those discriminated features of an object which he calls apprehended content? Is it the *tertium quid* which he abhors?

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

the term. If I am right, this means (1) that in sense-experience a real existence directly appears to the individual; (2) that it need not and initially does not appear as it really is;¹⁶ (3) that in the development of knowledge it comes to appear more and more truly and adequately;¹⁷ (4) that sensuous appearance or presentation has no distinct existence of its own as a "subjective modification" or *tertium quid*; it is always the reality itself immediately appearing.

How is this view to be reconciled with Ward's account of the development of knowledge as throughout dependent on the interaction of the *real* subject with its *real* object and more especially with the part which he assigns to mere attention in the process? He extends the term Attention to cover both theoretical and practical activity. What is distinctive of practical activity is that Attention is in it directed to "motor presentations" which are thereby translated into actually experienced movements of the body, producing change in its environment. This happens, for instance, when I actually dissect a flower. Now Ward seems to hold as a fundamental principle, that we also produce objective change, though in a very different way, when, by attentively contemplating a strange flower, we gain a more distinct and detailed apprehension of its partial features. On the ordinary view of common sense, we merely distinguish differences which pre-exist; and if in attending we altered the object of attention we should so far defeat our purpose. Ward's view seems essentially opposed to this. According to him there is not merely discrimination of pre-existing differences; new differences actually emerge, through the interaction of subject and object. What was at the outset a relatively vague total presentation is gradually transformed into a definite pat-

¹⁶ If I were dealing with ultimate philosophical problems, I should press the question how any thing can appear immediately and yet not appear as it is.

¹⁷ According to Ward the final truth is that it is really a system of monads.

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tern. The process is threefold: (1) There is a partial modification of the relatively vague and blurred whole whereby it becomes more definitely diversified. This is Differentiation. (2) Previous differentiation persists; this is Retentiveness. (3) The persisting modifications are further modified so that there is progressive increase in complexity, comparable to "the advance from the egg to the chicken." This is Assimilation—the growth of new differences out of old. Differentiation, retentiveness, and assimilation taken together constitute what Ward calls "plasticity." Ward describes the whole development of knowledge—apart, at least, from inter-subjective intercourse—as proceeding through progressive changes in a plastic presentational "Continuum" or tissue. Further the process throughout is an interaction of subject and object in which the action of the subject in attending is the formative agency. In attending, the subject *alters* its object: it makes, instead of merely apprehending differences. But, as Dawes Hicks rightly insists, in merely attending to a flower we do not by any action of ours generate the differences between stamens, pistil, etc. If, therefore, the presentation of the flower is plastic, this presentation must have an existence of its own separate from that of the flower, which is not plastic. Differentiation, assimilation, and retention, are not processes which take place in the flower.

Ward, for purposes of exposition, conceives mental development "beginning at the lowest level of life and advancing continuously up to the level of man"¹⁸ as taking place in the life history of a single imaginary individual. This individual has throughout one and the same sensorimotor presentation continuum which is always in some degree qualitatively diversified and always possesses the fundamental characters of intensity, extensity, and protensity. But at the outset definite and specialized complex-

ity is at a minimum both on the sensory and motor side. On the motor side, there is "original diffused mobility, which is little besides emotional expression"¹⁹—i. e., immediate expression of pleasure or pain. This motor continuum becomes gradually differentiated into comparatively distinct movements which are combined and co-ordinated in more and more special ways in adaptation to environing conditions. What especially interests us here is that, according to Ward, sense experience develops in just the same way. The primitive presentation-continuum approximates in its nature to what we now experience as organic sensation; external stimuli of various kinds modify this in a way corresponding "very closely to what is called the general vital action of contact, light, heat, etc., as distinct from the action of these stimuli on specially differentiated sensory apparatus."²⁰ It is only through a long process that the specific qualities which we now experience as light and color, sound, touch, taste, and smell, emerge from the primitive background of "general" sensibility. Again, within each of these special modes of sentience there is further differentiation, generating, e. g., the variety of specific colors and sounds. The whole process whereby the presentational continuum becomes more diversified and complex is essentially interaction of a real self with a real not-self; and the directive and formative agency is throughout Attention. But there is not transformation of the real world corresponding to this transformation of the sensori-motor continuum. However differently the environment of an oyster may appear to the oyster itself and to a human observer, it is still the same environment. It would seem to follow inevitably that the presentational continuum, which is plastic, cannot be any part of the real world which is not correspondingly plastic. If we attend

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Ph. 74-75.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50; Cf. Ph. 52-53.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

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to presentations we do not attend to things. Appearance and reality seem to fall apart as distinct existences. This argument seems strengthened when we consider the correlation of psychological and biological development. Ward, following irresistible biological evidence, holds that the differentiation of the presentation continuum is not only analogous to, but strictly correlated and parallel with the progressive differentiation of the sense organs and nervous system. "Wherever there is psychical plasticity, there is also neural plasticity."²¹ But there is no such correlation and correspondence between nervous changes within the living bodies of men and animals on the one hand, and changes in their environment on the other. Ward, by his free use of biological data seems compelled to be false to the psychological standpoint from which he started.

The explanation is to be found in his view of the connection of body and mind. This is most compactly expressed in the saying which he quotes from Leibniz: "the point of view of the monad is its body." The reference as he proceeds to explain "is not to the physical aspect of the organism. What is meant is the psychical or 'intentional' aspect of the body as the medium of intercourse with the objective world, its natural and social environment."²² To explain this position in the form in which Ward states it, we must refer to his metaphysical monadism, and especially to the points in which this agrees, and disagrees, with that of Leibniz. They agree in holding that what really exists as distinguished from its sensuous appearance is, ultimately, a system of monads. Each monad mirrors this real world differently according to its distinctive place in the whole system; and it does so primarily through its sense experience and in terms of sense experience. Each then has its own special "point of view" or special "perspective." The

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 428.

word "mirrors" and the word "perspective" are for both Leibniz and Ward only metaphorical. But they interpret this figurative language in radically different ways. Both indeed emphatically deny that sense-experience is an effect produced in each monad by interaction with others. Here, however, agreement ceases. According to Leibniz each develops according to the law of its own being without any sort of causal relation to the others. The relation between them in virtue of which each internally represents the whole system is one of correspondence and co-variation presupposing a pre-established harmony. According to Ward the monads appear to each other *immediately* by way of sense-experience, although they do not sensibly appear as they really are but only as phenomena,²³ yet there is no *tertium quid* in the way of ideas conceived as vicariously representing their objects. What we apprehend phenomenally as the body of a man or animal is a group of monads related in a peculiarly intimate way to a central monad, the human or animal mind. The relation is such that the rest of the world sensibly appears to this central individual in a manner and an order determined and limited by its appearance to the monads of the body. To speak metaphorically, it is as if the central monad gathered into focus the scattered rays reaching it through the body monads, and were otherwise without communication with the world beyond. Hence, Ward agrees with Leibniz in asserting that "a soul without a body would be a deserter from the general order" and that the point of view of a monad is its body.

This general theory of sensible appearances is by no means inseparable from the metaphysical doctrine with which it is intertwined in Ward. We have only to recognize what in any case can hardly be denied, that the living

²³ Here the contrast between things as they are in themselves and things as they sensibly appear is startling; and it is not smoothed over for Ward as it is for Leibniz by the view that sense is confused thought.

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body in its relation to mental process²⁴ has a function which is hidden from us when we consider it merely as a physical phenomenon. This being understood the essential points are: (1) that in sense-experience the real world appears directly without any intervening *tertium quid*; (2) that none the less it appears differently to different individuals and to the same individual in different stages and phases of his development; (3) that the factor which determines how it shall appear is the particular constitution of the bodily organism and the changes which occur within it. So formulated, the general position might be accepted, *e. g.*, by Mr. Alexander. According to him sensible appearance differs from what really exists only through the processes of "selection" and distortion. But selection and distortion are throughout conditioned by the body.

We can now understand how it is that Ward regards Attention as always involving real interaction between subject and object. The subject acts directly on its own body just as it does in practical activity. But the resulting adaptation of the sense-organs and modifications of the neural process are not merely physical phenomena. They have also an "intentional" aspect. Hence they determine changes in the way in which other things appear to the subject. They alter the objects attended to as presentations to the individual if they alter them in no other respect. Hence they alter the way in which the subject is agreeably and disagreeably affected by presented objects and so determine its practical activity. It is from this point of view that the whole doctrine of the plasticity of the presentation continuum has to be interpreted.

The true drift of this doctrine comes most clearly to light in the very interesting treatment of psychological heredity in Chapters XVII and XVIII of the *Principles*. The constitution of the presentational continuum or psy-

²⁴ What Ward calls "its intentional or Psychical aspect."

choplasm is there treated as something which is inherited together with the constitution of the body. In neither case is there literal transference from one generation to another. The parent hands over to his offspring neither his own body nor his own mind. What is inherited is always "a likeness to themselves *said* to be bequeathed by forbears to their descendants. The plain fact is simply that like begets like."²⁵ The mental likeness is the counterpart and correlate of bodily likeness, when the body is considered in its "intentional" aspect. This inherited *Anlage*, as Ward calls it, not only directly preconditions the affective and active self by determining the range and character of organic sensibility and of motor capacity; it also predetermines the way in which the surrounding world shall be sensibly presented. The *Anlage* of this or that individual has a long ancestral history behind it in which, according to Ward, subjective activity plays at every stage, an indispensable part. The living body is "continuous with other such bodies that were in like manner *angelegt* and each in turn further differentiated by the subject whom it invested." This influence of the mind over the body is exerted at every step through the entire line of the individual's descent from some primaeval protozoan to his own immediate forbears.²⁶

SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING

The preceding account of the development of knowledge is admitted by Ward to be essentially incomplete. It consists, as we have seen, in a process whereby a presentation continuum which is primarily sensori-motor is progressively modified so as to become more complex and differ-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

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entiated. But the presentation continuum or "psychoplasm" of each individual is his own private and incommunicable property. As "the point of view of the monad is its body," each individual will have his own particular presentation-continuum just as he has his own particular body related in particular ways, to its environment. According as the bodies of different individuals are similar or dissimilar, the real world which they apprehend will wear a correspondingly similar or dissimilar appearance to each. "A gannet's mind possessed of a philosopher, if such a conceit may be allowed, would certainly afford its tenant very different spatial experiences from those he might share if he took up his quarters in a mole."²⁷ At our present level such limitations have been transcended. The individual has overleaped his own shadow. The world as now conceived by common sense and science approximates in its character to the world as it might appear to a disembodied subject, to whom all its parts would be equally and in like manner present. Such a subject would, so to speak, look down on what is particular and peculiar in the diverse individual experiences of men and animals, would explain this as due to their bodily organization and circumstances, and in so explaining would discount it as irrelevant to the nature of things as apprehended from his superior and more comprehensive standpoint. This universal outlook characterizes common sense and in a still higher degree science. How is it reached? We cannot account for it merely through progressive differentiation of an original sensory-motor continuum. There must be another factor. This, according to Ward, is just the common sense in which human individuals participate. It is the outcome of that complex social intercourse which language makes possible. Through language "each several mind may transcend its own limits and share the minds of others." The mental development of each is still exclusively a develop-

ment within his own life history. But "the materials for this development no longer consist of nothing but presentations elaborated by a single mind." A transparent and responsive world of minds is added to the dead opaqueness of external things.²⁶

It is only as a result of such intersubjective intercourse that "when ten men see the sun or moon" it may, in spite of differences in its sensible appearance to each, be apprehended by all of them as one and the same in its existence and nature. For all, it has, *e. g.*, individually the same shape and size and position in space. This is so inasmuch as space and these spatial characters are conceived not merely perceived; and are conceived only as the outcome of a process in which many individuals compare their experiences and gradually correlate them in a more and more coherent system. The individual thus comes to apprehend the world from what has been called a "trans-subjective" standpoint as contrasted with the "immediacy and immanence with which all experience begins."

But even at this level the common object is still a phenomenon; it is still ultimately conceived in terms of sensible appearance, however much this may be elaborated by intersubjective intercourse. Ward, therefore, denies that we are justified in assuming the world *as it thus appears*, with its characters of extension, shape, etc., to say nothing of color or sound, to exist *per se* independently of its appearance to any subject. It is indeed a natural fallacy to conclude that because a phenomenal object, as such, is independent of this or that individual experient, it is therefore independent of all collectively. But such reasoning "is about on a par with maintaining that the British House of Commons is an estate of the realm independent of each

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 144. For further illustration and special reference to space, see the context of this passage.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 286 note.

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individual member, and that therefore it might be addressed from the throne, for instance, though there were no members."²⁹

Ward's position here is easy to misunderstand: and he has not sufficiently guarded himself against misunderstanding. He does not, as I interpret him, mean to say that for individual, as contrasted with trans-subjective experience, the *esse* of things is *percipi*, so that actual existence consists simply in actual appearance and nothing beyond this. On this view, it would be impossible for the individual to apprehend things as continuing to exist during the intervals of perception. But Ward finds no such difficulty at this point as troubled Berkeley. "As we have existed—or more exactly, as the body has been continuously presented—during the interval between two encounters with some other recognized body, so this comes to be regarded as having continuously existed during its absence from us." It is true that, according to Ward, this step is taken only at a stage in which, through the experience of resisted effort we apprehend something extended as exerting a counter effort, and therefore as actively occupying space. But such solidity, or space-occupancy, which is itself incompatible with the Berkeleyan view, is apprehended at the level of individual perception. Neither the apprehension of solidity nor that of persistence presupposes the "universal experience," which arises through intersubjective intercourse.

What Ward takes to be absent in merely individual experience and present in universal experience is the distinction between true and false appearance, between that which is and that which seems. "‘It shines, it moves’ not ‘it appears to shine, it appears to move’ would be the language of an individual percipient."³⁰

²⁹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 171.

³⁰ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 166. It should be remembered that even true as distinguished from illusory appearance is still only phenomenal.

Ward has certainly done a great service by his massive insistence on the essential importance of social intercourse as giving rise to the human view of the world, as it appears to common sense and science, in contrast to the limitations of the animal mind. What I, in agreement with other critics, find unsatisfactory is the account given of the relation of this trans-subjective stage to the previous course of mental development. Ward himself maintains that the transition is continuous in a way which is psychologically traceable; and he holds that in tracing it he has shown the continuity of sense-knowledge and thought knowledge. Now it seems to me that he does not and cannot show such continuity without presupposing what he ought to account for—without presupposing that something is thought of which does not immediately appear in sense experience.

His critics urged the question—"How, if every subject is confined to his own unique experience, does this inter-subjective intercourse ever arise?"³¹ He answers that "as the sensori-motor adjustments of the organism to its environment—*generally*—advance in complexity and range, there is a concomitant advance in the variety and intimacy of its relations—*specially*—with individuals of its own kind."³² "When its (bodily) self has become an object, the objects which resemble it become other selves or ejects." Here the essential point seems to be missed. Ward takes for granted as a matter of course that the other bodies like its own will be apprehended by the individual as embodiments of other selves like its own. I admit that, *apart from special theories*, this is a matter of course. The question is whether it is so on Ward's view. Up to this point cognitive advance has been supposed to consist merely in the progressive differentiation of an original sensori-motor continuum. The mere increase in the complexity of this original datum cannot alter its fundamental character any

³¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 33.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

more than an organism can be so differentiated as to cease to be protoplasm. But the sensations experienced by A cannot, *as such*, appear to B as part of the content of his own sense-experience; they are distinguished from his own as being another's. The same holds for A's awareness of B's feelings and strivings. A thinks of, but does not immediately experience, the experience of B. Thought is involved which transcends the immanence and immediacy of sense, abstractly considered. The thought is inseparably blended with sense-presentation and, so to speak, embedded in it. None the less it cannot be accounted for by any differentiation however complex of an original presentation continuum which is supposed to be merely sensorimotor.

If thought first arises after previous stages which can be accounted for without it, it emerges as a radically new faculty: there is a breach of continuity. But if we examine critically Ward's treatment of the development of the individual percipient prior to the beginning of the trans-subjective stage, we find that it already involves in manifold ways thought as well as sense. To apprehend an object as persisting when it is no longer perceived is to think of existence which is not sensibly presented. In discussing perceptual recognition, Ward lays exclusive stress on the familiarity and the practical facility which arise through attention to impressions frequently repeated in a similar way. What Ward has to say here is in itself true and very important. But such familiarity and facility cannot be substituted for, but rather presuppose, that mental attitude which is expressed in language by "another" or "another such." They cannot be substituted for what Ward himself calls "qualitative identification" and treats as more primitive than the apprehension of objects as persisting when not perceived. I might go on to examine from the same point of view Ward's treatment of spatial and temporal

perception and of images as ideas. My space is too limited for this. I shall therefore proceed at once to urge that thought, as I have defined it, is essential to subjective activity—to what Ward calls Attention and Conation.

Ward himself, when at an advanced stage of his work he comes to treat of thought at the trans-subjective level, recognizes that he is not dealing with something radically novel but with a special development of a feature of mental life which was present even in its rudimentary beginnings. He defines thinking as "finding an ax that is b ."³³ It is "always a search for something more or less vaguely pre-conceived, for a clue which will be known when it is found by helping to satisfy certain conditions." He then proceeds: "there is a continuous development from the extreme of mere blind trial and error—where the only clue is 'anything, anything, only not this' towards an opposite extreme where a crucial disjunction 'either . . . or' can be precisely formulated."³⁴ On this I would remark that the development is not continuous if we suppose that "trial and error" are at the outset merely blind. If this were so, there would be trial and error only in a metaphorical sense and from the point of view of an onlooker. What is sought must be predetermined for the psychological subject himself as a change in the given situation in those respects in which this situation is felt as unsatisfying. This implies that something is thought that is not given in actual sense-experience. The immediacy of sense is so far transcended.³⁵ If, on the other hand, we begin in chronological order with an experience which is absolutely blind,

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

³⁵ Ward says in a note (p. 295) that "at the lowest sensory level there is nothing answering to b in the formula an " ax which is b "; "there is just a subjective state, the pleasure of success and no more." But the subject is dealing with a concrete and specific situation, and b is determined as some relevant change in this. Of course, he does not himself analyze his experience as the psychologist analyzes. In dealing with questions of this sort, we must constantly bear in mind the distinction between psychical and psychological analysis.

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there is a breach of continuity between this and even the most rudimentary thought. If we use the word Conation for both stages, we are using it in radically different senses.

What has been said of practical conation holds also for attention in its theoretical aspect. What is here sought is more complete apprehension of an object as initially given or presupposed. The tendency is to make the object more distinct and to relate it to its context,—to develop it more fully in consciousness. Even in the most primitive stages of the process there must be some inarticulate counterpart of the question which we should formulate as: What? or What next? or What more?

The view which emerges from such considerations is that so far as mental development can be regarded as continuous, as Ward takes it to be, sense and thought must from the outset inseparably interpenetrate, so as to vary concomitantly and develop *pari passu*. Sense without thought would be, as Kant says, blind, and could not be properly called Knowledge at all. Thought without sense could not exist because there would be nothing to determine its object.

How far Ward, in the end, would agree or disagree with this view, I find it hard to decide. In the passage which I have just quoted he seems largely to agree. But the passage occurs only after he has fully treated of individual experience apart from intersubjective intercourse. In this earlier part of his work he neither expressly states the general principle nor consistently takes it for granted. On the contrary, he tends throughout to conceive the whole development as consisting merely in progressive modification of a sensori-motor continuum. The dominance of this conception makes his treatment of special problems more or less one-sided. What he has positively to say on the sensori-motor aspect of mental process remains, in the main,

as true and valuable as it is original. But his comparative neglect of the other equally essential aspect creates difficulties which form a stumbling block to some readers.³⁶

In dealing with spatial perception, the factors and processes which he regards as fundamentally important are really operative and really essential. But, conceived as he explicitly conceives them, they account only for an increasingly complex and definite pattern within the sensorimotor continuum. They cannot therefore, of themselves, result in what is ordinarily understood by spatial perception, in which extension and local relations are apprehended as characterizing something capable of existing and persisting independently of changes in sense-experience, however complex these may be. Ward cannot, indeed, refer such perception wholly to the trans-subjective stage. The contrary is implied at least in his account of projection and space occupancy. But how he can legitimately reach this view on the assumptions from which alone he explicitly starts, remains obscure.

In discussing temporal perception, Ward insists throughout that "it is a long step from a succession of presentations to awareness of succession."³⁷ It is necessary to awareness of *a* as before *b* and *c* as after *b*, that *a*, *b*, and *c* shall be simultaneously presented. On the other hand "to ask which is temporarily first among a number of simultaneous presentations is unmeaning."³⁸ It seems to follow that succession cannot be known at all if we mean by presentations merely modifications of the sensory continuum. This is not, however, Ward's view. The difficulty is, he holds, fatal to the possibility of any awareness of succession prior to the stage in which trains of free images emerge. But at this stage it is overcome. It is so "because

³⁶ More especially to those who like Mr. Pritchard are inclined to identify Psychology with subjective idealism.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

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with each distinct representation *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, there is probably connected some trace of the movement of attention of which we are aware in passing from one presentation to another." He calls such residual movements of attention temporal signs. But such temporal signs, even if we admit their existence, are present experiences in the same way as images are. They are not themselves thoughts of experiences which are *no more* or *not yet* actually experienced. Thus the original difficulty recurs. What seems to hide this from Ward and his readers is his use of the words "representation" and "idea" as interchangeable with "image." An image is, according to him, a special and relatively late differentiation or outgrowth of the sensory continuum. In calling it a representation it seems to be further implied that the subject represents something else, *e. g.*, a past or future impression by means of it. This again implies that a present modification of the sensory continuum, though it cannot *be*, may none the less determine the thought of what precedes and follows it. But once this is presupposed, there is no good ground for denying an inarticulate awareness of time transcendence of *no more* and *not yet*—long before the stage of free images is reached. Ward himself asserts that the experience of change is ultimate,⁸⁰ but how can there be an experience of change which is not an experience of transition. It may be said that the transition may be blindly experienced, without being known. I reply that this can hardly hold good for the passage from conation to what, for the subject himself, is fulfillment or disappointment, or for the change in the appearance of an object in successive phase of the process of attending to it. The dog in the fable who jumped at the bit of meat reflected in the water was surely aware of a transition. If Ward had started with a rudimentary time perception, what he had to say about its later stages

⁸⁰ P., p. 212.

would have retained its full value and would have gained in clearness and cogency. Resisting a strong temptation to pursue this topic in further detail, I may sum up as follows. It is misleading to speak, as Ward does, of a continuous development from sense knowledge to thought knowledge. All knowledge and all development of knowledge involves both thought and sense in inseparable unity. A blind sense experience is not knowledge at all and could not become so by any process, however continuous, of differentiation and integration. It is especially important to keep this in view in discussing Ward's view of the nature of the self or "pure ego."

THE PURE EGO AS ACTIVE AND FEELING SUBJECT

"By pure ego or subject," says Ward, "it is proposed to denote the simple fact that everything experienced is referred to a self experiencing."⁴⁰ But, on further examination, this fact turns out to be anything but simple, if by simple we mean easy to understand. The pure ego, as that which knows, feels pleasantly and unpleasantly and attends, is regarded as a distinct existence, set over against the objective world as presented to it. It is a distinct agent, operating on the presentations which confront it and being in turn agreeably or disagreeably affected by these. It has therefore that relative independence which is implied in interaction. To conceive it aright we must uncompromisingly discriminate, without separating it, from each and all of the objects which it knows, to which it attends, and by which it is consequently affected. How then can it be known at all, seeing that in becoming known, it must become an object and so cease to be pure subject. This is a

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

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difficulty to which Ward is keenly alive. He meets it in principle by saying that though the pure self cannot be known directly yet, in an assignable and traceable way, we may indirectly know of it as implied in the existence of presented objects. But such knowledge is reached only as the final outcome of a long and complex process in which the pure ego becomes gradually disentangled from various presentational wrappings which mask and disguise it. Considered generally, as an account of the development of the self and of self-consciousness, Ward's work is here admirable and ought to be carefully studied by every psychologist. But considered as an attempt to meet his own theoretical problem of how the pure ego, as such, can be known at all, it seems to me to be a brilliant failure.

The self, at the outset, is known only in its sensible appearance as a bodily self. In the most primitive stage, the boundary between it and other things is the skin; perception and action are relations between the organism and its immediate present environment; on the side of feeling, it is marked off from other things as the seat of the massive but ill-defined organic sensations with which our earlier pleasures and pains are directly connected. "The body is the only thing directly set in motion through the reaction of these feelings, the purpose of such movements being to bring it nearer to the things for which there is 'appetite' and to remove it from those for which there is 'aversion'." It is thus distinctively characterized by centrality, permanence, and individuality, and "affords an ever-present double" of the actual feeling and living self."⁴¹

With the development of free images there is distinguished "An inner zone of self having still more unity and permanence." There is "an intuition not only of the bodily self doing and suffering here and now," but also memories of what it has done and suffered and anticipations

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

of what it will do and suffer. Adaptation is not only to the immediate environment but to situations relatively remote in time and space. From this more advanced point of view, the boundary between self and not-self is no longer the skin. The external organs of sensation and movement are coming to be regarded as its property—as instruments which it uses—rather than as part of its being. It is regarded as placed inside the body where the organic sensations, inseparable from emotional agitation, are apparently localized, i. e., in the midriff. This is the imagining and desiring self.

It is only through the development of social communion among human beings that a conception of self becomes possible in which it is discriminated from its bodily double and ultimately from all objects. "As a member of society each one plays many parts—has many social selves or *roles*—and so he comes first to conceive himself as the actor that sustains or impersonates them all." This actor on the social stage is the *personal self*. The parts which he plays are still only masks or doubles of the pure ego. But they form the last disguise, so that when this vestment is stripped off there is nothing left but the conception of a subject which is subject only and not object. What makes this step possible is "that before he can act, the man has often to think and will, to plan, compare, and rehearse any new part he is striving to play." This presupposes a self behind the scenes which can no longer be identified or confused with any object. Critical reflection on this situation inevitably leads to the conception of a pure ego.

There are two alternative ways of interpreting this account of the development of self-consciousness. In one the transition is taken to be from confused to distinct knowledge. On this view, in apprehending the bodily self we *ipso facto* apprehend the pure self—directly or indirectly. We apprehend it inasmuch as it is indiscriminately in-

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cluded in the confused whole—the embodied self. All that is required in order to attain pure self-consciousness is that what is thus confusedly known should be disentangled from its irrelevant setting. But this does not seem to be Ward's view. For him, the empirical self of the lower levels is a "double" which does not include, but is provisionally substituted instead of, the pure ego. Similarly activity and feeling are not originally known either directly or indirectly. Only their presentational substitutes are apprehended. Starting with such assumptions it is quite unintelligible to me how pure self-consciousness can ever be attained. We must not here press the metaphor of a vestment. When we strip off clothes we can see what is inside them, provided that which is inside is not invisible. But the pure ego is supposed to be initially invisible. That is the essential reason why it is not itself supposed to be originally known but only its presentational doubles. How then can it be revealed, directly or indirectly, merely by removing these empirical substitutes.

There is a further difficulty which Ward himself signalizes. The process above described seems to yield only a limiting conception empty of all positive content. "We began with self represented by concentric objective zones, sensory, ideational, personal, spiritual, and end with a *focus imaginarius* as Kant called it."⁴² "But that pure subject or Ego which we reach in our analysis of experience at its rational level stands for no abstraction"⁴³ Ward's attempt to meet this difficulty is to me somewhat obscure; and no attempt which starts from his assumptions can, I submit, be possibly successful. It is not enough to point out that though our conception of the pure ego is abstract, yet we know that it cannot itself, as it really exists, be an abstraction. As *known to us*, it is essentially characterized by feeling and activity. But feeling and activity are as directly

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 377.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 379.

and positively known as anything can be.⁴⁴ I know as positively and directly the qualitative difference between being pleased and being pained as I know that between black and white. Yet Ward's primary position, from which to the end he never departs, is that we "know of" feeling and attention "mediately by their effects; we do not know them immediately in themselves."⁴⁵ The difficulty is not met by saying that "experience is wider than knowledge" and that feeling and activity are experienced. What is required is that we should know them *as* they are experienced. "Into the empty form of consciousness," says Ward, "our being fits."⁴⁶ But how can it be *known* to fit, if all that is known is the empty form, the positive content not being known but merely experienced.

From this intolerable position there seems to be no way of escape unless we give up Ward's conception of a pure ego as a single principle confronting the complex content of presentation. So regarded, its knowing cannot be conceived except as analogous to seeing with the bodily eye; and as the eye cannot see itself, so the pure ego cannot know itself. It is true that we can know indirectly what our own eyes look like, e. g., by seeing reflections of them; but this is only because our eyes themselves belong to the objective world and are connected by objective relations to other objects. But there can be no such indirect knowledge of the pure subject which *ex hypothesi* stands in exclusive antithesis to the objective world as a whole. In like manner, the activity and passivity of the pure self, its doing and undergoing, must consist in a process going on in an agent quite distinct from the presentational continuum, however closely and constantly it may affect and be affected by presentational changes. Hence, feeling and

⁴⁴ I admit that they are at first known confusedly, so that it is difficult to discriminate, e. g., pure pleasure and pain from organic sensation; but confused knowledge may be positive and direct.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

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attention cannot be known in their own nature as positively experienced; if known at all, they can only be known through their effects.

We can hardly avoid the conclusion that Ward's view is untenable. On the other hand, we must take care not to throw out the child with the bath. He has, in his insistent polemic against presentationism, at least shown the need for some thorough-going distinction between activity and feeling as characterizing the self in its individual unity and such presentational processes as assimilation, association, etc. The question is whether this distinction can be drawn in a way which is free from the difficulties found in his view of the pure ego.

All turns on the way in which we are to conceive individual unity. Ward seems always to assume that this excludes complexity. His pure self is regarded as a simple being essentially related to a manifold but in principle really distinct from it. The alternative view is that the unity of the individual is the unity of a complex whole, which is indivisible inasmuch as its partial ingredients have not an independent existence of their own, such that the whole could conceivably be constituted by taking them separately and then combining them. Individuality, in this sense, is not confined to mind: it is found, *e. g.*, in organic life. But it is in the mental life that it is, beyond comparison, most fully developed and most clearly recognizable.

The form of unity peculiarly characteristic of mental life is commonly called the unity of consciousness. Ward expressly denies that this can be made to account for what he means by the "psychological subject." He does so on the ground that it is a unity not of consciousness itself, but of the "so-called contents of consciousness"—"ideas, objects or presentations." It thus fails to include "the purely psychological facts of feeling and impulse" and it is just these facts "which compel us to recognize a conscious subject as

well as unity and continuity of the so-called contents of consciousness."⁴⁶

This position follows naturally from Ward's initial assumption that mental development consists in the gradual differentiation of a plastic presentation continuum regarded as, in the first instance, purely sensori-motor. On this view, if we ascribe to the individual subject any activity at all, it can hardly be other than that of an agent operating on a given material. But when once we recognize that thought, however rudimentary, is indispensable to the being of any thing which can properly be called an individual self or "I," his argument seems to break down.

I would urge that there is no unity and identity in attention, conation and feeling, which they do not essentially owe to the unity and identity of their object as such. In attending to a relatively obscure and fragmentary presentation, so as to make it more distinct, detailed, and complete, my attention is throughout one and the same activity only insofar as its object is apprehended as one and the same. So, in attempting to alter a painful situation, there is unity and identity in the conative process only insofar as resulting change is recognized as change in that same situation. It is this sort of unity which is implied when at the level of self-consciousness we refer the various stages and phases of our existence to an identical self. We do not require besides this, and as a precondition of this, a distinct single agent set over against its presentations, as such, and interacting with them. It is true that unity of consciousness if it is taken as merely cognitive is not, of itself, the unity of concrete experience; for mere cognition is an abstraction incapable of existing by itself. None the less, cognitive unity supplies the abstract scheme which is progressively realized in the concrete life of conation and feeling. There is cognitive unity insofar as the several distinct items of

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

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knowledge are apprehended, not in isolation, but as one with a context beyond themselves and as somehow related to each other within this context. There is cognitive unity inasmuch as objective experience is essentially incomplete so as to open a field for seeking or inquiring—for "finding an *ax* that is *h*." But the actual seeking or inquiring is mental activity—what Ward calls Attention.⁴⁸ Attention, in this wide sense, is a function of the self in its individual unity and identity, inasmuch as in and through it the unity of the whole mental life is actively expressed, sustained, and developed. Pleasant and painful feelings are affections of the self as an individual unity inasmuch as they are ways in which experienced activity is qualitatively modified according as it is furthered or thwarted.

I do not, of course, assert that there is nothing corresponding to what Ward calls interaction between subject and object. On the contrary, the process by which the individual maintains and develops its own unity can never be purely immanent. It is always essentially a transaction with the not-self just as vital process is a transaction between the organism and environing conditions. My point is that the subject of this transaction is not what Ward conceives as a "pure ego." It includes objects insofar as these are already known or thought of, and thus already enter into individual experience at any given moment. On the other hand, what it acts on and reacts on it is objective being, so far as this is not yet fully and determinately presented. When I voluntarily strike a match, it is no adequate account of what takes place to say that the thought or idea of a certain event realizes itself. For the idea is effective only in and through the active process which is a function of the self as a whole. But it is equally true that the peculiar dominance of the idea which leads to its realization is an immanent phase of the whole process

⁴⁸ Except that Ward recognizes a primitive form of attention which is non-voluntary, so non-conative. Here I cannot follow him.

and not merely an effect produced by it in something else. The actual striking of the match, on the other hand, involves what may properly be called interaction between the self and the not-self—and primarily between the self and its body.⁴⁹

Such a view as this leaves no room for interaction between presentations, as such, considered as a process distinct from and co-ordinate with the activity of the self. The distinction which Ward thus describes is rather between two mutually supplementary ways of approaching psychological problems, broadly corresponding to the so-called mechanical and teleological points of view in biology. All vital process when considered in its partial details is through and through "mechanical."

As again, the biologist in his piecemeal description of the physico-chemical events and of their relation to each other loses sight of that action of the organism as a whole which determines the concrete interdependence and co-ordination of these partial occurrences—so the psychologist in the piecemeal analysis of presentational changes fails to see the wood for the trees, getting out of line with the inclusive activity which is a function of the self as a whole. In both cases there is a natural temptation to posit a distinct agent operating *ab extra*, so as to direct, control and co-ordinate the partial processes. In biology this supposed factor, known as a "vital principle," is rejected even by these modern biologists who are most strenuous in urging the inadequacy of a purely mechanical treatment of vital process. What I here suggest is that Ward's pure subject is no more indispensable in psychology than "vital principle" is in biology. It is not, it seems to me, required for Ward's own Psychology. Nearly everything which he says about the part played by attention and feeling in

⁴⁹ From the standpoint of psycho-physical parallelism, this will have its counterpart in interaction between the neural process immediately correlated with conscious life and other bodily process.

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our mental life may be understood and accepted, with some change in the form of statement, without accepting his peculiar doctrine of the pure ego. At least, I have found it so. I have only to add in conclusion, that a close student of Ward can hardly fail to be fully convinced that in some form or other the conception of active subject as an individual unity is essential to anything like an adequate and systematic treatment of psychological problems.⁵⁰

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⁵⁰ The unity of the living organism is no tenable substitute: the biologist may indeed be driven to recognize some such unity as required to supplement the inadequacy of the "mechanical" point of view. But he cannot, so long as he consistently adheres to the standpoint of physical science, give any positive meaning to it. It remains vague and mysterious unless he falls back on the analogy of mental life—unless he approaches biology from a psychological standpoint. This is forcibly brought out in Mr. E. S. Russell's recent work, *The Study of Living Things*. So far Russell is in full agreement with Ward.

WARD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

THE earliest amongst Ward's philosophical writings which has been preserved is a paper with the title, "Can Faith Remove Mountains?" It was read to a discussion-society in 1879 and, although it has never been published, its argument often reappears in his later writings. By "mountains" the author means those conclusions of modern science and philosophy which seem to render impossible the consummation to which faith in God and the hope of immortality point; and by faith removing mountains he means "realizing its object and so justifying itself by the actual experience and knowledge of what has been hoped for while yet unseen." Two points arise in dealing with the question thus formulated. The former of these concerns the scientific obstacles to faith; the latter investigates the existence of other or extra-scientific grounds for it.

If theistic belief contradicted the results of science, then indeed the question would be settled. "But it is one thing," he says, "to believe a general proposition as inductively established and quite another thing to know all the particulars it will cover. . . . I do not quarrel with modern thought for insisting on physical continuity or on the inconceivability of disembodied spirits. But I must protest against that finality which regards our most general conceptions as if they were handcuffs on a once-vagrant body of facts now at length secure and well-known to the

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savant. . . . The very method of all our knowing necessitates ignorance. To know we must abstract, i. e., ignore as comparatively irrelevant details with which we cannot cope, and so we spin over 'the solid ground of nature' the thin webs of our systems and think we have comprehended the universe. The swinging of a church lamp, the falling of an apple, were such irrelevant details till Galileo and Newton saw in them the very foundations of physics. . . . The variation of domestic pigeons was an irrelevant detail till it set Darwin to investigate the origin of species. Surely then, if our boasted uniformity of Nature is worth anything, it should lead us to expect that in the future as in the past innumerable new facts that lie outside the meshes of our present science will furnish the starting points for fresh lines by which we shall comprehend nature more completely without doing any violence to those fundamental conceptions by which alone we can comprehend it at all. Allowing then to the full the continuity of nature, I cannot see that modern science is entitled to the proud boast I once heard made by the German Tyndall (Du Bois Reymond) on her behalf: *endlich haben wir das Universum entgöttert.*"

In these sentences we find more than a hint of the descriptive theory of scientific concepts afterwards formulated by Mach and others and developed by Ward also in later writings. Still more striking, especially in view of his work on the philosophy of religion, are some of his utterances when he goes on "to consider what analogies there are to justify (religious) faith, so far as analogy can justify anything, and under what circumstances such analogies will apply." This section of his argument contains a good deal that he was able to repeat, almost *verbatim*, in the concluding chapters of *The Realm of Ends*. "If we glance at the past history of the organic world as Darwin and Spencer expound it, we shall find that almost every

forward step could be formulated in this way: it was an act of faith not warranted by aught within the ken of the savant at that point. There was little, for example, in all that the wisest fish could know to justify the belief that there was more scope for existence on the earth than in the water and that persistent attempts to live on land would issue in the transformation of his swim-bladder into lungs. And when as yet there was not a bird to cleave the air there was surely little in all that the most daring of saurian speculators could surmise concerning that untrodden element to warrant any risk to his bones to satisfy his longing to soar, although, when he did try, his fore-legs were changed to wings at length and his dim prevision of a bird became incarnate in himself. No doubt with perfect knowledge all this would be otherwise; but the point is that, with such knowledge as ours, the maxim holds: nothing venture, nothing have. We trust and try first and understand after, till at length we are almost at one with Anselm's *credo ut intelligam*. The whole history of man, and indeed of all animate nature, seems to me to teem with instances in which 'mountains' that Reason, or if you will that Science, could see have been surmounted by blind faith, encouraged, it may be, or awakened by vague promptings to which reason, having—as has been well said—eyes but no ears, had no clue and gave no heed. I know nothing more wonderful than this unscientific trustfulness that from the very beginning seems to have been ingrained in things, likening them to Abraham, the type and father of the faithful, who 'when he was called . . . obeyed and went out, not knowing whither he went'."

Of such faith "the only test we can apply from our present point of view is that of success, survival of the fittest." "But the practice which justifies itself by results is also in the end at one with the theory it has helped to complete. . . . As the creatures that strained towards the light now

have eyes to see, whilst those that cleave to the primal slime remain full of darkness, may it not be that those among men who trust their religious impulses will attain in the end an insight as superior to all inferences based on sight as sight itself is to the gropings of the blind? . . . There was a time, the evolutionists tell us, when consciousness had not appeared on the scene; and the development of self-consciousness out of this was a process long and slow. But is self-consciousness the highest form of psychical life conceivable? Is there no meaning in the conception of a God-consciousness too? Those in whom self-consciousness is most developed are the readiest to admit that the light is dim when they seek to penetrate to this self: if this darkness should clear away might there not be something revealed of which our philosophies as yet scarcely dream? And may not the straining after God to which faith in Him leads quicken this new consciousness into life and show at length that it was from Him the impulse sprang? For, if we regard the world as a whole as the Unknown struggling into life, may not religious faith be a higher phase of this struggle; and, if so, is it not as likely to be consummated as those lower and blinder impulses have been?"

Attention has been drawn to these early reflections, partly on account of their intrinsic interest, but mainly because of the light they shed on the author's subsequent work. His two important works on metaphysics start from the discrimination of problems already suggested in his first paper. In *Naturalism and Agnosticism* he faces the scientific demurrer against theistic speculation and elaborates a theory of science which distinguishes its method and conclusions both from the negations of naturalism and from the speculative impotence of agnosticism; he reaches also certain positive results which he himself described as spiritualistic monism (meaning by monism that all reality is ultimately of one kind—spiritual—not that all realities

are merely modes of one being). He even asserts that this conclusion is an essential preliminary to his subsequent inquiries. "I take it for granted," he says in the preface, "that till an idealistic (*i. e.*, spiritualistic) view of the world can be sustained, any exposition of theism is but wasted labor." This is an extreme statement; he did not say, however, that even "the downright dualist who ascribes reality to matter and to mind alike" could not consistently be a theist; but he asserted that unless dualism be refuted we cannot "attain to" theism (that is, I presume, give adequate logical reasons for its acceptance), and he stoutly maintained that such dualism was an offence against the principle of continuity. He saw no fundamental objection to occasionalism, but argued that the "pan-psychical or Leibnizian" alternative was preferable, and that when we talk in Hegelian fashion "of *die Natur als Vorstufe des Geistes*, what is meant is not that there is a breach of evolutionary continuity but simply that the level of *self-conscious existence*, of spirit in the narrower sense, is reached continuously by development through earlier stages of more or less conscious life."

The second of the two problems thus discriminated—that of the positive grounds for theistic belief—is investigated in *The Realm of Ends*. The paper on Faith had asked only what analogies there were in organic life to religious faith and what the value of these analogies might be. The analogies reappear in the later work, but it goes far beyond them, covering almost the whole field of the philosophy of religion. So far as any distinction can be drawn between philosophy of religion and philosophical theology it lies in the definite recognition by the former of the facts of religious experience and their possible evidential value. That Ward had this range of experience in view from the first is shown by his preliminary definition of faith in the paper from which I have quoted and in his reference to

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"God-consciousness" at its close. The same point is made more explicit in a manuscript note-book on "Philosophy of Religion." "Religion," he there says, "is first and last a matter of experience. As ethics and aesthetics presuppose special experiences, so here. Pure theory—science and theoretical philosophy—have nothing to do with goodness or oughtness or beauty or religious faith: the experiences on which these rest lead to the corresponding ethical, aesthetical and religious concepts; and, since these experiences do not fall within the theoretical domain, theory alone can never legitimate their concepts." To these distinctions, however, an important proviso follows almost immediately: "though we divide knowledge into compartments, yet experience is an organic whole."

Neither in *The Realm of Ends* nor elsewhere did Ward enter upon any elaborate description of the facts of religious experience, such as other contemporary writers have attempted. He would not have described that work as a philosophy of religion; the facts of moral experience are more fundamental for its argument than those of religious experience; but the general features of religious experience have their place in it, and it issues in their justification. Indeed this follows from his general view of experience as an organic whole; religious experience is not isolated but a factor in this whole. Further, as he often insisted, experience is not passive reception of impressions; it is experiment, a process of selection in contact with an environment; through trial and error the subject of experience becomes expert.

Activity and the duality of subject-object are thus involved in all experience. This position is fundamental for Ward's psychology and philosophy, and on this basis his religious philosophy is built up. For this experience is the matter of fact which should be the starting point of all further speculation; subject, taken alone, like object taken

alone, in a one-sided abstraction, without the mark of reality. When Ward came to write *The Realm of Ends*, the vogue of pluralism was at its height, but that was not the reason for its prominence in his work. His own line of thought had been taken long before when singularism (as he called it) was in the ascendant; and it was developed by him in writings on different topics spread over many years. What is striking is the fundamental consistency of his thought during this long period and of the coherence of his final view of reality.

What he offers is a speculative interpretation of experience on the ascending levels of life, mind, morality and religion. Below the level of life—in the thing which is without any subjective aspect—he cannot find reality, only an abstraction from what is real. He starts *in mediis rebus* with the human type of experience; he can conceive higher forms of conscious life; he is familiar with many lower forms, and in these, as we go down the scale, the subjective aspect becomes less and less apparent till we are unable to identify it all. Nevertheless, that it is never absent altogether is an inference from the principle of continuity, and it saves the ultimate unity of the nature of the world: there will be nothing absolutely inorganic. It is a bold inference, however, for the continuity which we observe in nature is never strict or mathematical continuity: the differences between different individuals may be minute, but they are not infinitesimal. Strict continuity such as the mathematical would indeed be hard to reconcile with the doctrine of epigenesis; and epigenesis, as Ward constantly insists and as every biologist recognizes, is the method of evolution: the organism is not “evolved” from the cell, or the mind of a man from the mere subject of experience, without the give and take of interaction with the environment.

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The recognition of epigenesis is, of course, the mark which distinguishes all modern pluralism from Leibniz's. The Monads have windows; they interact. But Ward goes on to stress the point that this interaction is not of the nature of mechanical causation; it is a "sympathetic *rapport*" of agents whose nature is (in the wide sense) spiritual. Further, the organization of living bodies and the mechanical connections which we observe in nature are themselves the result of this spiritual activity. "Since," he says, "for pluralism there are no natural laws so to say 'in force' from the beginning, but on the contrary all natural laws are evolved, there will be no rigorous and mechanical concatenation of things such as naturalism is wont to assume: the fixity, so far as it is real, will embody the result of experience; so far as it is apparent, it will be due, as we have seen, to the statistical constancy of large numbers. But, again, in a world consisting of finite individuals no single individual and no community of such can foresee all the consequences of what they do: over and above what was intended much will result that was not intended. . . . As the result of what are aptly called blind impulses, whether due to positive pain or to mere restlessness, the successful individual or race gradually raises itself in the scale of life, shows a "tendency to progression," function perfecting structure, though the end attained may never be foreseen." All automatism is of the nature of a habit—of what is commonly called the secondarily automatic. What is routine for the individual was attained by a devious and tentative route in the experience of the race. This bold generalization is supported by a wealth of biological and psychological detail—sufficient, I think, to justify it as a working hypothesis. Clearly, however, there are much stronger grounds for admitting it within the realm of living beings, which we know to be such, than within the realm of what are commonly called inorganic things—though the pam-

psychist will dispute the distinction. It is only, however, the non-theistic pluralist who is compelled to regard "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of the earth" as consisting of countless numbers of obscure finite centers of life whose early discordant actions after much trial and error have produced the music of the spheres.

Ward's fundamental positions lead him to maintain with Spinoza and Leibniz that "all individual things are animated, albeit in diverse degrees." Their nature lies not in some supposed statical substance, but in their behavior or conduct; and each is distinguished by its characteristic behavior. One mark, however, is common to all; they all seek self-preservation—perhaps, self-betterment. Self-conservation is "the irreducible minimum essential to being in any sense a subject or self at all"; self-development, still the aim of many, "was perhaps at the beginning the aim of all." And, when the conceptual level is reached, what is aimed at is sought *sub specie boni*. The way of conduct is like the way of knowledge; fundamentally they are the same; trial and error are the means by which man attains both to truth and to goodness. And they are further alike in this that, as there is no principle of falsity, so there is no principle of evil. This is the element of validity in the old doctrine of the negative nature of evil: it is a failure to see or to realize what is good; apart from possible goodness there would be no evil; the latter has no place in the world when interpreted as a realm of ends.

If this position can be maintained, there is a further character common to all the countless individuals that make up the pluralist's universe. They are not only active subjects of experience interacting with an environment which consists of other selves; they have also a common *nisus* towards goodness, in spite of the wayward paths by which they seek it. And I think it was chiefly this *nisus* towards the good which he found present, however ob-

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scurely, in each individual, that compelled Ward to see the unity of the whole from the theistic standpoint. He tried to make pluralism work and could not; he found it incomplete and unsatisfying, though not charged with inherent contradictions. Nor, on the other hand, did he think that, as a philosophical theory, theism could be proved. Here he follows Kant, and uses a striking illustration which is worth quoting. "Though," he says, "demonstrations of the existence of God are unattainable, it by no means follows that the idea is theoretically worthless. It has even in this respect—to say nothing of its practical value—a 'regulative use' as what Kant called a *focus imaginarius*, a use which he declared to be not only admirable but indispensable. What Kant meant by a *focus imaginarius* it may be worth while to illustrate by an example. Suppose the earth were wrapped in cloud all day while the sky was clear at night, so that we were able to see the planets and observe their movements as we do now, though the sun itself was invisible. The best account we could give of the planetary motions would still be to refer them to what for us in accordance with our supposition would only be an imaginary focus, but one to which was assigned a position identical with the sun's position. The pluralist's universe, according to Kant, answers to the wandering orbs that we see and God to the sun, which we are supposed not to see but merely to conceive as giving to their motions both reason and unity."

The above quotation illustrates his theoretical view of theism. What may be called his moral argument was restated in succinct terms in answer to a critic: "The world has progressed so far that the best of men are dominated by moral ideals, and the question arises: Can these ideals be realized? If they cannot, the world, in spite of this advance, is not rational: if they can, it is. But we know nothing that compels us to say that they cannot. At the

same time theism and its corollary, a future life, would meet all our practical needs and give besides a theoretical completeness to our *Weltanschauung* that it must otherwise lack."

This is all groundwork. What follows upon it in the book is Ward's contribution towards the reconstruction of theology. It makes no pretence of system or completeness; but the topics selected are the most significant in the field of theology. Once the theistic standpoint is adopted, we might say that two questions arise. One is What is God, so far as we can see or infer? The other is What is the universe from the point of view (so to speak) of God? But obviously the two questions are interdependent: our interpretation of the universe will depend upon our view of the nature of God, and what we know of God is itself dependent upon our knowledge of the world whose ground he is. Whatever the topic may be—creation, providence, eternal life—we have to look at it both from the divine side and from the human; and the introduction of the former must profoundly modify our view of the latter.

"Theism," as Ward maintains, "is not simply the possible crown and completion of pluralism: such a transcendent modification will, it may be expected, change all." But it cannot negate the truths of experience which it was introduced to unify and interpret. Man will not be less man, nor the universe of interacting subjects less real, because God has been found: only their significance will be heightened. The problem of God in relation to man and the world is rendered difficult, for the two simplest solutions are seen to be inadequate—pantheism, in which the reality of the finite is lost in God, and deism in which God is separated from the world he has made. Accordingly it is inevitable that the thinker must steer a cautious course between the rocks of deism and the absolutist whirlpool.

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In general I think that that is what Ward has done and that—whatever criticisms may be urged against points of detail—he has laid down the lines for a true philosophy of theism. He begins with the concept of creation. Discarding both the temporal and the causal aspects which belong to it in ordinary thought, he finds a useful but imperfect analogy of it in the work of the artist which we call creative; the divine creation, however, implies no antecedent formless matter which needs shaping; nor does the creator stand aside from his work as the artist does. Apart from the world he is as inconceivable as the world is apart from him. But he is the ground (rather than cause) of the world; its existence depends upon him not at one moment only but always. So far, this statement could be interpreted in terms of absolutism, were we not already convinced of the reality of the finite. We are therefore justified in saying that God limits himself in giving existence to freely acting minds.

Similarly with regard to the concept of Providence. The world is a temporal evolution and God cannot be said to be unconcerned with it; on the other hand if he determined every incident in it, the whole view of evolution from which Ward's theism results would disappear; contingency in the behavior of monads, freedom in man, are fundamental. Hence a solution which looks (it must be confessed) something like a compromise: the plan or purpose of evolution must be assigned to God (clearly no finite spirit has determined it) while the details are largely contingent. In this way, again, God limits himself, and those who carry out his purpose may be said to be co-workers with him. "It is," said Ward, "just the power to do and to initiate without being ready-made that constitutes a free agent, a person who can never be reduplicated, as a machine can always be. But it does not follow that with a world of such free agents God will always or ever be liable to sur-

prises. It implies that he will always be interested: indeed he could not be a God of love if he were not. Yet the continuity between the actual and the possible and his complete knowledge of both make his main purpose secure. . . . There is no denying freedom. Substitute providence for prescience, continuous control for eternal decree, and the whole difficulty vanishes and nothing of value is lost."

The crucial problem of evil is discussed on similar lines. No fully satisfactory solution of the power and ramifications of evil is given or attempted, but an explanation of its place in a moral universe is essential. And Ward's explanation is the only one that meets the case. There is no principle of evil, as there is of goodness; but the possibility of evil belongs to the nature of a world in which there is contingency and freedom. It is the "travail of the creature," taking its own way until in the fulness of time the good is discovered and freely chosen.

The doctrine of personal immortality is not a part of theism, but it may be a consequence of it: and that it is such Ward maintains: "Our moral ideals lead not only to faith in God, but also, supported by this faith, to belief in a future life. The question of the rationality of this belief depends, we have allowed, on the value we are entitled to assign to man and to his work." But, granted this ethical postulate, he seems to put immortality on the same level of rationality as theism: "either the world is not rational or man does not stand alone and this life is not all." Now, although this argument from value is the only argument regarded as valid, yet, if immortality be admitted, its place in the theoretical scheme must be investigated. It is impossible to follow Ward's discussion, but one point may be noticed—the question whether immortality involves pre-existence. Ward inclines to an affirmative answer to this question; and certainly it seems to give a more harmonious view, if death is not the end, to say that birth is not the

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beginning. But, from the point of view of value, there is a consideration which should not be left out of sight. If the continuity between this life and the future is no greater than that between a pre-natal life and the present—if, in a word, no memory connect the succession of lives—the value of the new life, not merely from the point of view of enjoyment but also from that of the development of consciousness, seems imperilled if not largely lost.

All these topics (that of evil, however, less obviously than the others) involve or fall back upon the perplexing problem of the relation of time to the eternal; and this is the reason why there is always something tentative about the solutions offered. On that problem also Ward has something useful to say: especially the discrimination of the three senses—formal, ontological, and axiological—in which time and eternity are contrasted. But the problem itself remains unsolved and perhaps insoluble. How can we, whose life and thinking are in time, understand the divine experience or experience the divine nature? When he deals with this problem he seems to return to his early question concerning faith and to illuminate his first thoughts by the results of mature reflection. To begin with, faith was represented as blind and groping, but light and direction have come from the experience and ideals of value. "All our good deeds render us more, and all our evil deeds render us less, amenable to divine influence or inspiration." Further, it would seem in harmony with the whole trend of the argument to add that the good deeds lead also to clearer insight into the divine nature and even perhaps to the mystical "God-consciousness" of which he spoke.

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JAMES WARD'S DOCTRINE OF EXPERIENCE

THE philosophy which James Ward offered to the general public from his fifty-sixth year onward comes to us as a scholarly worked-out system which, starting from the refutation of Naturalism and Dualism, establishes a pure Spiritualism, works out from a panpsychist point of view a whole theory of evolution, shows the necessity of completing that Pluralism by an avowedly theistic doctrine, and justifies finally this latter thesis with reference to the problems of creation, predestination, evil and future life. We abstract from this vast and attractive mental edifice only an apparently humble part, which may however be found to constitute its foundation: namely, the doctrine which deals with the nature of experience. We shall try to set apart the essential characters of that doctrine, and shall then proceed to a rapid examination of its origins and its value.

I

Ward's theory of experience appears already in his first articles: before he used it for the construction of his metaphysic he made it the basis of his psychology. It is a well-observed fact that in Ward the psychologist we have already eminently Ward the philosopher. Not that he is abandoning the domain of facts for the hazardous specula-

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tions of a so-called rational science of the soul, but as a sagacious observer, he never loses sight of the connection between the different problems, he excels in discerning complexes and abstracting "principles." 'Ο συνοπτικός διαλεχτικός: if Plato's saying remains true, then Ward's psychology represents by no means the least philosophical part of his work. Now the first task that confronted such a mind was to define the object of his enquiry, and to define it without making use merely of conventional distinctions which will not stand the test of the simplest analysis. Yet what value have the current definitions in this respect? Nothing seems more natural at first sight than to define psychology as the science of *inner* or *subjective experience*; but nothing is more artificial than this definition if one goes to the bottom of things. For in spite of the unfortunate expression coined by Locke there is no "internal sense" comparable with external senses. The child who becomes capable of reflecting on himself does not thereby acquire some sixth sense; but he becomes conscious of already experienced sensations as related to his ego.¹ There are then no facts which belong to the inner world exclusively. Locke and his followers have ignored this simple truth, because they retained the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, simply carrying it over into the field of phenomena.²

Now Ward sees in the principle underlying contemporary naturalism a reappearance of this same dualism;³ modern scientists have just kept the second half, the idea of a material world purely mechanical and completely independent of the mind. The progress of the various sciences (each working out separately the conceptions deemed proper to its own domain) has only accentuated Cartesian dualism,⁴ as is shown in the theory of psychological paral-

¹ See article "Psychology" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. 20, beginning; and *Psychological Principles*, pp. 15-16.

² *P. P.*, pp. 13-14.

³ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 3rd ed., vol. I, pp. 13, 18, etc.

⁴ *Ib.*, vol. 2, pp. 4-5.

lelism. On the other hand it has done nothing to lessen the difficulty of that dualism. Far from it. Ward's learned criticism of the parallelist position is well known.⁵ According to this it appears that, when admitting the notion of a self-sufficient material world, one does not arrive at comprehending either the presence or the character of mind. Inversely, a psychology that has for its object a purely subjective life cannot arrive at explaining how we perceive an external world.⁶ The dualistic conception leads from either end to a veritable *impasse*. In the presence of such difficulties one ought to raise the question whether this conception is verified by experience.

Now the answer given by the facts is perfectly clear on that point, according to Ward: what characterizes every experience is the "duality in unity of subject and object."⁷ There are, then, two distinct but absolutely inseparable factors in our experience. There is no experience which does not imply an object: the subjective modifications to which certain authors would reduce our psychological life are always correlative to certain changes in the objective continuum.⁸

It is well known, besides, how energetically Ward lays stress on the essentially *objective* character of the sensations or more generally still of the "presentations."⁹ But neither is there an experience without a subject: every experience is somebody's experience.¹⁰ Just because psychology is the science of concrete experience it cannot leave the notion of the subject out of consideration: this is a proposition on which Ward soon comes to insist. And he has pushed the dispute which he broached over this point with associationism, or to use his own wider term with

⁵ *Ib.*, part 3.

⁶ *Ib.*, vol. II, p. 109.

⁷ *Ib.*, p. 110; *P. P.*, p. 13.

⁸ *P. P.*, p. 30.

⁹ *Ib.*, pp. 46-48. *N. & A.*, vol. II, pp. 113-117.

¹⁰ *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 111 and 123.

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"presentationism," much farther, not only than Bradley, but also than William James: for he criticizes the conception of the ego developed in the *Principles of Psychology* as being still only an "extraordinary" variation of the doctrine to be rejected. For Ward, every experience implies, always and necessarily, a subject, an individual ego: not a spiritual substance of course, but something very different from a simple series of mental phenomena, even if there were added to it the notion of the unity and continuity of the contents of consciousness.¹¹ Thus the relation of the subject to the object remains an absolutely final characteristic of our experience—a fundamental characteristic reducible to no other, not even to the relation of causality.¹²

Yet Ward does not conceive subject and object as two terms of a logical and static relationship, but as two real factors in "interaction." From this point of view he has given an original and luminous interpretation¹³ of the psychological triad: feeling, cognition and conation are distinct neither as separable and complete states of consciousness, nor as obscurely irreducible elements, but as the divers aspects of a fundamental cycle in which the interaction between subject and object is manifest under an alternating predominance of the one or the other factor.¹⁴ From this same point of view he has again followed the development of individual experience, which he has so profoundly described as the gradual differentiation of an original continuity. For him, experience is in its essence a life, a series of exchanges between subject and object, a progress in the course of which one sees these two factors mould each other.¹⁵ But Ward does not omit to point out that the

¹¹ *P. P.*, pp. 35-40. As regards the estimation of James's thesis, see also the rather severe critical notice of his *Text-Book of Psychology* by Ward (*Mind* 1892): he characterizes as "logical barbarisms" (p. 536) such expressions: "The thoughts themselves are the thinkers."

¹² *N. and A.*, vol. II, p. 117 sq.

¹³ *Ib.*, pp. 52, 125; *P. P.*, p. 13, and 378.

¹⁴ See *P. P.*, pp. 40-59.

¹⁵ *N. and A.*, vol. II, p. 110, 130; *P. P.*, p. 410.

parts played by the two factors are very unequal. In his view the fundamental fact is the activity of the subject, the first factor in every experience;¹⁶ an activity which, however, could not be conceived as purely nor even as primarily cognitive: Ward has insisted with as much emphasis as any pragmatist on the precedence of conation guided by feeling.¹⁷ Moreover he has explained the increasingly perfected structure of our experience as arising from selections and syntheses brought about by this subjective activity:¹⁸ at the beginning of every new acquisition one can trace an act of attention directed by some interest.¹⁹ Thus in the genesis of our knowledge the object furnishes only a material condition especially favorable owing to its plasticity: the *primum movens* must be found in the activity of the subject which is the principle of every initiative and every progress.²⁰

Finally Ward has emphasized the transformation of individual experience through social life. The former rises to the latter by virtue of its own progress. When the individual begins to distinguish his body from other objects, he attributes to all similar bodies an ego endowed with faculties analogous to its own.²¹ Thus there begins that exchange of experiences which Ward has called, by the term borrowed from Duhring,²² "intersubjective intercourse." The individual discovers that his experience is partially identical with that of his fellows—not as regards particular qualities of course, but at least as regards relations. He thus comes to conceive "trans-

¹⁶ *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 52-53.

¹⁷ *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 131, 133, 134, 189; *P. P.*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁸ *P. P.*, pp. 412-416.

¹⁹ *Ib.*, pp. 72 and 180.

²⁰ *Ib.*, pp. 410-411; *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 235, 236, 255, 256.

²¹ *P. P.*, pp. 33-34; *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 164-165.

²² According to Ward's own declaration, in the first of the articles entitled "Psychological Principles," *Mind*, vol. VII, 1883, p. 164. We do not know why the author has not reproduced this reference in his books. The whole passage shows how clearly Ward had conceived the theory, which he did not fully develop before his lectures of 1896-1898.

subjective objects" common to all intelligent beings, but independent of every individual subject: these objects form the content of a new experience, that is, "universal experience."²³ This experience opens to us a whole world of new knowledge; but far from opposing itself to individual experience, it is, according to Ward, nothing but an extension of this. From the idea that trans-subjective objects are independent of each of the subjects *taken by itself* the common thought passes no doubt easily to the idea that they are independent of all subjects *taken together*; and if one adds to this transition in thought the mechanism of introjection, which makes us artificially attribute first to our fellows then to ourselves a life made up of "internal states," then we are led to believe in a dualism of the physical and the mental. But according to Ward this genesis of the belief is by no means a justification. The trans-subjective object is only an elaboration of the perceptual object grasped in individual experience; and, on the other hand, the universal experience must itself have a subject. Is it distinct from the individual subject? In no way, for one finds in the activity of the latter all that is necessary to explain the origin of the categories: this is at least what Ward tries to establish. Thus the experience in which trans-subjective objects are given has no other subject than that of individual experience, raised only through social life to the level of self-consciousness where it reaches a world common to all intelligent beings. This world is never given or conceived apart from any thinking subject.²⁴

We have already partially indicated the consequences to which the propositions just exposed will lead. The characteristic unity of every experience leads us to eliminate dualism as much in metaphysics as in psychology. But the duality immanent in this unity should make us reject even more resolutely the theories which uphold only one of the

²³ *P. P.*, p. 32; and especially *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 166-171.

²⁴ *N. and A.*, lecture 17.

two terms: *viz.*, first, psychology without object, or subjectivism; and then, psychology without subject, or presentationism.²⁵ Shall we not have to eliminate equally unilateral metaphysics? Here the question becomes complicated. Ward does not hesitate to reject a metaphysics of the pure object, that is the type of Naturalism whose characteristic propositions he has refuted at length. But is he applying a similar rigour with a metaphysics of the pure subject? At first we can see how logic forces him to that impartial severity: he condemns the systems which pretend to reduce objects to "offsets" or "emanations" of the subject, and rejects equally on that account the monadological idealism of Leibniz and the pantheistic idealism of Fichte.²⁶ One knows, however, that Ward finishes his discussion of Naturalism with a conclusion in favor of a spiritualistic Monism.²⁷ Is he then contradicting himself here? We shall have to come back to that difficulty. Let us note merely, for the moment, that even this conclusion is nevertheless based on the theory of experience. Ward very naturally appeals, in support of his spiritualism, to that pre-eminence of the subject in the development of experience which his whole psychology has emphasized. To this is added another argument which Ward draws from the teleological character of science: as science is confirmed by experience Ward concludes that nature itself is teleological, and is found to be, at bottom, mind.

Finally, and although Ward drew this last consequence more tardily, one has to add that the consideration of experience brings us towards Pluralism. For what manifests itself in our experience is not an Absolute,²⁸ but a plurality

²⁵ Cf. the article "The Present Problems of General Psychology," *Philosophical Review*, 1904, p. 605.

²⁶ *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 119-120.

²⁷ *Ib.*, part 5. It is to be recalled that Ward employs the term *Monism* in a "qualitative sense" (*The Realm of Ends*, p. 24, n. 2 and 481), and consequently does not at all oppose it to the term *Pluralism*.

²⁸ This is affirmed more plainly than by Ward by his pupil and disciple C. A. Richardson in his interesting work *Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy*, 1919. In particular, page 3, "Pluralism is the modern outcome of Empiricism."

of active beings in more or less close relationships.²⁹ If we adopt the principle of continuity we may rightly posit a similar plurality as the fundamental character of Nature.³⁰ We can equally well imagine a whole scale of beings transcending us; but if we wish to hold to that same principle of continuity, we have to represent to ourselves all these beings as subjects in correlation with objects.³¹ Pure object, supreme subject, unity of subject and object in absolute self-consciousness, unity transcending that consciousness itself—these are so many forms of the absolute arrived at by way of abstraction and contradicting the fundamental facts of our experience.³² Yet, according to Ward the same objections would not serve against a Theism that intended completing the Pluralism without abolishing it:³³ a God, even a creator, does not necessarily swallow up in his being the diversity of individuals; that diversity remains real, if one admits with Professor Howison that such a God "creates creators."³⁴ Furthermore, in one of his last articles Ward thinks he can see his conception of experience supporting the Christian idea of "eternal Life"; as we raise ourselves from the sensory and individual experience to a world of common intellect which the animal cannot discern, so may there be a still higher world—the spiritual world of eternal values—which the intellect alone cannot comprehend. Thus according to Ward psychology might come to confirm the Graeco-Pauline doctrine of the threefold nature of man.³⁵

²⁹ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 18-19 and 24.

³⁰ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 20-21.

³¹ *Ib.*, p. 29.

³² *Ib.*, lecture 2; in particular p. 41.

³³ *Ib.*, lecture 11.

³⁴ *Ib.*, p. 271.

³⁵ "The Christian Idea of Faith and Eternal Life," in *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1925, Vol. 23, pp. 197-198.

II

It is obvious that the theory of experience occupies a truly central place in Ward's philosophy. How far is it original? In developing it, he has himself clearly referred the origin back to Kant, who first put forward the problem of the nature of experience,³⁶ indicated the true solution of that problem in insisting on the inseparability of subject and object,³⁷ finally made the development of all knowledge depend on the subject's activity,³⁸ and pointed out the mutual implication of objectivity and self-consciousness.³⁹ Yet whilst he is rendering homage to the master whose work he has penetrated so deeply, Ward does not hesitate to point out the faults of his analysis. Kant isolates and limits to excess that activity of the subject whose importance he has grasped; he seems, sometimes, not to recognize that it does not manifest itself only in reflection, but already in perception; above all he has ignored the essentially selective and conative character of that activity.⁴⁰ If he has rightly made a distinction between individual and universal experience, he has not explained how we rise from the one to the other: he has not perceived the part played in the development of knowledge by inter-subjective intercourse.⁴¹ In short, he allowed himself to be dominated too much by his taste for *Architectonic*; he has abused artificial dichotomies and followed the errors of a

³⁶ *N. and A.*, Vol. II, pp. 109-110.

³⁷ *Ib.*, and *P. P.*, p. 13.

³⁸ Immanuel Kant (from the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 10), p. 12; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, pp. 133-134, 186.

³⁹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 124.

⁴⁰ Immanuel Kant, p. 12-13; *A Study of Kant*, p. 83; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, pp. 133-134, 186.

⁴¹ Immanuel Kant, p. 14; *A Study of Kant*, pp. 58-59; *The Realm of Ends*, p. 127.

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superficial and defective psychology, whilst professing an unfortunate disdain for that science.⁴² He especially lacked, like most of his contemporaries, the historic sense of development.⁴³ But these faults which he points out with so much precision Ward thinks himself able to correct, whilst still adhering faithfully to Kant's central conception.⁴⁴

With the appreciations just alluded to in a summary way Ward has made evident very precisely both his indebtedness to Kant and the transformation which the thesis of his German master underwent in his hands. It will however be fitting to define the latter more accurately, giving some indication of the origin of the differences.

The fundamental thesis itself is, in a sense, more rigorously insisted upon by Ward than by Kant. The latter never broke away completely from the Cartesian dualism,⁴⁵ whereas Ward is ever insisting on the unity of experience, and the inseparability of its two factors. He is, besides, by no means the first British thinker who enunciated this truth clearly. Ferrier in particular, as Ward has not failed to point out, has not been less categorical on this subject than Ward.⁴⁶ And one might find a fairly analogous position taken up by John Grote.⁴⁷ Are these independent disciples differing indeed from their inspirer only in the fact that they bring a superior degree of coherence to the thesis they received from him? To say this would, perhaps, not be going deeply enough into the matter. If the duality tends often to transform itself into dualism with Kant, that has its reason no doubt in the fact that Kant does not consider experience as the final term of reality. We must not forget that, according to him, "the highest

⁴² *The Realm of Ends*, p. 125.

⁴³ *I. Kant*, p. 13; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 190.

⁴⁴ *Cf. I. Kant*, p. 13; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 186.

⁴⁵ *Ib.*, p. 114.

⁴⁶ *Ib.*, Vol. II, pp. 199-200; *cf.* Forsyth, "The Conception of Experience and Its Relation to the Development of English Philosophy," *Mind*, 1904, N. S. Vol. XIII, pp. 404-405.

⁴⁷ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 406-408.

problem of transcendental Philosophy is the following: How is experience possible at all?"⁴⁸ A thinker who puts the question thus will without self-contradiction be able to push the analysis of experience even to the discovery of independent factors which might explain experience itself. In order to eliminate even the possibility of such a decomposition, the Kantian thesis had to be interpreted with a feeling of respect for experience which is looked at as the ultimate reality beyond which there is no going. Such feeling is, perhaps, a specifically British characteristic.

Ward modifies Kant's thought more directly when he identifies the subject of knowledge with the individual studied by the psychologist; if he differentiates between epistemology and psychology, he does not do so without bringing the two into close relationship,⁴⁹ and if on the other hand it is an exaggeration to maintain that Kant's *Critique* has nothing to do with psychology⁵⁰ then the *Bewusstsein ueberhaupt* to which Kant refers knowledge is nevertheless made to be far removed from the concrete individual. On that point Ward gives a twist to Kantianism in the direction exactly opposite to that which, following Hegel and Fichte, the absolute idealists of Oxford had adopted. It is more evident here than before that he carries on the tradition of the English empiricist school; and one wonders that he should unreservedly join in the common censure launched against that school, that is to have unfounded theory of knowledge with psychology,⁵¹ and that he should not give his due to Berkeley with whom he has at bottom more in common than with Kant.⁵² In this recon-

⁴⁸ *Saemtliche Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, 1868, Vol. VIII, p. 536.

⁴⁹ Cf. *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 133.

⁵⁰ Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 58.

⁵¹ *P. P.*, p. 26. No doubt Ward is to be distinguished from empiricists in that he sharply defines the object of epistemology as being that of *universal* experience, but one recalls that according to him the individual raises himself to that level of experience.

⁵² This approach has already been pointed out by R. Berthelot, but only as regards psychology: *Un Romantisme Utilitaire*, Vol. II, p. 150.

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ciliation of the Kantian analysis with the empiricist tradition Ward is, however, not the first. One might compare his attitude with that of Shadworth Hodgson and especially with that of Renouvier. But Ward never quotes the first and seems not to have made the acquaintance of the latter till late.⁵³ We should finally remember that Wundt had already used certain Kantian conceptions in the domain of psychology, and had in particular criticized Kant's definition of the latter as the science of internal experience, pointing out the fundamental unity of experience. It is surprising that Ward never mentions this theory which is so much akin to his own. Without going so far as a French critic who called Wundt "Ward's real guide"⁵⁴ one may think that Ward cannot but have experienced his influence in some measure.

As regards the essentially conative character of experience, Ward indicates the origins of this thesis quite clearly: Kant announced it when he proclaimed the primacy of Practical Reason, although he was not able to make that truth fit into his theory of knowledge; Fichte gave it more prominence and breadth; Schopenhauer, finally, defended the thesis in sweeping and forcible argument.⁵⁵ To these well-known forerunners Ward adds in another passage British psychologists such as Brown, Hamilton, Bain, Spencer, as well as Maine de Biran.⁵⁶ But there is no indication which could make us suppose that he had made use of the work of this French thinker whose position closely resembles his own. On the other hand, he manifestly ignores the voluntarist theory of belief due to Lequier and Renouvier. Yet he could not miss knowing the original development given to it by William James. His

⁵³ He seems to have quoted and doubtless known only Renouvier's work *Le Personalisme; N. and A.*, Vol. I, p. 6, n. 1; *The Realm of Ends*, p. 63, n. 1.

⁵⁴ Cantecor, in an article on "Les Tendances actuelles de la Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine," *Revue Philosophique*, October, 1911, Vol. LXXII, p. 390.

⁵⁵ *P. P.*, p. 20, n. 2; and *The Realm of Ends*, p. 196.

⁵⁶ *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 191-192.

allusion to that seems, however, to be guarded and only tardily given.⁵⁷ Finally, he does not even mention the psychological voluntarism of Wundt and quotes his theory of apperception only to criticize it, and not, of course, without motive.⁵⁸ Yet these omissions scarcely need apology. The reading of Schopenhauer alone could suffice to lead a discerning psychologist in the direction which Ward has followed with as much clarity as propriety.

With the theory of the part played by inter-subjective intercourse in the progress of knowledge we come to a more original order of considerations. Ward found this theory in embryo in Herder.⁵⁹ He draws, moreover, on E. Caird and Royce⁶⁰ for its support. But these two have not preceded him. Without going back to that other forgotten great forerunner Jean Jacques Rousseau, he could have made appeal to Auguste Comte in this matter. He quotes merely a well-known phrase of his.⁶¹ That fact does not attest a direct knowledge of Comte's works, but denotes at least for Ward a feeling of a renewal which the theory of knowledge could derive from the French sociologist. The influence of Schuppe has been pointed out,⁶² but in the absence of any indication furnished by Ward we could not say that he is really in any way indebted to that thinker. In short, with regard to the connection between the intellectual and the social, Ward seems to have expressed in a rather personal fashion opinions comparable to those which, with different orientations, were developed by such men as Royce and Baldwin, and also by such as Bergson, Durkheim and especially Lalande. One might add, that such a theory does nothing but carry into the realm of epis-

⁵⁷ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 413.

⁵⁸ *P. P.*, pp. 310-311.

⁵⁹ *Immanuel Kant*, p. 14.

⁶⁰ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 128-129.

⁶¹ *Ib.*, p. 20; and *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 139.

⁶² See T. Case, "Metaphysics," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., Vol. XVIII, pp. 247-248.

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temology the kind of explanation which Adam Smith had introduced in the domain of ethics.⁶³

If we consider, finally, Ward's metaphysical conceptions, it is evident that they are in their greater part influenced by the reading of Leibniz and Lotze. It is, however, clear too that in certain respects they lead away from these great inspirers. Thus Ward affirmed, in much more categorical fashion than either of them, both the independence of individuals and their interaction. It may be that the influence of William James helped to bring out this pluralism which springs, besides, quite naturally from his own psychology.⁶⁴ But there is another peculiarity which interests us here more particularly; namely, the justification of this pluralistic spiritualism by an argument of the epistemological order. This combination seems to us Ward's own contribution. In this respect one could only find once more in Berkeley a strangely neglected forerunner and a kindred spirit in a contemporary whom he seems not to have known, Emile Boutroux, who also goes to the fountainhead of Kant's *Critique* and Leibniz's *Metaphysic* whilst defending a doctrine of contingency as foreign to the first as it is to the second of his German masters.

It becomes clear that these differing analyses converge to the same conclusion. Ward's theory of experience does not possess, and in no way pretends to possess, a pronounced originality. Although it developed in rather a new fashion the idea of evolution, it is, on the whole, above all, the work of a penetrating continuer. On the other hand, the materials employed by Ward are almost entirely of German origin: yet he uses them for a harmonious and simple construction in which one may find—perhaps he is not aware of it himself—the mark of the best British tra-

⁶³ Cf. what Ward says of Smith; *P. P.*, p. 369; and *R. of Ends*, p. 367.

⁶⁴ Cf. William James on this subject: *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 314. Nevertheless, Ward denied such an influence and even any change in his own thought concerning the problem of Pluralism. See *The Realm of Ends*, 2d ed., p. 481.

dition; a construction which presents, besides, certain remarkable analogies with the systems built up by several of his French contemporaries and forerunners. The most profound of these were also formed in part by the great German thinkers and had perhaps for this reason acquired a keener appreciation of the complex and dynamic character of reality; but they had stamped their borrowings with a transformation analogous to Ward's—led no doubt, like him, by a lively sense of personal activity which they tried, however, to reconcile with the recognition of the universal and the social.

III

What value may we now assign to this conception of experience? To determine this one ought to answer two different orders of questions: (1) Is the analysis of experience given by Ward a faithful picture?; and (2) Are the consequences which he draws from that analysis legitimate? In Ward's analysis one might examine different elements: there might be room for the question, e. g., whether activity is indeed a given factor of experience?⁶⁵ and especially whether inter-subjective intercourse is indeed a fact anterior to the conception of facts independent of the self?⁶⁶ We would like to justify the first of these two theses, and, on the other hand, we doubt whether Ward has sufficiently established the second. But we will limit ourselves to the discussion of the most fundamental, if not

⁶⁵ One knows that this thesis, which is common to Ward and James has been contested by Bradley. It has been criticized from another point of view by H. Wildon Carr in his article, "The Theory of Subjective Activity," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N. S., Vol. I, 1901, pp. 191-199. See also: *The New Realism*, pp. 13-14.

⁶⁶ This difficulty has been pointed out by different critics: by H. Wildon Carr (in the article quoted already, p. 195-196), by A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, 1922, pp. 334-335; by Ritchie, "Nature and Mind," in *Philosophical Review*, May, 1900, pp. 265-266; finally by Charles S. Myers "Naturalism and Idealism," in *Philosophical Review*, Sep., 1901, p. 47.

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the most novel, characteristic and ask: Does every experience imply the duality of subject and object?

That it does has long been accepted as self-evident by almost all thinkers; but it will be remembered with what clearness this thesis has been rejected by William James in a very original article that seems to have exercised much influence in the United States and, with the important exception of Mr. Bertrand Russell, very little in other countries.⁶⁷ According to the American thinker "pure experience" does not present any kind of internal duality; it is only afterwards that we can find in a single and selfsame fragment of that experience either a known object or a knowing subject according to the context we associate it with; the famous distinction would therefore be in reality an additional and extrinsic one. Can one imagine a more radical antithesis to Ward's conception? We have to ask ourselves, how could two first-class psychologists, akin in so many respects, contradict each other on so fundamental a point?

The opposition is explained and mitigated—so we believe—when it is noted that the two thinkers have not placed themselves at exactly the same point of view. William James calls up experience in its immediate freshness, such as it appears at the moment when it happens. Ward characterizes experience such as reflexion is led to conceive. Now, according to him, every consciousness is not necessarily accompanied by reflection; every consciousness does not imply self-consciousness.⁶⁸ This is a point on which Ward parts company clearly if not with Kant himself⁶⁹ at least with the majority of his British successors; they—and Ferrier no less than Green—had maintained that there is no knowledge without self-consciousness,

⁶⁷ "Does Consciousness Exist?" in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*; see, in particular, pp. 9-15.

⁶⁸ *P. P.*, pp. 372-3 and 361; and "The Present Problems of General Philosophy," *Philosophical Review*, 1904, p. 604.

⁶⁹ Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 54, n.

without thinking about the distinction of subject and object.⁷⁰ Ward was led by his profound sense of development to oppose this proposition. In our concrete life self-consciousness appears as a late product, whose gradual formation must be retraced by psychology.⁷¹ Ward goes so far as to declare that the duality of object and subject is of all the experienced relations, the last in the order of knowledge.⁷² He admits that the subject is never the direct object of his own experience;⁷³ even more, that—properly speaking—he is never *known*, for what is known is always an object; the *me* presented, is always different from the real Self.⁷⁴ And yet this *Self* nevertheless remains, in Ward's eyes an indubitable reality.⁷⁵ Why? By virtue of an epistemological necessity. All knowledge—and even all experience—implies, presupposes, a subject.⁷⁶ We have there a reality arrived at by an intellectual process, but anterior to that process and altogether different from a pure abstraction.⁷⁷

It can be seen there is no disagreement here between two psychologists about the immediate facts of experience, but between two philosophers about the interpretations of these facts. Now James' thesis, however attractive in its ingenious simplicity, appears to reveal itself to us, when analyzed, as the more artificial of the two. It is not exactly true that one and the same experience passed through can be taken by

⁷⁰ See the texts quoted by James who opposes this proposition: *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 174; and *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 29, n.

⁷¹ *P. P.*, pp. 361-376.

⁷² *Ib.*, p. 370.

⁷³ *Ib.*, p. 380.

⁷⁴ *Ib.*, p. 378 (bottom) and article quoted, *Phil. Review*, 1904, p. 604. Richardson is still more categorical on that point: "Knowing is a relation between two entities, so that evidently the subject cannot know itself," *Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy*, p. 19. He adds, however, "It simply realizes its own existence" and declares somewhere else: "We all *realize* what a self is. This realization is far more than knowledge in the ordinary sense. . . . It is a unique, supreme, intimate fact, and therefore stands in a class of its own." *Ib.*, pp. 13-14.

⁷⁵ *P. P.*, p. 38.

⁷⁶ *Ib.*, pp. 377, 378, 380.

⁷⁷ *Ib.*, p. 379.

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us at will, and in turn, now as objective, now as subjective according to the system of relations into which it may please us to press it. In reality, if I call up any event whatever of my life *in its totality*, I can never look at it as purely objective or as purely subjective; I see in it always a personality entangled in certain circumstances. Thus, although he may not perhaps have explained himself completely enough about our knowledge of the subject,⁷⁸ Ward seems to us to be right when he retains for experience a character of which it cannot divest itself in the eyes of reflection

Now has one got the right to draw from this remark conclusions bearing on the nature of reality? Could it not be the case that Ward had borrowed here an illegitimate argument from what Professor R. B. Perry has called so happily the "ego-centric predicament?"⁷⁹ It is true he does not use it altogether in the manner of true idealists; for, far from making reality depend on thought, he has not hesitated to affirm the priority of being over knowledge.⁸⁰ But this being which is anterior to elaborated knowledge is for him always the one which manifests itself in experience; it is therefore always a subject in relation with an object. Ward postulates, then, that the character of every experience is *ipso facto* that of every reality. Might we not contest this and admit with the neo-realists that the things given in experience have a nature independent of it, and in no way demand the relationship with a subject as experience does?⁸¹

⁷⁸ In the article quoted he declares that the existence of the Self cannot be inferred from its knowledge: *Phil. Review*, 1904, p. 606. How then can this affirmation express an epistemological necessity? On the other hand, the subject is not given: "It is not 'there,' but 'here' whereto 'there' is relative," p. 607. This remains enigmatic, although doubtless bringing us nearer to the "realization" of Richardson.

⁷⁹ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 129-130.

⁸⁰ Let us quote a particularly typical passage: "We may perhaps venture without fear of metaphysical cavil, to maintain that being is logically a more fundamental concept than knowing," *Phil. Review*, 1904, p. 606. Cf. *P. P.*, p. 377. Ward distinguishes "experience as known" and "experience as real."

⁸¹ Cf. *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 315-316.

The problem belongs perhaps to those about which dispute will never cease. It seems of course impossible to prove that there exists no reality outside of all experience, no reality of an object not given to a subject; but it seems no less impossible to prove that such a reality exists. I have good reasons no doubt to believe that the objects I perceive are still existing in my absence, and even that they would exist in the absence of all beings like myself. But in this latter case *what* would remain of these objects? Here lies the true difficulty. I can look at them according to Mill's excellent formula simply as "permanent possibilities of sensation" and this seems to be the notion with which we all content ourselves in practical life. But what is such an unactualized possibility? I cannot make the slightest representation of it. Berkeley would have said that we are dealing here with an empty abstraction; such was no doubt Ward's idea too. Let us now suppose that these objects which have escaped our experience are yet got hold of by some other subject: our metaphysical imagination will be satisfied with that condition; i. e., we shall have to renounce the understanding of the nature of the extra-human reality or we shall have to bring it into a system of experiences more or less analogous to our own.⁸² So it was not without plausible reason that Ward extended his theory of experience in a panpsychical direction. There is, however, another objection that may come to mind here. Does not Ward in reality break faith with his own theory of experience, when he is working out a spiritualistic metaphysics? According to him the duality of object and subject was fundamental; and now he sacrifices the first term to the second. Is this not a mutilation analogous to that which he had with justice denounced in Naturalism; and is it not as arbitrary? The objection is natural enough,⁸³

⁸² Cf. W. James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 88-89.

⁸³ It has been formulated expressly by Charles S. Myers, "Naturalism and Idealism," *Philosophical Review*, Sept., 1901, pp. 463-476.

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but if we look closely it does not hit all forms of spiritualism equally. Only those are unable to parry it which exclude all real interaction of beings. This is the case in absolute idealism, as it is in the Leibnizian monadism. But a pluralism which puts that interaction in the forefront is interpreting the distinction between subject and object without eliminating it: for a given subject, the object can be simply the action on it of other subjects. Far from suppressing the known object, Pluralism and especially Panpsychism would presuppose in it rather more independence in regard to the subject than the Ward theory of experience may allow.⁸⁴

Thus it appears to us that this theory is not seriously affected by any of the criticisms it can evoke. It presents, in a particularly acceptable form, a thesis which, though it be more than a century old, need not necessarily be taken for antiquated. We believe that it may well deserve to be taken seriously into consideration in our time when so many thinkers appeal to experience in support of their systems without always penetrating sufficiently into the true meaning of that term and into its essential implications.

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⁸⁴ Something might perhaps be retained on this point in the criticism of A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, p. 333.

JAMES WARD'S ACCOUNT OF THE EGO

THE duality of subject and object in all experience is a cardinal feature, and in a sense the pivot, of Ward's psychology, of his theory of knowledge, and of his ontological metaphysic. Largely by its means, he tells us, dualism is overcome. There is no "ugly broad ditch" or forbidding battlements between spirit and nature. Instead there is necessary correlation and a bi-polar integrity in place of unintelligible conjunction of disparate substances. With the ruin of dualism, also, goes the annihilation of naturalism. We escape from the contradiction of a self-subsistent *phenomenon* of Nature; and are able to deal faithfully, not with an "epiphenomenal" mind, ornamental and impotent, but with the realities of attention and interest. Dualism itself is a mistaken interpretation of the message of "intersubjective intercourse" and of the "trans-subjective reference" elicited from the same. It rests on the fallacy of taking independence of any particular mind to be independence absolute. The same fallacy taints and corrodes every species of naturalism and, quite peculiarly, its agnostic form.

In this duality, we are told, Nature and those portions of Nature which we select and apprehend, are given to us as objective. They are apprehended, that is to say, as data which confront and may constrain us, not as modifications of our own private being or as appearances situate within our heads. Theories of the latter type depend upon the

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"introjection" fallacy according to which we lose sight of the plain deliverance of our experience and sophisticate ourselves in its stead with analogies applied to our own case from what we take to be the predicament of other percipients. Despite this objectivity of phenomenal presented data, however, there is an important sense in which, according to Ward's theory, the subjective pole of this bi-polar integrity takes the lead. Quoting Goethe with approval, Ward tells us that "Man never realizes how anthropomorphic he is."¹ We may add "and ought to be." Even in Nature, the "real" categories of substance, cause and end are, in the last analysis, imputed with assurance because of a certainty borne in upon us from the subjective pole of the bi-polar "experience" which is the governing reality in all these matters. This contention, to be sure, is not an abstract or "high priori" creed in Ward's philosophy. On the contrary, it is enforced and supported by a *sachlich*, searching review of the achievements of mind in its scrutiny of Nature.² Its foundation, however, lies in our psychological predicament, and the consequences, philosophically speaking, are momentous. "We find *again* without us," Ward says, "the permanence and individuality, the efficiency, and the adaptation we have found *first of all* within."³ Or more at length, "The main structure of our concept of Nature is entirely anthropomorphic. The unity of Nature is the ideal counterpart of the actual unity of each individual experience, where synthesis ever precedes analysis, and things are only distinguished relatively to each other so long as they are apperceived together by the one subject. The category of causality we owe to the interaction of active subjects with their environment and

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 165. For convenience, I shall refer to this work as N. in the sequel, giving the volume and the page. Similarly, I shall refer to *The Realm of Ends* as R.; to the *Psychological Principles* as P.; and to the *Study of Kant* as K. My references will always be to the first edition of each of these works.

² N., II, Lecture 15.

³ P., 335.

especially with one another, and we attribute it analogically to what we then call the interaction of natural agents. Then as to the regularity of Nature or the universal reign of law, this never has been, and never can be, empirically established, nor does its denial involve any contradiction. It is a postulate that has its root in our primitive credulity: were this *anticipatio mentis* never confirmed, knowledge would be impossible; but confirmed as it is continuously in our earliest experience we thus advance to an *interpretatio naturae* as an orderly and intelligible system, a cosmos that evinces directly or indirectly the all-pervading presence of mind."⁴

I have reminded the reader of these matters (and at some length) in order to show that Ward's account of the subject has an important, and in certain ways, a dominating function in his entire philosophy, and that, in some sense, we must be presumed to have a knowledge of the Ego, or at least an assurance concerning it, which is at least less uncertain than most of the bewildering uncertainties with which we are perplexed in these intricate affairs. This, on the one hand. On the other, it seems plain that the *fons et origo* of this knowledge or assurance must lie somewhere within the ambit of our own psychological experience. Ward, indeed, says so expressly. "We begin our study with our own experience," he tells us, "since other experience can be intelligible only in terms of this."⁵ With this preamble, therefore, I think I can explain, and in a certain small degree may even justify, the plan which I intend to follow in these pages. Taking the psychological account of the ego to be the core of this immensely important contention, I propose to devote my attention in the main to the profound and careful analysis which Ward supplies in his *Psychological Principles*, and merely to supplement this inquiry, as need may arise, by references to

⁴ R., 11-12.

⁵ P., 361.

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his other works. This is the best I can do, I think, on so wide a theme when the need for brevity is plain; but I should like to add a further and a more personal explanation. In confining my comments, in this fashion, to a relatively small, if a very fundamental, part of Ward's argument, I cannot even indicate the wealth of knowledge and the extraordinarily adequate equipment which he brings to his task. To a profound knowledge of philosophy and of its history he adds the genius of our foremost psychologist, and he combines with these the sifted and penetrating synthesis of a mind familiar at first hand with the theological, social, biological, physical, and mathematical sciences. To deal with a *part* of his theory is therefore to do it injustice; and those of us who have had the privilege of being his pupils, are continually reminded of the circumstance. We learned more from this amazing adequacy of his equipment than from any more specialized employment of it; and the example which he gave us in this respect (not of set intention but from the character of his teaching) was second only (as we know) to the balance and wisdom of his outlook upon life and to the supreme intellectual candour which none who knew him can fail to have noticed and to have felt. I admit, then, that any partial inquiry is most mischievously curtailed, and that any particular objection is liable to conquest by a completer understanding. Nevertheless, Ward's contentions are argued step by step. He shows us precisely what we must accept if we are to go along with him; and if we baulk at any point he would have been the last to desire to coerce us.

Ward's account of the ego, in its main theoretical structure, is given in the definition and general analysis of his *Psychological Principles*, together with the fifteenth chapter of that work when he deals with the presentation of self, with self-consciousness and with "subjective being." Accordingly, I shall deal with his account of these matters

in this order, and attempt a bald and brief summary of his principle contentions, indicating at the same time the points which seem to me to be either most important or most debatable.

The introduction to the *Psychological Principles*, following the historical method, explains in detail that psychology is not the "science of mind," either in the sense of Descartes' dualism (according to which minds are *res completae*) or according to the conceptions of a Lockian "internal sense." This "internal sense" is reflection or self-consciousness, and at this level "the so-called object-experience seems clearly implicated in the so-called 'subject-experience.'"⁶ Even Kant who, unlike the philosophers before him, recognized the inseparability of subject and object in experience, had too few misgivings concerning this internal sense.⁷ Nevertheless, Kant showed us the way; and if we agree that psychology is to be defined as *individualistic* or as dealing expressly with *individual experience*, we have to ask only how far and in what ways its "subjective" aspect is contrasted with the "objective" aspect of the sciences. Here "we can answer at once: the one is the standpoint of conscious life—or more fully the standpoint of the living subject in intercourse with his special environment; the other is the standpoint of Science in which the characteristics of individual environments are in general ignored."⁸ Thus "subjective" and "objective" have different meanings in psychology and epistemology. "In epistemology, 'objective,' we might say, means so much of experience as is common property, and 'subjective' so much as is private property: in psychology, 'subjective' refers to the owner, and 'objective' to the property that he owns."⁹ Or again (and advancing the argument).

⁶ P., 16.

⁷ P., 14.

⁸ P., 17.

⁹ P., 18.

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¹² P.

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"The so-called operations and states of consciousness are not mere modes *in vacuo*; they imply an active and affectible subject, and it can only conduce to clearness to make this fact as explicit as possible. The so-called contents of consciousness, again, though not necessarily actions or affections of the subject, are never objects *per se*; to be contents of consciousness they must be objects for a subject."¹⁰ The implication contained in the former of these statements is our main business at this time. It is, however, correlative with the latter; and the latter shows that "the way of ideas" (*i. e.*, of *objects* of the understanding) is the proper path of psychology. These "objects," however, belong to a subject. "By whatever methods, from whatever sources its facts are ascertained they must—to have a psychological import—be regarded as having a place in, or as being a constituent of, *someone's experience*."¹¹

Individual experience is, therefore, the experience of a subject which finds its own property confronting it objectively and interacting with it. Indeed, "Every Ego has its own correlative non-Ego";¹² and we dare not deny or forget the Ego through an interest in the "presentations" which are the objects of its attention and interest.

The argument, from this point onwards, is in the main a refutation of presentationism. The Ego is not the soul of pre-Kantian metaphysics. On the contrary "by pure Ego or Subject it is proposed to denote here the simple fact that everything experienced is referred to a Self experiencing."¹³ This is an "inexpugnable assumption"¹⁴ even for Hume who treats it as a fiction. Therefore, we had better accept it, and frankly. The Ego is *not* the body, for the body is a phenomenon and therefore someone's phe-

¹⁰ P., 24.

¹¹ P., 27.

¹² P., 31.

¹³ P., 35.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

nomenon; and a self-sufficient representationism is a contradiction in terms. Again, a series of "mental phenomena" or presentations cannot possibly (as Mill suggested) be aware of itself as a series. One part of the series cannot be aware of the rest, since both, *ex hypothesi*, are objects of awareness; and no single privileged phenomenon could ever accomplish what *no* phenomenon can achieve. In short, every phenomenon is the property of a subject and must continue a piece of property. This property, moreover, cannot be elicited from the subjective side, *e. g.*, from "feeling," since feeling is part of "subjective being" not an object of the ego. "The simplest form of psychical life involves not only a subject feeling but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable objective presentations which are the causes of its feeling."¹⁵ Through feeling a change of attention is induced, and this attention, again, is not an object or presentation but belongs to subjective being.

In the final analysis, therefore, the subject attends to and is moved by the presentations of objects. The subject itself is not an object at all. Neither it, nor its feeling, nor its attention, can ever be *known* immediately in themselves.¹⁶ They are known only mediately and through their effects. This, which is a paradox, is also inevitable. For philosophers have acknowledged very widely since the days of Kant that the subjective *qua* subjective cannot be presented.

This paradox is certainly considerable since it seems to imply that neither pleasure nor pain (the two modes of feeling) nor even the difference between them can ever be "*known* immediately in themselves" but only mediately and through their effects; and most of us, I think, would say (with perhaps a trace of stubbornness) that the truth which has been shown is only that in so far as pleasure or

¹⁵ P. 45.

¹⁶ P., 58.

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¹⁷ P.

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pain are not organic sensations they do not confront us in the same manner as certain other knowable facts (say sense data) do. The statement on a later page of the volume¹⁷ that "feeling as such is, so to put it, matter of being rather than of direct knowledge; and all that we *know* about it, we know either from its antecedents or from its consequents in presentation" may not seem to diminish the paradox appreciably; or even the further statement that feeling is "a unique and ultimate factor in all experience."¹⁸ If we grant its consequences and its reality as a mode of "subjective being," we still may suppose ourselves to have some sort of acquaintance with it; and if this acquaintance is not to be called *knowledge*, the most natural inference would seem to be that "knowledge" is being defined in a technical and peculiar sense. Similar difficulties appear to wait upon the parallel statements Dr. Ward makes concerning attention. The attention process, we are told, has for its modes, the varieties of *remembering, perceiving, inferring, desiring, striving*; and so forth.¹⁹ These imply activity as well as object.²⁰ Yet we are driven to questioning; for if these varieties are, as in the case of feeling, modes of our (subjective) "*being*," we might attempt to conclude (but apparently are forbidden to conclude) that, in part at least, these processes are just what we *are*; and if we distinguish between them (as apparently we do) it is hard to avoid the belief that the distinctions are based upon some kind of immediate acquaintance. If this were not so how could we impute them, anthropomorphically, in the "real" categories we prescribe to Nature; how could we find *again* what we have found *first of all* within? In a word, as we have seen, there is at least a pretext for the suspicion that the term "knowledge" is being used in some special and unnaturally restricted sense.

¹⁷ P., 245.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ P., 60.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

These dubieties, however, may perhaps be dispelled by a fuller understanding of Doctor Ward's account of our knowledge of self or of subjective being. This extended description, as we have seen, is supplied in Chapter XV of the *Psychological Principles*; and so we come to it.

The fundamental fact, here, is the reference of experience to a self that *has it*.²¹ This we attribute to all consciousness; and our consciousness of this consciousness, the *je ne connais* of the French, is the special problem of the chapter.²²

Ward distinguishes sharply between the self which is known (*i. e.*, the Me or the empirical Ego) and the knowing I (or pure Ego). Of all presentations whatsoever we may say, "This presentation is mine; it is my object; I am the subject attending to it."²³ It is the pure Ego to which this ultimate reference of *any* object is made; and the empirical Ego, the self known or presented, can only be one object or presentation among the others. This inexorable circumstance determines the lines of the inquiry.

The earliest nucleus of the Me is the "vital sense" or coenaesthesia; and an obvious and primitive interpretation of this nucleus leads us to think of the self as situated within the body and consisting of somatic appetites and reverberations. Hence we pass to an inner but still bodily self somewhere within the breast, desiring rather than simply appetitive, imagining as well as in present contact, through perception, with its environment. Finally, and more intelligently "we come at length upon the concept which every intelligent being more or less distinctly forms of himself as a person, M or N, having such and such a character, tastes and convictions, such and such a history, and such and such an aim in life."²⁴ This "inmost self," revealed to us chiefly in social life, is the "thinking and willing" self. But it is not the pure Ego; and the fact remains that this

²¹ P., 361.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ P., 363.

²⁴ P., 368.

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²⁵ P.,

"inmost self" is not inward enough, or rather that the pure Ego is of a different order from even the innermost inwardness. For further elucidation a certain symbolism is given us. Assuming that "external perception" is adequately symbolized by SpO we should symbolize "internal perception" (*i. e.*, self-cognition) as $Ip[Mp'O']$.²⁵ Here I is the pure Ego, and is expressly stated to have the single faculty of attention and the single capacity of feeling, as also (of course) to be itself incapable of being presented. M , of course, is the empirical Me at whatever stage it is known (but especially at the highest and most usual stage).

In his interpretation of this symbolic structure Ward does not directly discuss the relation of S to I ; and he treats O' as being "a differentiation of O (*e. g.*, *My* thunder as *I* hear it is to be considered a "differentiation" of thunder not so qualified). What he does discuss is the character of $Mp'O'$, the relation of p' to p and of M to I . Varying his phrases slightly, but preserving (as I think) his meaning, we may say that the statement *I* am conscious of (*myself* as hearing this clap of thunder) is adequate, in his view, to the whole complex situation here set forth for investigation. In this statement every part is significant and must somehow be capable of being explained. I must confess to a doubt, however, whether Ward's interpretation can be sustained.

Let us first consider $Mp'O'$. When we think of "ourselves hearing thunder," we commonly distinguish ourselves from the thunder, but it is not so plain that we distinguish ourselves from our hearing. Certainly, if the M (ourselves) is taken to be some "inner sense" of our bodies or some still more inward somatic reverberation, we do distinguish *this* M from $p'O'$; but if M is the "thinking and willing" (although empirical) self it is not at all plain that we draw the distinction except in so far as p' is a

²⁵ P., 371.

momentary event and M more or less abiding. If this is the whole distinction, however, M might very well be a continuity of *p*'s and not distinct from any *p*'. [Certain psychologists would hold of course that "sensation" does not contain *p*' and O', (sensing and sensum, say) but that it is intrinsically single. I am omitting this, however, and am still very sensible of a difficulty in the remainder.] Again: if *p*' is correctly described as *remembering*, *hearing*, *imagining* (and the rest) then not only may M be indistinguishable from a continuity of *p*'s but *p*' bids fair to be indistinguishable from *p*. As we have seen, these very instances of *remembering*, *perceiving* and the rest were stated in an earlier chapter to be instances of attention;²⁸ and attention, it is here stated (and in general abundantly evident) is a faculty of I (i. e., it is *p*, not *p*').

This leads us, secondly, to the relation of *p* to *p*'; and here, as I cannot help thinking, Ward's theory is poised upon a razor edge. As we have noted, the refutation of presentationism in his general analysis depended upon the intrinsic impossibility of precisely that which here he declares to occur. His argument there was that *no* presentation, however privileged, could ever have the relation to other presentations which the subject has to all presentations. Since *p* is stated here to be *different* from *p*', consistency is so far retained, but the symbolism at least suggests an important and instructive analogy, and the use of the same term (as *remembering*) to describe both, makes the "analogy," to say the least, very pointed. *Ex hypothesi*, however, M (a presentation) cannot have *at all* the same relation to other presentations as I has to all presentations, and the similarity of the relation, if there is one, must be more misleading than instructive.

In the third place, M *must* be *toto genere* different from I, since M is an object, presentation, or phenomenon while

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I is the subject of all objects, presentations or phenomena. Yet M in its inwardness, permanence and observable action points the way to I. In Ward's own words "To identify *I* and *Me* is logically impossible, for, *ex vi terminorum*, it is to identify subject and object."²⁷ Yet "we know *intellectually* what we are as experients: into the empty "form of consciousness' our being fits";²⁸ and "that pure subject or Ego which we reach in our analysis of experience at its rational level stands for an abstraction so long as we are content to distinguish it without attempting to separate it from its objective complement, the non-Ego."²⁹ Again "this concept of the pure Ego, or I, is the limit to which the empirical Ego points."³⁰

A limit may certainly lie outside the series which approximates to it, yet if subject and object are always the opposite poles of a bi-polar unity (and so defined by their contrast in complement) it is hard to see how M can ever be so very instructive concerning I; and the analogy which M offers in respect of inwardness, efficacy, and permanence seems particularly precarious. It is admitted that M, at its highest level is only metaphysically "inwards" and that I is perfectly non-spatial. It is declared, again, that activity cannot be observed; and if that is true *no* process can ever be observably active, and any "activities" of M (which seem to be observed) must be totally devoid of genuine efficacy. The case for permanence is still more dubious. M has indeed a certain permanence. We may certainly hold that "I have the same me as I had yesterday"; but we cannot say that "I am the same I that I was yesterday" if all we know is that yesterday's Me was the same Me as today's. I cannot see any reason for the inference. All "objects" imply the ownership of same subject but it does not follow that different enduring objects imply different

²⁷ P., 379.

²⁸ P., 381.

²⁹ P., 379.

³⁰ P., 377.

owners. (One might as well say that two ponies, if they are owned, imply two owners.) If the objects are owned *at all* the essential condition is satisfied. It would be satisfied, say, if all the Me's were owned by a single *Ich-an-sich*, or by that "consciousness in general" (or *Bewusstsein überhaupt*) of which Ward, taking his cue from Kant, so often speaks. And it would be satisfied in any other system of ownership.

All the three points we have considered, therefore (and none of them is trivial) contain serious difficulties, and their structural combination (or even the strigose symbolism in which, following Ward's lead, we have tried to regard them) does not seem entirely convincing. I would not be misunderstood, however, when I say this. The problem which Ward discusses in these chapters is the most intricate, as it is the central, theme of a reflective psychology; and a psychology which is not reflective and reasoned (but content to deal wholesale in genial *apercus*, sweeping generalizations or spacious analogies) is unworthy of what ought to be the honored name of psychical science. The systematic architectonic on which Ward has spent so much pains, and to which he has brought so much insight, wisdom and philosophy, is precisely what a developed science of psychology imperatively requires. Anyone, therefore, who dissents from it, for reasons shown, is aware, firstly, that Ward's analytical structure is an extraordinarily able attempt to deal with the *cruces* of the problem; and secondly that any adequate alternative is all but certain to follow the lines he has set forth (at least in great measure) and to fall, somewhere, within the framework which he supplies. Consequently, if we dissent, we dissent with gratitude and with hope. And if we attempt some alternative within the general framework we know that, even if our own constructions are wrong, they are still attempts to answer the right questions, and on the right lines.

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Believing, then, as I do, that the most fruitful line of investigation in this important matter is to be found in the further exploration of alternatives within the general framework of Ward's argument, I venture (although with the greatest diffidence) to offer certain reflections upon these cardinal points in the analysis. These are: (1) *p* or the "ownership" of the objects of experience; (2) the nature of *M* or of the "empirical self": and (3) the unknowability of *I*. On the first two of these I shall be very brief. The third point, if not treated very perfunctorily, needs fuller comment.

(1) It is doubtful, I think, whether the relationship of the Ego to its objects is properly to be described as "ownership." What is part of myself may perhaps be called my property, and I am said, more strictly, to "own" anything which I am permitted to use, with or without restrictions, for my own private purposes. It seems to many, however, that the mere fact that I am *acquainted* with this or that does not necessarily imply *possession*, in any intelligible sense. If presentations, although appearing as objects, are ultimately psychical in character (or parts of the "psychoplasm" in that sense) they *would* be personal property; but the revival of realism in the twentieth century appears to show that there is a possibility, at least, that this conclusion does not necessarily follow from the "ego-centric predicament." And the *use* of this property, if it were property, does not seem to correspond to ordinary notions of possession. To the prisoner, judge, turnkey and executioner are *his* objects in the sense that *he* is aware of them—until the drop comes. But they are not at his disposal.

Cognitively, these objects, as Berkeley himself sometimes admitted, are "in the mind" only in the sense that they are "before the mind." In other words they are *my* objects only because *I* attend to them, and some philoso-

phers at least take the plain reading of experience to be that the objects of our experience reveal themselves (for the most part) not to be "ours" at all, but on the contrary facts which do not require *us* (either as sensitive or as intelligent) although we have learned (up to a point) how to inspect and interpret them. This question, in a word, is still in debate; and although our attention, as Ward convincingly points out, is not merely cognitive, but also conational and suffused with feeling, it would not appear that these inducements to, and reconstruction of, our sensitive and intellectual selection, necessarily result in "ownership" of any indubitable sort. Even if every self is confronted in a sense with *its own* non-Ego, it does not follow that this specific non-Ego is a piece of property any more than the fact that a book lies upon *its own* part of the table makes the table a possession of the book.

(2) We said that the relation of M to I presents serious difficulties. In consequence there is a temptation either to deny the existence of one or the other, or to seek for something which is both. Anyone indeed who believes that there is *no* self other than the living mind which is our psychical existence is bound to deny any ultimate distinction between the "empirical" and the "pure" Ego. For Ward, such a distinction is ineluctable since the "pure" Ego cannot be known (as a presented object) and yet cannot be gainsaid; and this is the third and last point we are to discuss. Postponing it, therefore, for the moment, we may ask whether the difficulties of the relation between M and I, in Ward's account, may not readily be overcome without any fundamental alteration in the interpretation which he puts upon M and upon I respectively.

Here (as has been suggested) there is at least a plausible way of escape. When M is *bodily* (however inward and, so to say, etherial its zone), it is "presented" and it is *not* I. We have to distinguish, in other words, between the

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sight of the mind and the movement of the eye, between our psychical feeling and the somatic resonance which wraps it as in a garment, between intellectual assent or denial and the opening or closing of the glottis. Anyone, at least, who believes that his mind is not a psychical entity or merely a function of breath and blood and nerves, is bound to draw these distinctions and to believe (as Ward does) that his "thinking and willing" (or "spiritual") self can be distinguished from any form of its corporal accompaniments.

Supposing, then, that this restriction can be (and, indeed, must be) drawn, we might attempt to modify Ward's account somewhat as follows. There is an M, we should say, but this M is bodily, and it is not the "spiritual" self. On the other hand, this "spiritual" self is not merely intellectual and volitional. It is also fanciful and desiring, perceptual and appetitive. In other words, at all levels of M, apprehension, feeling and attention must be distinguished from their bodily accompaniments. These accompaniments are *never* spiritual; the psychical processes which they accompany are *always* spiritual.

I believe that this is what the plain man does mean by himself, and what he does distinguish (clearly enough in principle although with hesitation when he is cross-examined) from any zone or echo of his body.

M, in other words, consists, on this view, of organic sensa and their echoes; and these are "presented" in the *mélange confus* of mind and body. But M in any other sense is not "presented" (*i. e.*, given as a sensible object) and need not be distinguished from I. In other words, attention and feeling, in their continuity, are the authentic I itself; and if not the whole of it, at least an integral part. This is not Ward's theory; and of course it is at least as disputable as his. It pays regard to his distinctions, how-

ever, is based upon a clear principle, and may perhaps be sustained.

(3) The belief that neither the I nor its feeling and attention can be "directly and immediately *known*" but, on the contrary, that these have to be inferred, indirectly and indeed intellectually, from their effects, is manifestly central to the whole of Ward's analysis, and not the less so because he admits it to be a violent (if inescapable) paradox. Ultimately, however, the paradox and all its consequences are inevitable, in his view, because the principle of them is indubitable. It has emerged, as we have seen, from the history of thought itself being "a more concrete statement of what philosophers have very widely acknowledged in a more abstract form since the days of Kant—the impossibility of the subjective *qua* subjective being presented"³¹ and it seems plain that Ward, here even more than in other parts of his doctrine, keeps Kant in mind. It is fortunate, therefore (although not an accident) that in his *Study of Kant* he has dealt with the problem at what, in proportion, is a considerable length; and to this we may turn.

In this critical analysis Ward considers, first of all, Kant's doctrine of the "inner sense." Here the difficulty is that the "inner sense," if there were one, is not parallel to the "outer senses." In the latter the stimulation of a sense organ leads to awareness of a sense-datum. In the former there is no sense organ but the subject, on the contrary, would appear to affect itself.³² Again, our external senses are usually supposed to be differentiated from an original "*sensus vagus*." Kant, however, produces no evidence of any such differentiation;³³ and he could not, because "out of sensations as mere stuff, order and form can never arise: something ordering and informing is then

³¹ P., 58.

³² K., 141.

³³ K., 143.

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implied, and surely this something cannot be devoid of all spontaneity."³⁴ The attempt to consider "inner" sense as temporal and the "outer" senses as spatial could not succeed. In short, Kant's two kinds of sensibility, the internal and the external, are not comparable and do not run on all fours."³⁵

In the *Analytic*, the subject has the role of active synthesis, and this function can never be *given* through objects, but, on the contrary, is presupposed when any object is given. This, Ward tells us, is "the central truth which we have to keep steadily before us"³⁶ and refrain from confusing, like Kant, with the supposed phenomena of an inner sense. We should also avoid some of the standing puzzles of Kant's *Dialectic*. The problem there was "to hold fast to the *reality* of the self without at the same time repudiating the doctrine of transcendental idealism, *i. e.*, that the self is only "given" by an inner sense and so as *phenomenal*";³⁷ but Kant persisted in regarding the Ego as "problematic"—a mere "as if"—because he persisted in treating the real subject of experience as an object, although his theory truly implied that the subject *is* the activity of synthetic judgment itself. He vacillated in consequence between what he did not doubt and what (as he thought) he could not show; and in the end was driven to the statement that the Ego is neither phenomenon nor noumenon. According to Ward the only possible meaning of this statement is that "the Ego is in Aristotle's sense a substantial factor in experience not a mere attribute of it";³⁸ and Ward concludes that "apperception is not a "presented existence" . . . but the activity of a subject . . . and experience consists in its interaction with objects which are presented existences. The two are correlative, but they do not stand

³⁴ K., 146

³⁵ K., 147.

³⁶ K., 150.

³⁷ K., 163

³⁸ K., 170.

on a par. Nevertheless, Kant is continually attempting either to treat of them apart or to regard both as objects. *Together* (in experience) they cannot, however, both be objects alike given in sense—the subject merely as epiphenomenon “attached” to or “accompanying” the phenomena of external sense. . . . *Apart*, on the other hand, they are but empty abstractions; and in that case, it is immaterial whether we designate them, like Locke, as a “something we know not what,” or like Hume, as nothing that we do know at all.”³⁹

To this conclusion, and to the grounds for it, certain observations may be pertinent.

(a) The self on any theory cannot be simply an object of sense (external or internal) to be taken in at a gulp by an single set of sensing. Even if it revealed itself to “inner sense” and were a “thing,” it would still be an intellectual construction in the sense that we should require to think out the fleeting revelations of sense in terms of their reference to something relatively permanent. If there were an “inner sense,” however, we might legitimately believe that we could obtain through it genuine if fragmentary revelations of the “thing.”

(b) Sense organs, or the supposed derivation for a simpler and vaguer condition, are at least extrinsic requirements or criteria of the fact of sensation. The “inner sense,” therefore, if there were one, would not necessarily be annihilated by arguments based upon the supposed absence of these; and if by “sense” we mean merely a direct unmediated acquaintance with existential fact, there would appear to be grounds for believing that our acquaintance with the forms and varieties of feeling and attention (as exemplified in the concrete instances of these which Ward supplies) is, in this interpretation of the words, either a sense or, as Locke says “very like it.”

³⁹ K., 173-174.

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(c) The absolute distinction (even if it is a differentiation in unity) between subject and object, leading, as it does, to the conclusion that the "subject" can never be an "object" even to itself, may be disputed. Thus Bradley held that portions of the non-self might be assimilated by the self and *vice-versa*. More generally it does not seem evident that we cannot be immediately acquainted with feeling or attention. These may not confront us as a color does. Perhaps, even, they do not confront us as taste, or nausea, or as an aching tooth does. Nevertheless, we do seem aware of them; and to *find* them within us. To be acquainted with a thing, and to be acquainted with a thing *as an object* (in the wide sense in which "object" is used in these arguments) are perhaps nothing different from one another. In other words the sole question may be whether or not we are immediately acquainted, in a form which may lead to knowledge, with our psychical existence. Our own being, we may conclude, is primarily rather a reference to objects than itself an object. While it is itself it is not, in general, occupied with itself. Yet, as Arnauld used to say, we may always have a "virtual" acquaintance with ourselves; and if this virtual self-acquaintance (very partially, to be sure, but perhaps with immediacy) becomes express self-acquaintance, it need not follow that we turn ourselves inside out, so to speak, in this process, and can never observe what we are.

(d) If "activity" be interpreted, not as a process with which we may be acquainted, but as the governing presupposition of the whole subject-object duality, it is hard to see why it should have any special connection or affinity with either pole of this duality. In so far as "subjective being" is contrasted (within experience) with "objective being," the activity presupposed in *both* would seem, theoretically to be indifferent to *either*. Ward, as we have seen, while regarding "activity" in this light *also* allies it with

"subjective being"; but he does not, and cannot, give a reason. *Per contra*, if we could be acquainted with the processes we call striving, and if these were literally and actually phases of our activity, our "subjective being" might be partially recognized for what it is, in the way most of us assume to be possible. If not, feeling, attention, together with their modes and distinctions, would seem to be *known* only mediately; and there is no obvious connection between the results of *this* mediate knowledge and the *other* intellectual construction according to which (as Ward tells us) we "fit our being" into the "form" of an unrepresentable activity presupposed by, but not authentically revealed in, the whole subject-object duality.

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[This was written during Doctor Ward's lifetime when the project of a "Ward Number" of *The Monist* was first broached. In the belief that there is no good reason for saying anything different now that Doctor Ward's eye cannot reach these discussions (if indeed it be true that it cannot) I have left them as they stand. But I would like to express here my admiration for his moral and intellectual character and my deep regret at the calamity of his death. I never met a man so sincere in his aim or so sincere towards others; and his death is our loss and our great calamity although his years were ripe. For his intellectual force was not abated.—J. L.]

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THE APPLICATION OF WARD'S PSYCHOLOGY TO THE LEGAL PROBLEM OF CORPORATE ENTITY

I HAD often hoped to meet Professor Ward, but as that is now impossible, I may perhaps be allowed before entering upon the problem of this paper to acknowledge the debt of gratitude that is due to him from a lawyer who is interested in the nature of law, the nature of society, and the nature of the State, and who believes that psychology holds the key to the solution of such questions. For it is difficult for anyone to pursue studies outside his own professional competence unless he has complete confidence in his guide; and Ward possessed in an exceptional degree those particular qualities which inspire confidence in a lawyer. To begin with, he is consistent and therefore intelligible, and he frankly admits not only the limitations of knowledge but also the consequences that follow. Thus having studied physiology both at Leipzig and Cambridge and having earned the admiration of Sir Michael Foster in that department of science he obviously kept in close touch with its most recent developments. He uses biological analogies with telling effect and is keenly alive to the "effect of the mind on the body"; but when he is pursuing analytical psychology he recognizes the fact that the intellect has not built any reliable bridge of theory by which transition can be made from the mind to the body or from the body to the mind and he therefore works within his

chosen province and never leads his followers into a trap which is not a bridge because it will neither stand nor float. And this fundamental consistency extends to every detail. He never uses a word which will not accept full responsibility for all the weight that can be put upon it. Furthermore, he is comprehensive. His treatment covers practically all the ground, not of course, exhaustively, but in the sense that all the most important matters of principle are systematically and coherently dealt with. And he moves easily and as an equal in the company of the great philosophers of the past and brings the illumination of their thought to bear on each point of his treatment showing exactly where and why he agrees or disagrees with their opinions and giving such a wealth of reference that his work is a kind of psychological encyclopaedia. Perhaps the training of a lawyer makes one unduly responsive to tradition and references, but in every department of learning there is a kind of apostolic succession obtaining at a certain high level which operates profoundly, though not very directly upon all of us. For the lift boy admires the uniform of the commissionaire who respects the office manager who appointed him, and the office manager recognizes business capacity in the director who supervises his department, while the directors appreciate the unique qualities of the chairman under whose guidance the business prospers. Thus there is a kind of indirect recognition not only of power at the top but of the value of those qualities by which it has been acquired and by which it is appraised. And in a learned profession such as the law or the church the vitality and meaning and scope of a great tradition is preserved at the top. For if "we cannot cross the cause why we are born," neither can we cross the cause why, or the form in which, our thoughts are born. To be intelligible an author must use not only the language but the forms of thought which we all inherit,

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and before he uses them it is desirable that he should understand them. It is absurd if a man goes into his garden with a telescope to study astronomy without knowing that the heavenly bodies have been under observation for some time and that the sciences of physics and mathematics have already arrived at certain serviceable conclusions. For a bright idea or the picturesque description of a common experience, however interesting it may be to a wide circle of readers, differs as much from a scientific theory as a passing meteor does from Orion's belt; and discoveries like those of Einstein could neither have been made, nor can they be understood, apart from the immense volume of learning upon which they are based. It was thus as heir of the past that Ward became, in the words of *The Times*, "the father of modern English Psychology." His "science of individual experience" opened up a new view and, if an outsider may hazard an opinion, it is a view which people will find themselves driven by the force of logic to accept before further systematic progress can be made. Thus Mr. G. C. Field has shown, in an article which appeared in the thirtieth volume of *Mind*, that the psychology of several particular instincts is open to much the same objections as the discredited psychology of several particular faculties, and the same is true of *Lebensformen*. Of course, the important place occupied in psychology by such words as anger and fear, business and religion, and the like, shows that these are matters with which psychology must deal, but in general psychological analysis such distinctions become insignificant long before the mind comes to the end of its tether. And it is worth observing that the sex specialist Freud when he attempts general psychology is driven to extend his denotation of the word sex till it comprises every conceivable form of vital activity. But however this may be, there can be no doubt at all that forty years of incessant labor and a close study of all the important contem-

porary literature bearing on his subject only confirmed Ward in his convictions; and the general stability and assimilating power of his work will be best appreciated by those who happen to have read his successive articles in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* finally consolidated and brought up to date in his *Psychological Principles* of 1918, a book which *The Times* recently described as one of the two most important works on psychology in the English language, the other being William James' *Principles of Psychology*. Indeed, many will subscribe to the opinion expressed by Professor Dawes Hicks in the *Hibbert Journals* and in the *Aristotelian Society's Proceedings* that Ward's *Psychological Principles* is "beyond all question the greatest and most original work on the sciences in the English language."

Of course the practical problems involved in the treatment of nervous disorders, education, propaganda, and the like, which at present engage so much attention, do not fall within the scope of a book on psychological principles, but it would be interesting to many if such matters were sometimes discussed in relation to Ward's psychology which is not like a rag bag into which the tattered fragments of miscellaneous observation can be thrown; for it is an organic whole which either assimilates or rejects, and if it assimilates vitalizes, whatever is presented to it, so that its truth and value can best be tested in its application. Such an undertaking would be peculiarly appropriate to *The Monist* which seeks to bring various branches of study into contact. Not being a pathologist, however, but a lawyer, I propose to attempt something of the kind in regard to a problem in which lawyers have been much interested for it has far-reaching importance in questions with which they are concerned.

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THE LEGAL PROBLEM OF CORPORATE ENTITY

The problem to be discussed in this paper goes by a variety of names. In Germany, where the modern controversy arose, it is known as *Verbandspersönlichkeit* or *Genossenschaftstheorie*; in France it is often called *Personnalité morale* or *Personnalité juridique*; in England the late Vinerian Professor called it Legal personality, and in America it is known as the Entity theory of corporations. Psychologists might call it the problem of the group mind. It is not strictly a legal problem, for a legal problem is always a practical problem, but it bears upon various practical legal problems which about twenty or thirty years ago happened to be very much to the fore not only in Germany and France but also in England and America, so that the number of lawyers who became interested in it far exceeded the rather limited number of those who are ordinarily interested in theoretical questions. The practical problems which were then prominent having been temporarily disposed of without any solution of the theoretical problem, interest in the latter has abated; but it is bound to arise again because it lies at the base of all legal and social and political organization. Not that there is any immediate prospect of a radical solution, for the individuality of a group is rather like the individuality of a single person which, as Leibniz says, envelopes the infinite. But philosophy, which is an ennobling pursuit, would have to be abandoned if philosophers were easily discouraged.

The practical problems to which reference has been made were as follows. In Germany a Civil Code was being settled for the German Empire and general provision had to be made for juristic persons; in France the *campagne*

laïque was in progress and the Law of Associations was under heated discussion; in England the Scotch Free Church case and the liability of Trade Unions for the acts of their agents were first before the House of Lords and then before Parliament; and in America there was the great question of Trusts and Corporations. In these various countries the date and bulk and importance of the literature and learning brought to bear upon the theoretical problem follows the order above indicated; but before saying anything about this, one or two general observations may be made.

Law is a social product; it has to do with the social relations of men, and with groups as well as with single men, so that its theoretical basis must be sought in sociology. It is hardly worth quoting authority for these propositions because none in these days disputes them. They are equally applicable whether we consider the beginning or the end; for if, as many people reasonably believe, there is a law eternal in the heavens it cannot be conceived either there or anywhere else apart from social relations. We, in fact, need some concept more general than "the genus of which State and Corporation are species"—one that includes unorganized as well as organized groups. But unfortunately (and here again no authority need be quoted) the science of analytical sociology is not yet on its legs. My own little contribution to that great problem was made before the Aristotelian Society of London last November and as it has appeared in the twenty-fifth volume of their published proceedings it would be superfluous as well as irrelevant for me to attempt again any discussion of the general problem. What we are here concerned with is the theories which lawyers have made in order to account for a concept which is so natural that any unsophisticated person has always used it, and will always use it, without a moment's reflection.

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We cannot, of course, expect to find any theory in the *Leges Barbarorum*. Roman law, besides dealing with the practical problems, had significant things to say. A corporation (*universitas*) acts as a person (*personae vice fungitur*); the liability of the corporation remains though the members change, for the name remains (*stet nomen*) and so forth. Roman law had no explicit theory and the question whether any, and what, theory is implicit in its provisions is one that has been discussed for a century at great length with extraordinary erudition but without anything approaching to agreement. On the whole, perhaps, most acceptance is given to Savigny's view that Roman law regards a corporation as a ward and the corporators or officers of the corporation as guardians. An English or American lawyer can easily follow this idea if he thinks of a corporate estate as a trust estate and the corporators or officers of the corporation as trustees. Speaking for myself I am clearly of the opinion that sooner or later lawyers will have to recognize the fact that what is often discussed as the incorporation of men is really the estatification of interests, and that a corporation sole or one man company is an absurdity when regarded in any other light. But I am here anticipating a conclusion of which the psychological foundations will be discussed later, and for the present we are only concerned with the historical development of legal theory. The joint possession and use of common land comes from early times when it was the most important fact of economic life, and it still exists in a very attenuated way up to the present. It is part of the ancient common law of Europe and none troubled about a theory for it until recently when speculative interest arose in another connection. Neither was there any trouble about the contract of partnership (*societas*) derived from Roman law, though in the case of a *société en commandite*, when the property of the partners was entrusted to the manage-

ment of an agent, the situation temporarily created was in many ways very like that of a modern company.

It was in connection with the corporate bodies which were taking shape in the early part of the later middle ages that need for a theory was felt. The eleventh and twelfth centuries were formative not only of institutions but also of general ideas which crystalized in the thirteenth; and it was a lawyer Pope, a contemporary of Aquinas, who is credited with inventing the famous fiction theory. It has often been observed that a theory in order to be effective must have powerful interests behind it; and there can be no doubt that this theory supported the power of the central authorities of church and State—a power which was valuable not only to themselves but also to everyone else in those unsettled times—for it recognized in them and in them alone the faculty of creating corporations. According to the theory a corporation is not a natural entity but a fictitious person (*persona ficta*) created by the State, non-existent unless the State has created it, and only existing in the manner and for the purposes ordained by the State. Whenever and wherever the State was firmly established this view prevailed; not only in the countries which received the Roman law but also in those which did not. From England it went with the common law to America where “a corporation is a franchise.” It was in Germany and in the interests of Germanism as against Romanism that it was first challenged by Beseler in 1843, but chiefly by Gierke whose monumental writings on the subject begin in 1868 and cover about half a century. They were, however, practically complete before 1900 when Maitland epitomized Gierke’s theory in words which are now widely familiar. “Our German Fellowship (*Genossenschaft*) is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State’s machinery, no collective name for individuals, but a real organism and a real person, with a body and members and a will of its

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own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious person; it is a *Gesammperson*, and its will is a *Gesammtwille*; it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will." None read Gierke more carefully or was better able to define his views than Maitland; but if anyone who is not prepared to face the massive volumes of the *Gennossenschaftsrecht* and the *Genossenschaftstheorie* desires a somewhat fuller account of the theory than that just quoted he will find it in the section on *Verbandspersonen* in Gierke's *Deutsches Privatrecht*. I will use the phrase corporate body, though unsatisfactory, as the best that I can think of for *Verbands-person*. Gierke says that a corporate body is one which has legally recognized rights and duties as a single whole regarded as distinct from the sum of its members. By its own laws and orders a State may confer the rights of a corporation upon any body of persons as it thinks fit, but (if I may use an illustration of my own) it no more makes the body of persons upon whom it confers corporate capacity than it makes the body of a man upon whom it confers the privilege of nobility. Gierke agrees with a long series of jurists beginning with Puffendorf that though a corporate body is for legal purposes an abstraction it is for those purposes no more of an abstraction than is John Smith. To make this clear it may be observed that though the law touches the life of John Smith at many points, and conditions it in many important particulars, it does not generally affect his life directly as a whole. It is not often interested in his domestic happiness or his indigestion or the numberless other things that he likes and dislikes and that affect his life as a whole and make him what he is. On the contrary, it abstracts from his whole life and conduct such particular actions as have legal significance and deals with him in respect of them through one or more of his various

interests, it may be his interest in half a crown or in a valuable estate or in the accommodation of a club or in a share in a company or in a whole skin or in a living body. Thus Gierke points out that whereas the legal concept of a single person is got by isolating elements which are related to his own being, that of a corporate body is got by concentrating elements which make a number of men into a single being. His own words on the point are so important but so difficult to translate that I give them verbatim. *Indem wir diese unsinnlichen Einheiten gegeneinander abgrenzen und einerseits durch Isolierung die in jedem Menschen auf das eigne Sein bezogene Einheit, anderseits durch Konzentrierung die in vielen Menschen ein gemeinsames Sein wirkende Einheit verselbständigen, belangen wir zum Begriffe der Wesenheiten, die im Rechtsgebiete als Einzelpersonen und Verbandspersonen auftreten.* He says that a corporate body is a living thing that wills and acts as such. Its organs are men but they do not act one for the other, nor one for the others, but each as an integral part of the whole. *Die "Vertretung," die hierbei stattfindet, ist also kein Stellvertretung des Einen für den Anderen, sondern Darstellung des Ganzen durch den Theil.* A corporate body is a social organism and therefore must have a constitution providing for the origin and termination of membership and of office, defining the personality of the corporate body in reference to the members and also defining within what limits the resolutions and acts of the members or officers are to be reckoned as the resolutions and acts of the corporate body. It must further provide for the rights and duties of the members to the corporate body and to one another. A corporate body may be a member of a larger body. It is either a corporation or a foundation. *Die Körperschaft ist ein Verband mit einer ihm selbst entstammenden Persönlichkeit; ihre Seele ist ein einheitlicher Gemeinwille, ihr Körper ein Vereinorganis-*

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mus. Die Anstalt ist ein Verband mit einer ihm von aussen eingepflanzten Persönlichkeit; ihre Seele ist ein einheitlicher Stiftungswille, ihr Körper eine organische Einrichtung, vermöge deren fort und fort Menschen diesem Willen dienstbar werden. This is perhaps all that it is possible to say here about Gierke's theory unless one should add that he is inclined to attribute a peculiar and admirable quality to the German as opposed to the Roman will in virtue of which it more easily throws off elements which coalesce into a joint will. This claim has been ridiculed by some of his compatriots; but Gierke's thoughts turn a good deal on early Germanic institutions, and if we compare our own early institutions with the more artificial products of today it is easy to follow his meaning. The jury must be unanimous. In old vestry books the resolutions of the parishioners appear to have been unanimous. In Russia, where primitive institutions survive, a village meeting is ultimately unanimous; the dissentients are not out-voted but suppressed or ejected like Thersites of old. All this is far distant from a carefully counted vote and further still from proportional representation but it is so significant that it has been worth a moment's digression to note it. The gist of Gierke's theory, often called the *Willenstheorie*, is that every corporate body, and the same argument would I think apply to every social group, has a joint will distinct from the wills of its members. This theory has certainly not had a decisive victory. A list of the German combatants on each side together with much interesting matter is to be found in a note to section 49 of the last edition of Windscheid's *Pandekten*. Jellinek in his *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (chapter VI, II, B. I.) objects that an organism is essentially a teleological conception, and that every definition of an organism as an objective phenomenon independent of our individual point of view (*von unserer Betrachtungsweise unabhängig*) is

bound to fail; for there is no objective unity analogous to the unity of individual experience. And he claims in a note to the second edition of the same book that Gierke's rectorial address at the University of Berlin, *Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände* (1902) was directed to this objection and failed to meet it. I notice moreover that in a recent article by Silberschmit in the eighteenth volume of the *Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*, where the views of many writers on the topic are discussed, no reference is made to Gierke or his theory, although it would have been very appropriate to the subject.

France besides taking careful note, as she usually does, of what is going on in Germany, has produced a literature on the subject which is hardly less voluminous or important; and the most convenient account of the whole matter—historical and analytical, French and German—is to be found in Saleilles' single though substantial volume, *De la Personnalité Juridique*, which was first published in 1910. The second edition of 1922 contains a preface by Professor Capitant suggesting, as appears from other sources also to be true, that Saleilles represents the learned opinion of France. He recognizes the reality of a corporation as an entity for practical and juristic purposes, but he is unable to accept the *Willenstheorie*, not only because it is too complicated and refined, but because it fails to give any psychological explanation of a will other than that of a single person. He himself, and also Professor Michoud, follows Ihering in regarding a legal right as an interest protected by law, but adds that a will must be put at the service of the interest in order to make it effective. When the free will of a single individual is inappropriate, or unavailable, a will can be disengaged by means of an organization or what Hauriou calls an *institution*, by which I understand any constituted scheme.

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England, like other countries, accepted the fiction theory; but the practical inconveniences were obviated by the use of trusts, supplemented latterly by legislation under which corporate and quasi-corporate bodies are freely erected with statutory rights and liabilities. Some idea of the volume of these provisions may be got by citing (in one of the alphabetical orders in which English law books are written) the articles in Halsbury's *Laws of England* which deal with them. Apart from special forms of public utilities such as electricity, gas, railways, and so forth, there are articles dealing with particular private and public groups and government departments such as building societies, clubs, commons, companies, constitutional law, corporations, friendly societies, industrial societies, literary institutions, local government, loan societies, partnership, public authorities, public health, and trade unions. Then for "foundations" there are articles on charities, ecclesiastical law, education, settlements, trusts, and wills. To these must be added such articles as may bear on the whole subject, such as agency, contract, personal property and real property, and articles on action, practice and procedure so far as they bear on joinder of parties, representative actions, execution against firms, and the like. If then the British Empire were, like Germany, preparing a civil code for the Empire, or even, like France, preparing a Law of Associations, it would not be surprising if questions of principle should assume an interest which they have not yet had in this country. But the English literature bearing upon the theory, though slight in amount, is not insignificant. Pollock and Maitland have pursued historical inquiries and the latter has shown, as none else has done, the illuminating importance of trusts in this connection. Doctor Geldart also made Legal Personality the subject of his inaugural lecture as Vinerian Professor and wrote repeatedly on trade unions. These writers favor the views of

Gierke but they substantially refrain from dealing with a problem which is one of philosophy and two of them (Maitland at the end of his paper on *Moral Personality and Legal Personality*, and Geldart in his inaugural lecture) are content to urge philosophers to do so.

In the English courts, an ancient fiction, though never allowed to obscure facts or to obstruct substantial justice, is often treated with ceremonious respect; but the investigation of modern metaphysics is judiciously ignored. If, however, the English bench and bar had an opinion on the subject, it would, I think quite certainly, be that which was cautiously expressed by Dicey in the *Harvard Law Review* in 1919. "Personally I am not inclined at the present moment to follow out German thought, or misthought, to the startling conclusion that a corporate body has all or nearly all the characteristics of a human being. Whilst I am not prepared without further consideration to treat the important legal fact as grounded on nothing but a legal fiction. . . . My belief increases every day that there are 'natural corporations,' groups of persons who act together for different objects and on account of their acting together have many feelings and do many actions which they would not entertain and which they would not perform were it not for this habit of common action and common sentiment." It is less certain whether the words which follow would command similar adherence; but Maitland had previously regretted the lack of flexibility in our legal ideas of corporate bodies, and both writers were regarded with very exceptional respect in the profession. Dicey continues, "This is what may be called 'corporate consciousness' and in my judgment the gravest mistake made both by English courts and by the British Parliament has been always, where possible, to incorporate such natural corporations when their acts are not injurious to the state, and, on the other hand, to treat such natural corporations

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as illegal when their aims are palpably injurious to the state."

In America it may be inferred from Professor Gray's book, *On the Nature and Sources of the Law*, and from articles, reviews and notes of cases which have for many years appeared in the *Harvard Law Review* that the Entity theory is thoroughly disliked both in theory and in practice. Ever since Dicey lectured at Harvard and wrote in the *Harvard Law Review* for 1904 on "The Combination Laws and Opinion," it has been impossible to deny that corporate action is a reality with which the law must reckon. But Mr. Arthur W. Machen probably reflects the general opinion in his article published in 1911 when he says that corporate personality is a natural conception to be used and not analyzed. "To understand and apply the doctrine of corporate personality no other guide is desirable than sturdy common sense." I do not know whether Professor Laski's article in 1916, reciting the well known difficulties of rejecting the entity theory, produced any effect; it did not apparently produce any reply. But I have not met in America, any more than in England, any serious attempt to define or to get to grips with the philosophical or psychological problem. It has, however, been observed in both countries (and I do not think that it can possibly be denied) that from the point of view of philosophical theory there can be no fundamental difference between a large group and a small one, between one which is long established and one which is ephemeral, or between one which is legally recognized and one which is not.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF THE GROUP MIND

Let us now look at the problem we have been discussing in the light of Ward's psychology. The first necessity is to define the point at issue; but the literature is so vast, views are so various, and so much is conceded on both sides, that this is no easy task. It is perhaps most conveniently put in the form of the question—Is a society (using that word with the widest possible extension) an organism or only an organization? Is it, as Gierke says in his rectorial address, a living organism with a life of its own essentially similar to the life of a man? *Allein wir betrachten das soziale Ganze gleich dem Einzelorganismus als ein Lebendiges und ordnen die Gemeinwesen zusammen mit den Einzelwesen dem Gattungsbegriff des Lebewesens unter.* Or is it, as Stammeler says in his *Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft*, merely an organization characterized by the special manner in which the ends of individual men are set and combined as means to one another in the social relation? *In dem Zusammenleben der Menschen werden ihre Zwecke wechselseitig als Mittel für einander gesetzt. Dadurch entsteht ein Unterschied von den Innenleben eines jeden, das es mit seinen wünschenden Gedanken zu tun hat, eine eigene Art der Zwecksetzung. Sie verbindet die Bestrebungen und wird als drittes Wollen über den Begehrungen der verknüpften Menschen gedacht.* And, again, elsewhere, *Der Gedanke von äusserer Regelung* (which "outside regulation," with Stammeler, connotes organization), *das ist einem verbindenden Wollen, ist mithin die Form in dem Begriffe Gesellschaft.* As against the organism theory it is urged by Jellinek that it is impossible to give any scientific (*wissenschaftlich*)

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definition of an organism except in terms of an individual will, and we have no knowledge of any wills other than those of men; so that it follows that Gierke's theory is merely a profession of faith or, as Max Weber said, *Gierke Gefühlsinhalte hypostasiert*. As against the organization theory all the arguments which have been used against the Social Contract theory are, as it seems to me, available. If the "social organism" is dependent upon our way of looking at things (*von unserer Betrachtungsweise abhängig*), may it not be said with equal truth that our way of looking at things depends upon the "social organism" which has not been made, and is at best very imperfectly understood, by any of us?

Notwithstanding the eminence of Ward's position it appears that a good many people are not very familiar with his writings; neither is it an easy matter to epitomize his views, but an attempt must be made to do so, insofar as this is relevant to our present purpose.

Ward defines psychology as the science of individual experience. Although Hartley as far back as 1748 had defined it as "The Theory of the Human Mind, with that of the Intellectual Principles of Brute Animals," and Hamilton in 1836 as "the science conversant about the phaenomena or modifications or States of the Mind or Conscious Subject or Soul or Spirit or Self or Ego," yet the word came into use in connection with those weird experiences which are so strikingly individual that they find no place in the natural sciences, for the natural sciences rely upon experiences which are common to all. Thus in France until lately psychology meant abnormal psychology, and the Society for Psychical Research which was founded by that name in 1882 is concerned with unusual experiences. But the important distinction nowadays is not between the normal and abnormal (for everyone recognizes that psychology includes both) but between the

subjectivism of Descartes and Berkeley on the one hand and the objectivism of Herbart and the modern behaviorists on the other. In this controversy, Ward maintains that mind itself includes both elements; for at the center of his psychology lies the duality of mind or experience which includes a subject who experiences and an object, or psychologically objective world, which is immediately experienced. Neither is conceivable apart from the other, for we can no more think of a subject without experience than we can of an experience not experienced by someone real or imaginary. This psychologically objective world, which is part of the mind and the private property of the subject, is to be distinguished from the epistemologically objective world of science and history and common sense which is common property. Concerning this outside world it is important not only to realize how much we know but also how little. I am told that the mole cannot live in the daylight, and that the vision of a cow beyond a few inches is blurred. Our own vision even when good is limited; none can hear wireless vibrations without the help of an appropriate instrument. Nevertheless, it is upon the material which may be conveniently described as delivered to the mind by the brain and the senses that experience is "grounded." The problem of psychology is to describe the manner in which the mind elaborates this material into its own world—a world in which the most peculiar abstract conceptions and the wildest delusions of a lunatic are every bit as objective as the experiences which are common to us all. Now if we admit the existence of mind as well as of body, it will be conceded that each one of us starts life with inherited aptitudes both mental and bodily, and it is therefore necessary to trace the development of mind phylogenetically. In order to do this, Ward goes back almost to the origins of life and follows the fortunes of what he calls the psychological individual, meaning thereby a hypo-

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thetical individual who begins at the beginning and acquires for himself all the experience which operates in us through our ancestors. Ward conceives mind as having a subjective or functional side and an objective or structural side, both sides having the intimacy and correlation that belong to function and structure. The sole function of the individual is attention, which is guided by its sole capacity which is feeling. The objective side he describes as *totum continuum objectivum* or psychoplasm—both terms having the same meaning. Psychoplasm is analogous to bioplasm and the process of its elaboration by specialization is analogous. Starting as an undifferentiated continuum some vague differentiation is unexplainably effected by the attention of the subject which is directed thereto or attracted thereby, and when once a differentiation has been made a more intelligible process has begun, for the differentiation is retained and becomes the organ of further differentiation as experience proceeds. We may obtain an advanced and high speed illustration of the kind of process involved by taking a few short successive glances at an unfamiliar object.

At each glance there is a retention of what is seen so that the object is seen in greater detail and with greater accuracy on each occasion. The lowest level of experience is that of sensation and movement—the level at which we so to speak make contact with the outside world through our bodies. For just as changes in the physical environment occasion nervous changes which “occasion” sensations; so movements of attention, if sufficiently pronounced and appropriately directed, “occasion” nervous changes by which bodily movements are effected. Thus by differentiation of the psychoplasm, on the one hand, things come to be clearly differentiated and perceived in time and space, and on the other hand out of a general, diffusive, purposeless movement there are differentiated the specific controlled

movements which are found to give satisfaction. The next level with which Ward deals is that of imagination and desire. Out of memories, which have a context in time but not in space, there are developed generic images which are free from context in time or space and thus available for intellectual manipulation. And so too desires, which have not attained the assured prevision of reason, have yet sufficient independence to rise above the present certainty of sense. Lastly, through the acquisition of language and the development of social intercourse we reach the level of intellection and reasoned purpose. Here the presentation of self, the empirical self, becomes the central object of interest and is capable of infinite refinement and nobility. Although Ward dwells on each of the levels referred to he is careful to trace the gradual transition from one to the other so that there is no gap in the development. And, of course, life at a higher level does not supersede life at a lower though the latter may be more or less controlled by the former.

The point with which we are here concerned is this. Development throughout and at every level, and whether it concerns apprehension or movement of attention (which controls not only trains of thought but movements of the body), involves elaboration of the psychoplasm, that is to say it has a psychologically objective or structural side; and this structure is throughout framed by the subjective activity of the psychological individual. As the process becomes more intellectual it becomes, as that word itself implies, more definitely selective. Certain elements, as in a picture or symphony, are integrated by the subject; and again certain aspects or elements of various phenomena are found to be relevant in certain connections and are abstracted by the use of words, which become the instruments of imageless thought and are themselves elaborated into objects of a still higher and higher order. Thus are formed

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what Ward calls intellectual systems, a phrase which he prefers to Herbart's "apperception masses" inasmuch as the latter follows the analogy of chemical behavior and ignores the subjective activity. By means of intellectual systems, the building up of which is always motivated by interest, we arrive at general ends which, owing to the value which we put on them (such valuation being itself an intellectual process), may become objects of pursuit and have the same relative independence as an intellectual system regarded as such. Such general ends or sentiments or interests differ from intellectual systems owing to the fact that they are ultimately based on the subjective feeling side, whereas an intellectual system (if, for the purpose of analysis, we eliminate the subjective factors of creative imagination and make-believe) is ultimately based on objective circumstance.

Leaving now the psychological individual and turning to the concrete individual such as you or me, Ward considers that just as our bodies inherit at the moment of conception a certain tendency to develop according to race and parentage, so too the mind on its objective side as psychoplasm has a particular inherited *Anlage* or aptitude of mental development. In the lower forms of animal life, where progress is made by the race rather than the individual, this *Anlage* practically determines what the living thing will make of its experience. But in the human race, and most conspicuously in its more intellectual members, action is determined more by individual subjective selection and less from the objective side, so that conduct supercedes behavior. But apart from inherited aptitude and individual character the social circumstances in which we are educated introduce their formative influence. Language and forms of thought and institution (some elements and combinations of which often go back with a continuous history through Rome and Greece to Asia

Minor and the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt) determine the forms of our thought and of our aims. An intelligent child frequently complains that a foreign language which he is learning is stupid, and offers to make a better; but there are several reasons for using language as we find it. It provides a ready means of intercourse between a large number of people; it is the product of experience, for every word has been the solution of a practical problem and has come into use in order to fill a felt need; and it has also been adapted to needs as they develop so that it is not only the record of accomplishment but the instrument of progress. Without this achievement the artificial devising of Esperanto would have been impossible. And the same is true of all kinds of institution. Thus civilized life is an articulated whole and every man finds his living and maintenance—what Indians call his *Dharma*—as an articulated part of the whole. In a free country an energetic man may have almost as much choice in the direction of his activities as he has in the use of his words, but the requirements of intercourse puts limits upon each. His words and his acts must be adapted to his social environment in order to be effective.

It only remains to consider the bearing of these reflections upon the problem of corporate entity or of the group mind, for it is the philosophical or rather psychological problem with which we are here concerned, and I imagine that the fundamental problem is the same whether we are concerned with the meeting of two friends or the whole fabric of a State. The solution suggested by Ward's psychology is as follows. If mind is the relation of a psychological subject to a psychological object, then subjects may to some intent be integrated by their relation to an object just as objects may to some extent be integrated by their relation to a subject. In the case of an individual mind, such as yours or mine, the unity lies on the subjective side. For

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however heterogeneous my experiences may seem to be they derive a certain unity from the fact that they are mine. They are my objects, my interests, my estate. This unity would seem to be somehow based on temporal continuity and not to be *primarily* structural. On the other hand the unity of a group mind lies on the objective side. Provided the experiences themselves form an articulate whole it does not matter who are the subjects who experience them. Provided the chairman of a company is able and willing to perform his duties as such all the rest of his life is irrelevant to the company, and the same is true of his successor in office. The identity of the πόλις (which is mental) lies in the πολιτεία. The unity of a mental structure is essentially logical and in a certain sense spatial rather than temporal. The activities of the members of a group are not necessarily synchronous. The relevancy is not in time. The old firm carries on in the name of the founder though none of that name is a partner in the business; and the church counts among its living members those whose bodies may be lying in the churchyard.

I have had some little hesitation in putting forward this view of the objective unity of the group mind because, although it seems to follow from Ward's psychology, I am not sure that it is quite the same as that which he himself expressed in the sixth of his Gifford Lectures on *The Realm of Ends*. But the problem of Mind and Society with which he is there dealing is somewhat different from that of a mind and a society which troubles a lawyer. The Kantian objectivity of morality and reason rests on their universal character; and although Hegel's *objektiver Geist* is embodied in institutions it has this same universal reference. It may be that there is something universal in individuality wherever found, whether in you or me or in a society or social group, and if so the objective mind would be in every such group; for there would be in it a unity of

the individual and the general, the *Einheit des Einzelnen und Allgemeinen* described in the Addition to section 156 of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*. But the pursuit of that line of thought might lead onto the great circle where one may travel equally well in opposite directions and arrive at the same spot which is also nowhere. What a lawyer wants to discover is the real entity of the John Street Poker Club which cannot be found in morality and reason as understood by Kant. It would seem to belong to the will which is not the completely (*schlechthin*) objective will which is true to its own fully developed nature, but only objective in the sense that it is either determined by and merged in objects, or that it connotes the object which a subject has immediately in view when he acts. Section 26 of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* may here be quoted (without the note and addition): *Der Wille* (α) *insofern er sich selbst zu seiner Bestimmung hat und so seinem Begriffe gemäss und wahrhaftig ist, ist der schlechthin objektive Wille, (β) der objektive Wille aber, als ohne die unendliche Form des Selbstbewusstseins ist der in sein Objekt oder Zustand, wie er seinem Inhalte nach beschaffen sei, versenkte Wille—der kindliche, sittliche, wie der sklavische, abergläubische u.s.f.—(γ). Die Objektivität ist endliche die einseitige Form im Gegensatze der subjektiven Willensbestimmung, hiermit die Unmittelbarkeit des Daseins, als äusserliche Existenz; der Wille wird sich in diesem Sinne erst durch die Ausführung seiner Zwecke objektiv.*

We want a sociology similar to the biology which includes the amoeba and the ephemeral fly as well as the elephant and man and the whole world of living things—one which will deal with the smallest and most transient groups as well as the largest and most permanent. For this purpose, I think that it will be necessary to recognize that every man has a number of relatively independent objective interests and corresponding dispositions and that the

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grouping and integration of these by and in reference to himself constitute his own personality; whereas the grouping and integration of objective interests as such, involving the corresponding dispositions, but without reference to the persons whose interests and dispositions they may happen to be, constitute the group mind.

CONCLUSION

In order to emphasize the conclusion arrived at I shall make free use of the researches of those who have devoted their labors to the psychology of advertising. They tell us that language produces a striking effect when striking words are used.

The unity of the group mind is a *psychoplastic unity*. In the group mind subjects are integrated through an object and not objects through a subject. It follows, among many much more important consequences, that a scientific analysis and arrangement of the law relating to corporations should proceed in the manner practically indicated in the Law of Limited Companies, Corporations Sole, Trusts, Bankruptcy, Local Government, and so forth, that is to say, by the *estatification of interests* and not by the pretended incorporation of people.

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JAMES WARD'S CRITIQUE OF NATURALISM

A QUARTER of a century has elapsed since James Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* first appeared. From the outset the work was received with applause from many sources. The philosophic journals printed long and favorable reviews. Mr. A. E. Taylor wrote of it in *Mind* in April, 1900: "No more damaging exposure has ever been given of the baseless and uncritical assumptions which materialistic and agnostic thinkers are fond of presenting to us as the demonstrated and established teaching of 'science' about the constitution of the universe and our own position in it." The successive editions through which the work has passed testify to the influence which it has continued to exercise upon the philosophical thought of England and America.

To a certain extent the argument which Ward develops in *Naturalism and Agnosticism* strikes a reader today as tiresome. At least some of the details of that argument are now almost as wearisome as the petty rejoinders in a seventeenth-century controversy. The type of thought which Ward attacks is essentially a nineteenth-century affair; it belongs to a generation which is gone. *Naturalism and Agnosticism* must be read with sympathetic imagination quick to reconstruct the situation in which Ward was writing. Like many books which are devoted to attack instead of to a constructive world-view, it has become largely of historical interest only. A constructive world-

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view, if vividly painted, may charm and attract when it can not convince: it may deserve attention as a bit of human imaginative sentiment when it would not be worth a refutation. But often a book which seeks to refute a certain world-view can not hope to live when it is successful in killing its enemy. It may cease to have an effective appeal after the object of its attack has ceased to exist. And such is largely the case with Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Doubtless the well-rounded and penetrating criticisms delivered by Ward against Huxley, Spencer, Clifford, *et al.*, are one reason why the book has served its purpose and no longer has the wide interest it possessed when it was published in 1899.

Nonetheless, the broad outlines of Ward's critique of nineteenth-century naturalism are of considerable interest. In the course of his attack on naturalism he gives the prolegomena of a philosophy of science. Of course, Ward did not originate the general line of discussion of the nature of science which he sets forth, and it would be impossible to say exactly how much credit belongs to Ward himself for the development of the position which he and many other recent writers have taken of the metaphysical significance of scientific formulae and concepts. Ward is only one, even if an important one, of a whole school of idealistic writers in whom a certain estimate of the ontological bearings of science is made. But if we can not hope to apportion to Ward his precise share in terminating the curious combination of dogmatic materialism and metaphysical agnosticism which constituted the naturalism of the 1880's and 1890's and in developing a more critical and profound understanding of the philosophical bearings of scientific theories, at least we can not fail today to recognize in his book one clear and forceful exposition of the idealistic philosophy of science.

Ward's philosophy of science is beautifully summed up in a fine passage in the closing paragraphs of *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (pp. 572-573):¹ "Thought gives us only 'science,' not existence; we cannot by piling up propositions secure the simplest 'position.' Thought, again, gives us only the 'universal,' the relational; from the 'particular' which is the 'surd' for it—or the real moving point or subject of relations—it must start, but to this particular it can never return save by traversing an interminable series. But this reality, richer than thought, is experience. Science cannot originate experience; for experience is the source of science, yet always more than its product, so surely as the workman is more than his tools. Science is but the skeleton, while experience is the life; science but a means, and experience the end itself." In this passage are a number of important points through which Ward suggests a philosophical estimate of the nature of science, viz., that science is selective, that science is symbolical, and hence that science can not be taken as a metaphysics. Each of these points deserves special comment.

Fundamental to Ward's whole attitude is the realization that science is selective. The history of science from Descartes to the twentieth century furnishes Ward with abundant illustrations of this truth. Starting from some particular problem which engages his attention, the scientist pushes aside irrelevant considerations and centers his mind upon those aspects of his subject-matter which are pertinent to his problem. Selection is not, however, falsification: science is innocent of any illicit interpretations which metaphysical speculation may draw from its conclusions. Yet such illicit interpretations have often followed upon the success of science in formulating a truth about some phase of nature. Enthusiastic over

¹ References to pages throughout this paper are to the fourth edition of *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 1915, unless specific mention is made of some other work.

the ability to predict change and to explain a causal sequence, many a thinker who has used the results of scientific investigation has reduced the entire rich manifold of experienced objects to the one aspect which has proved significant for his own problem. Descartes' identification of the material world with extension is one instance of this confusion, and the nineteenth century attempt to equate mass and force with reality is another such instance. "The notion of mass leaves far behind it not merely all the diversities of chemical classification . . . not merely the variety of secondary qualities . . . not merely the physical distinctions of solid, liquid, and gaseous states" (p. 50). Every scientific proposition, even when literally true, is one truth which leaves unsaid many other truths which other interests and other problems might lead men to discover and affirm about the same objects. Through the whole field of the natural sciences and the whole field of human history we take up into our formulae or our records what we want to emphasize or as much of the richness of the entire reality as we can: we never take up the full being of things. It is a vital part of any truth about reality that that truth is a partial truth. And if the partial nature of any truth is overlooked, then that truth can not be properly understood; if it is denied, the truth thereby becomes false in its implications and references. Ward quotes with approval the words of Mach: "In reality the law always contains less than the fact itself, because it does not reproduce the fact as a whole, but only that aspect of it which is important to us, the rest being either intentionally or from necessity omitted" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 17).

In addition to being selective science is symbolical. At least science is largely symbolical and has become increasingly so during the last century. Scientific explanations are no longer stated in most cases in terms of concrete causal factors but rather are given in terms of certain

abstract mathematical formulae. The entities defined in scientific formulae are often ideal tools of the imagination into which for purposes of convenience the complex realities of experience are translated. For instance, in Newton's system we have a number of factors none of which exactly describes real objects, but all of which are for that very reason valuable as scientific concepts. Newton speaks of "absolute time" and "absolute motions" and "bodies that by definition are masses and only masses, absolutely determinate and unchangeable," and thus he formulates entities which give him a "mechanical system that is independent and complete" (p. 77). But real time and motions and bodies are not exactly of that sort. Newton's entities are "not real but ideal, not sensibly or empirically given but intellectually conceived or constructed, not ectypal but archetypal, as Locke says of all purely mathematical ideas" (p. 73). There is probably no body in the universe in the exact state described by the first law of motion; yet the first law of motion is, relatively to its purpose and function, absolutely true. There may be and probably is no lever in the universe which is perfectly rigid and lacking in characteristics which introduce extraneous considerations; yet the law of the lever is, relatively to the ideal it seeks to define, absolutely true. Not simply must science select from the manifold of reality if it wishes ever to state any proposition about reality, but also science must simplify, must deal with conceptual entities less complicated than the given reals of experience. Science treats concrete realities in terms of "statistical means and hypothetical mechanism" (p. 114); it is only a pseudo-science which then proceeds to suppose that the statistical means and hypothetical mechanism are the concrete realities.

The philosopher should then be cautious in his treatment of the entities of science. Insofar as these entities are not directly given in experience—and many of them are not—

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they can not be given an assured ontological status. Perhaps such entities in some cases exist, perhaps in other cases they do not. At any rate their existence is less certain than the concrete experiences which were the basis of fact from which the entities were inferred, and hence the existence of the scientific entities can not be used as an argument against the reality of the concrete experiences. For example the chemical molecule may exist. "Such things *may* exist or the hypothesis would not be legitimate" (p. 105). But whether they exist or not, they at least "serve, like certain legal and commercial fictions, to facilitate the business of scientific description." Some formula would have to be literally true, whether the molecular theory is so or not. Probability of literal truth is high when the theory has been formulated under a compulsion of experience which seemed to leave no other alternatives. Yet the seeming compulsion in all such instances may be due to lack of sufficient imagination on the part of a scientist and not to the material of experience. And we can never be so sure about the literal truth of any conceptual entity as to use it as a basis of deductive inference concerning the unreality of what is given in experience. In other cases there is no doubt about affirming that the entities of science are purely ideal and symbolical. Such, Ward thinks, is the case with the conception of force. Force is not a thing: it is a name. Force is not an agent which changes the motion of a body: it describes the fact that the motion of a body is changed in particular ways. So far from being a real being, force "means simply the direction in which, and the rate at which, this change takes place" (p. 57). Likewise in regard to all the formulae of science which are stated in terms of entities which lie beyond the direct experience of men, Ward advises us to maintain a healthy ontological scepticism. "We cannot be sure that there is any *a priori* necessity about the particular mechanical principles of

Galileo and Newton; from other fundamental definitions consequences equally exact might be deduced" (p. 77). Yet the utility of scientific formulae is not to be disputed, nor is any disrepute cast upon scientific method. The translation of the concrete realities of experience into the ideal terms of mathematics and into the possibly fictitious terms of imaginative systems is the key of scientific success. An algebraic equation is simpler than a maze of steel scaffolding, and a chemical formula is simpler than a mixture of various salts. The simplicity, taken as an objective reality, is false; but taken as a tool, it is an indispensable condition of control and progress. Only a formula which is approximately rather than exactly true can hope to be relevant to multitudes of cases, and so approximations are in scientific matters often more desirable than entirely accurate descriptions. Ward agrees with Karl Pearson that entities of science are "conceptual shorthand"; and if sometimes they are even more, they are nonetheless also such. If we try to make all our symbols literally true, they become so unwieldy that they lose their value; they then are not more easy to handle than the bulky and intricate realities of concrete experience. Science is wisely symbolical and approximate; it would cover a very narrow range in the effort to be literal and would "become involved in interminable complications in the attempt to be exact" (p. 162).

The selective and symbolical character of science is sufficient evidence for the position that science can not be taken as a metaphysics. This is not of course to say that the metaphysician can ignore science or proceed without a knowledge of science: it is not to say that science has not metaphysical implications. It is simply to say that the part is not the whole and the symbol is not the reality. "Our experience certainly does not embrace the totality of things, is, in fact, ridiculously far from it" (p. 189), and

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our science is far from embracing the totality of our experience. Science is thus twice removed from encompassing the whole of being. If we discover that things are extended in space, we can not consequently say that reality is extension. If we discover that we are confronted by and use mechanical devices, we can not therefrom conclude that reality is a mechanism. If we discover instances of evolving forms of life, we can not thence infer that reality is a process of evolution. "The universe then, we may safely say, not only *is* not, but never can be, a single object in this wise" (p. 190). "Experience provides us with instances of evolution and dissolution on the most varied scales, from the grass of the field or the cedars of Lebanon to the solar system or the Milky Way. But of a single supreme evolution embracing them all we have no title to speak: not even to assume that it is, much less to say what it is; least of all to affirm confidently that it can be embraced in such a meaningless formula as the integration of matter and the dissipation of motion" (p. 191). Things happen in the world, but we can not say the world happens. Perhaps we could express Ward's point by saying that our propositions about reality can not legitimately be of the form "Reality is X" but only of the form "X is real" or "There really is such a thing as an X."

The history of modern philosophy is full of ontologies which are due to an incorrect interpretation of the metaphysical significance of science. Ward lingers, with what today is tedious reiteration, on Herbert Spencer; but he puts Descartes down as the offender who in modern times began the unjustifiable method of taking the abstractions of science as the ultimate reals of the universe. The dualism of Descartes arose from a misunderstanding of the selective and symbolical nature of his own science. Extension is a selected aspect of the particular objects of concrete experience. Taken as the real essence of things, it

led him to deny the objective status of all other aspects of experience and to banish those aspects to another realm of being. Similarly seeing, thinking, doubting are particular processes which we find ourselves carrying on. Taken as the essence of mind, they led him to separate these processes from the external world of matter. Thus a dualism of matter and mind arose which has left many deep impresses upon subsequent thought. Each of Descartes' two types of substance represents a certain interest which he sought to satisfy; each is a carefully defined universe of discourse which enables discussion to progress towards the solution of certain problems. Taken as ultimate realities from which then all other aspects of experience must be deduced, they create ontological problems which no one can hope to solve. Since Descartes' time most scientists have been concerned primarily with the world of matter. And though they have changed his conception of matter as bare extension, they have usually retained his division of the universe into the two realms of matter and mind. Unable to account for the dualism and anxious to keep the realm of matter intact from disturbances which are contrary to their definitions of the nature of matter, some philosophers have felt it necessary to reduce mind to an impotent automaton, to a "shadowy concomitant of brain, which is itself but a part of this mechanism inextricably linked in with the rest" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 6). But the original Cartesian dualism and the materialistic developments which have ensued therefrom are alike false to the every-day experience of all men. In experience we find "a duality of object presented and subject affected, of subject striving and object attained," but we never find "a dualism of material phenomena and mental phenomena" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 10). From the dualisms and materialisms of modern philosophy we could never infer the possibility of such experiences as actually are going on constantly: rather we seem forced to

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deny that such experiences could really occur. The ontologizing of the selected aspects of experience and of the symbolical terms of scientific control leads thus to a denial of the data upon which all science must rest. Philosophies which start out with an intent to be thoroughly scientific sometimes end up by becoming entirely mythological. The moral which we can obviously draw from the failure of such philosophies is that there is no single formula for the whole of reality within the power of science to state.

"Experience in every case consists in interaction between individual and environment" (p. 346). This interaction is characterized by activity, doing, expression, the "unswerving tenacity of purpose"; also it is marked by passivity, feeling, impression, "aimless drifting." The reality of experience thus defined is not a matter for doubt. rather it is the final test of the truth of all theories. We can select any element of experience as a subject for investigation and scientific inquiry, and we may develop the logical implications of the terms in which we state the character of that selected element. Those implications, however, are significant only as hypothetical predictions to be verified by a return to experience; they are not necessary determinations of reality through which the unreality of some future experience can be established. Not embodying the full nature of experience within any set of selected elements, and not describing the full nature of things in any formulae of science, we can not then deduce from our selected elements and symbolical formulae the other aspects of experience which we chose to disregard temporarily. Much less can we find any warrant for taking the deductions of our partial science as more certain than the direct nature of experience. And it is only ridiculous to suppose that the inconsistencies between the implications of our formulae and the evidence of our experience are to be explained on the basis that the formulae give us

reality and the experience is but "appearance" or "illusion." Yet naturalism does venture "to discredit the plain testimony of experience" (p. 352). Naturalists begin with an interest in the physical, define their terms, take those terms as giving them the essence of reality, find that they can not thence deduce life and mind and purpose, and so feel forced to deny the reality of what is not implied in their closed system of thought. What had priority of interest for them is thus changed into what has priority of being in reality.

Ward is insistent upon the point that science implies rather than denies the presence of teleology in reality. Science is a construction which serves an end and is designed for the end it serves. Its instrumental character is obvious whether it is also literal description of fact or purely symbolical. And its function as instrument implies the reality of ends and the efficacy of endeavor towards those ends. The blindly mechanical and the intelligently guided are two kinds of process which ordinarily we can easily distinguish; hence "insofar as both are compatible with mechanical principles it is obvious that strictly mechanical considerations will not enable us to distinguish between them" (p. 200). The discovery of mechanism, in other words, is its discovery in particular phases of experience in which it is co-ordinate with other phases, and it is not, *qua* mechanism, an explanation of the other phases. It is not the mechanism by which I obtain my ends that furnishes me with the ends to be sought. We can no more reduce the whole of reality to a mechanism than we can reduce it to an evolution. We find many a case of evolution in nature; and every such case is the gradual change of an object under the influence of external forces affecting it. Evolution therefore is change within an environment; and there can be no evolution for what has no environment. The whole of reality may be the scene of many

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evolutions, but is hardly itself an evolution. Likewise with mechanism. I may use a mechanism, or I may in turn be part of a social situation which another person seeks to control. But in both cases, mechanism stands in contrast with the teleological aspect of experience. Finding mechanisms in abundance in the real world, we can not hence conclude the whole of reality to be a mechanism. And in no case could the purpose be deduced from the mechanism employed; for the mechanism might serve for another purpose or continue to play in the absence of human purposes altogether. "The complete unravelling of the two sets of factors, teleological and non-teleological, so as clearly to exhibit their respective shares in any given form is probably an impossible task. My concern is only to show that the two sets of factors are there, and that the teleological are indispensable" (p. 289). Mind, purpose, ends are not "collateral products" (p. 376): they are as much given in experience as any other factor. However irrelevant they may be in connection with the development of certain theories of the mechanism of nature, they are presupposed in any consideration as to why such theories are formulated.

Such is the general philosophy of science from the point of view of which Ward launched his attack against naturalism and agnosticism. Throughout the development of the argument Ward gives clear evidences of the idealistic outcome, the spiritualism and the theism, to which he wishes eventually to lead his readers. These elements of his thought have in this paper been left unnoticed. And it would be the contention of this paper that the general conception which Ward held of the nature and function of science was not logically tied up in any way with the idealistic ontological views which he also shares. Indeed if historically it was the idealistic school which inaugurated the philosophy of science which is expressed in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, we find today a similar point of view

expressed by realists, pragmatists, and other non-idealistic groups, most of whom in a broad sense could be called naturalists. Ward's critique of nineteenth-century naturalism might indeed be said to have served one purpose which Ward could never have intended or contemplated in undertaking his work, viz., the formulation of a new type of naturalism which incorporates the lessons concerning science which Ward meant as a death-blow to naturalism altogether. Contemporary naturalism stands with Ward against the uncritical use of science which characterized the closing decades of the last century. Bosanquet wrote in his *Logic* (2nd edition, vol. II, p. 245, note b) that in traveling in the United States in 1892 he met an American philosopher who told him with an air both of rebuke and of great finality, "Sir, the people of these States have endorsed the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer." However extreme the judgment of that American philosopher was for even that moment when the influence of Spencer was at its height, it is a well-known fact that a generation ago there was a widespread and uncritical acceptance of Spencerian naturalism and agnosticism. And today Spencer is in such disrepute that the merits of his work are ordinarily forgotten and he is referred to as an instructive example of the error of turning science too facilely into metaphysics. In the place of Spencer we have men eager to devote philosophy to a criticism of the categories and concepts of science, men who frequently agree with Ward in his judgments as to the selective, symbolical, and non-metaphysical character of science, even though they differ with Ward on most points of epistemology and ontology. A rereading of Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* is likely to impress one today by the contrast it affords between the naturalism of the 1880's and 1890's and the naturalism of the present day.

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Ward defines what he means by naturalism in several passages. In one place he writes: "Naturalism we have taken to designate the doctrine that sets Nature in place of God, subordinates Spirit to Matter, and regards unchangeable law as supreme" (pp. 179-180). Or in another place, "Those who assign the priority to Nature we call Naturalists; those who contend for the priority of free agents we may call Spiritualists" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 3). These definitions are far from clear. In their setting such phrases must find their meaning in the fact that Herbert Spencer is ultimately intended; and so his philosophy furnishes the sense in which the phrases are to be taken. Perhaps, indeed probably, Ward would condemn naturalism of the type prevalent today; but he could hardly do so on the grounds adduced in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. I know of no contemporary naturalist who would have men's worship directed towards an Unknowable behind nature. To put "Nature in place of God" would be equivalent to putting the chemical formula for mixing paints in place of the beauty of a great altarpiece. Or as a friend said to whom I recently quoted Ward's definition: "One might as well speak of putting H₂O in place of Byron." Contemporary naturalism is prone to distinguish between existential-judgments and value-judgments; and while nature is an inclusive name for the many sorts of existences we discover, God is usually taken as a term through which men strive to integrate their aspirations. Naturalists will perhaps always seem to Spiritualists to deny God; but they can hardly be said today to put nature in place of God. Similarly with the phrase about regarding "unchangeable law as supreme." Many naturalists certainly would deny that the nature of life and mind can be correctly expressed when they are "reduced" to physico-chemical terms. The continuities between inorganic and organic bodies or the continuities between different forms of living things can never

be properly used to express the discontinuities: the similarities are not the differences. Man as a rational animal has characteristics which are not stated by any complications of chemical formulae. "Reduction" is oversight. "Unchangeable law" is what it is found to be and wherever it is found to hold; but there is no warrant to charge most contemporary naturalisms with regarding the "laws" of matter as preventing us from recognizing the qualitatively distinct nature of life and mind. Finally, with the phrase in which Ward says that naturalism "subordinates Spirit to Matter" or makes Nature prior. Naturalists all hold, I presume, that temporally non-living matter was prior to life; and I think most naturalists also hold it as probable that ultimately life will disappear before certain transformations of the material environment. But if "Spirit" means anything we can empirically designate, it refers to a quality of excellence found in all noble human lives and outwardly expressed in all great human achievements of art and imagination. That is, it does not name a distinct entity or existence, but it helps us to appraise values. Professor John Dewey says in his last book (*Experience and Nature*, p. 28): "Nature's place in man is no less significant than man's place in nature. Man in nature is man subjected; nature in man, recognized and used, is intelligence and art." One might perhaps without violence repeat his meaning by saying that man in nature is matter and nature in man is spirit. At least many naturalists of today would find such a statement just to their own positions. And however in the remote past or the problematic future matter may have had and may again come to have a temporal priority of existence, certainly in estimation of values it might be said that spirit alone had any significance.

To summarize the contentions of this paper, the critique which Ward made of nineteenth-century naturalism has

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two chief claims on our interest today. In the first place this critique embodies many keen and penetrating remarks about the nature and function of science. These remarks, gathered together, furnish the outlines of a philosophy of science. This philosophy of science does not depend for its validity upon any other part of the system of thought which Ward went on to develop: it is not pledged to Spiritualism or any other single ontological point of view. Rather it is an estimate of the nature of science which has become widely accepted by thinkers in many different schools of philosophy, and indeed constitutes one of the few points which are held in common by many opponents in current controversy. In the second place Ward's critique enables us vividly to see the contrast between the naturalism of a generation ago and the naturalism of the present. To note this contrast is not to disparage Ward's work. It might better be taken as a tribute to the effectiveness of his critique; for seldom has a widespread philosophy so quickly disappeared as the naturalism he exposed. Glimpses which we get today of that curious combination of dogmatic naturalism and agnostic dualism seem like very faded daguerreotypes in which the features are hardly those of friends we know. And the naturalism of the present hour, like the Spiritualism of Ward, begins with the distinction Ward himself emphasized between experience as real and science as a selective and symbolical description in terms of fixed concepts more precise than the experience which they are used to mean. Indeed many naturalists would claim to adhere more faithfully than Ward to the instruction he gives towards a methodology in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. For just as the terms of mathematical and physical science represent, not ultimate forces and beings, but the sequences and structures of experience, so, in their view, the terms of Ward's own idealism and theism represent, not real agents and existences,

but the aesthetic values and moral aspirations which human experience may under proper conditions come to manifest. Supernaturalism, just as much as agnostic dualisms and epiphenomenalisms and dogmatic materialisms, puts reality in things beyond experience, taking terms of interpretation for entities and facts. Contemporary naturalism thus adheres in one sense to the point of Ward's critique of nineteenth-century naturalism and his methodological principles more truly than he himself did in the constructive statement of his own views. But at least the issues between idealism and naturalism are not today what they were when Ward in 1899 published his work on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and current naturalism has many points in common with Ward.

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THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WARD'S PHILOSOPHY

I

PERHAPS no single term has so much to answer for in the long history of philosophy, equally for good and for evil, as "idealism." Its origin expressed the highest stages attained by Greek thought, for which the "ideas" were the eternal foundations which sustain the changing universe. Essentially, therefore, they were objective and self-existent, and not in any degree the content—much less the product—of any human mind; and in this respect it is of the first importance to observe that, in spite of the almost complete absence of scientific knowledge, these idealistic principles anticipated in a most remarkable way the standpoint of modern science. For it is only necessary to substitute "natural law," "causation," or "the uniformity of nature" for "ideas," to perceive that Greek thought had intuitively apprehended the basal postulate of modern science—that the ever-changing flux of transient phenomena is the manifestation of a universal order governed throughout by agencies whose character is more and more fully expressible in terms of human thought. This form of statement, of course, at once raises the old puzzles of subjectivity and objectivity. For since all thought necessitates mental processes it is often concluded that its entire content can never be other than purely relative and subjective—a viewpoint represented by the widely accepted contention

that scientific laws are merely conceptual, schematic formulae, highly valuable in economizing intellectual labor and anticipating the course of events, but never to be regarded as corresponding to any real existents. All arguments of this type, however, fallaciously confuse the *process of thinking*, which is necessarily subjective, with the *object or content* of thought, which is fundamentally objective and ontologically real; the fallacy is one and the same as that which neglects to distinguish between the process of perceiving and the thing perceived, or between sensation, as a psychical activity, and the quality or attribute that is sensed.

Thus the true and objective interpretation of current scientific principles is in complete agreement with ancient Greek idealism. The "ideas" were self-sustaining, and did not necessarily exist in any mind at all, either human or divine.¹ But the rise of Christianity, with its insistence on the divine supremacy, finally resulted in "ideas" being regarded as the forms of eternal wisdom and as existent therefore only within God's mind; after which the still further step was inevitable of defining all ideas as contents or objects of mind in general—a standpoint common to Descartes and his successors, and the root alike of the theories of representative perception and of Berkeleyan idealism.

Whether Berkeley himself was a subjectivist or not is still a debatable point. But it would seem that only his genius could guard thinkers from the descent into the later unmitigated subjectivism which characterized much of nineteenth-century science, for which ideas became restricted to the individual mind while reality remained always outside or beyond the mind. Thus consciousness became degraded to the epiphenomenal level, and thought

¹ Plato's use of the terms "God" and "creator" is mainly poetic rather than purely philosophic, though this does not imply any absolute dissociation of the two standpoints in his own mind.

to the status of a mere by-product of cerebral changes; whence it followed that Reality was either reduced to the invisible motions of impalpable atoms or relegated to the Limbo of the Unknowable.

But unreservedly to condemn, or even unsympathetically to criticize, this phase of modern thought would be to adopt a totally unjustifiable attitude. For the unending stream of human speculation, like all else in the universe, has its own causal determinants. The philosophy which emerged from the rapid and triumphant progress of last century's science, therefore, can be adequately appreciated only in the light of its own generative precedents. For it regarded itself, in the first place, as the strictly logical development of the earlier Cartesian and Lockean dualism between matter and mind; and burdened with this unfortunate philosophic heritage, it was compelled to choose between the scepticism of Hume and the phenomenalism of Kant. Secondly, it was the natural and inevitable reaction from the earlier crude theories of special creation and divine control that had invaded religion and theology. More and more Nature was revealing herself as self-maintained and self-explanatory, and material energies as increasingly adequate to account for vital or even psychical processes—a tendency that has in our own day gained still weightier significance, although its final implications still remain to be discerned. But in two fundamentally important respects the thinkers of this dawn-period of modern science were prevented, by the very character of their work itself, from apprehending the true perspective of their problems and solutions; for like all other workers, they were too close to their field of inquiry and too deeply immersed in its detailed subject matter.

Hence as uniformity and law became more and more universally apparent in the physical world, it was perfectly natural to conclude that matter was the fundamental or

sole reality while consciousness was scarcely real at all. The alternative suggestion that physical laws were in this way more readily discoverable simply because the material sphere was much less complex than the psychical was completely ignored; it required the still profounder researches of recent biology and psychology to reveal the baffling intricacy of all vital and mental processes. This persistent overemphasis of the importance of the material world, further, radically distorted its relations to the psychic sphere; and this is all the more curious in the light of the evolutionary foundations of last century's knowledge. For the truth that life and mind rest upon an indispensable physical basis was taken to mean that this basis was primary and the superstructures secondary; thus overlooking the possibility that, simply because it *was* a basis, matter itself formed the subordinate instrument whose essential purpose was the development of yet higher levels of immaterial being.

II

The culmination of this continued stress upon matter and motion, law and causation, is to be found in the enthronement of mechanical necessity; and with this, freedom and purpose seem to vanish from the universe. The reaction within the sphere of ethics and religion is equally patent, and is summarily expressed in the two "isms" which give the title to Ward's first series of Gifford Lectures, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Whatever term we may choose to designate them—whether Ideas, universal energies, or scientific laws—all the foundational elements of reality exist within the world of matter—this is the essence of Naturalism; while beyond this phenomenal sphere the human mind can never penetrate, even though

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it may bow in mute reverence before the Unknowable—this is Agnosticism; and the same law that rules the realm of the physical dominates human thought and will—these, equally with the atom and the star, are the bondslaves of Necessity.

Looking backwards at this sharp turn of the Meander of speculation from the vantage-point of the wider knowledge of today, it is not difficult to appreciate the peculiar intensity of the difficulties which faced the older systems of thought. For resting as they necessarily did upon the most meagre content of positive knowledge, and appealing in the main to spiritual intuition, religious faith and divine revelation, they suddenly found almost all the contentions of the hostile "isms" consistently supported by the incessant discoveries and new principles of advancing science. Evolution rendered a creative Deity superfluous, just as all-comprehensive Nature left no room for direct revelation; universal law made miracles impossible, while ethics and religion were absorbed within the domain of psychology. Nothing remained therefore except to cling, boldly or despairingly as the case might be, to ancient truths which found their value in their practical success, or in some incomprehensible but indestructible inherence within human nature. It was as yet too soon to discern that the turbulent stream which threatened to undermine the old foundations was in reality a Nile flood which in due time would richly fertilize the arid deserts of ignorance and evil.

Adequately to appreciate Ward's own distinctive treatment of these problems it is necessary to observe that he was content with no such half-measures as perforce satisfied many of his contemporaries. Just as his presentment of psychological principles recast the whole subject, so his philosophic criticism is directed, not against the ascertained results of science, but against the assumptions and

presuppositions which these results were almost universally supposed to establish—conclusions, further, which are recognized from the outset as under the given conditions inevitable; “the naturalistic view of the world seems to stand out clearly *of itself*.”² His analysis of naturalism therefore, taken together with his subsequent constructive superstructure, constitutes one of the principal movements in that counter-attack, initiated by philosophic idealism towards the close of the nineteenth century and vigorously sustained to our own day, which may justly be called the Battle of the Marne in modern speculation.

It is impossible, however, to disconnect the different aspects of Ward's general standpoint from each other. Both his distinctively psychological theory and his treatment of scientific principles as a whole are organically conjoined with his ethics; in a deeper sense than the Kantian, Pure Reason and Practical Reason are essentially one. His initial protest, in the light of some current interpretations of the scientific Theory of Relativity, is still of fundamental significance. For it is frequently contended that the older concrete entities of the physicist—force, gravitation, ether—must now be wholly dispensed with, since all physical processes may be regarded as elements of the universal Space-Time continuum, whose nature finds complete expression in mathematical formulae of adequate complexity, while Space and Time themselves, still further, are nothing more than relativist or even subjective schemata of the observer's mind.³ Such a standpoint, of course, is but the natural development of an earlier powerful tendency in scientific thought; and in both its earlier and its present-day phases it still remains open to Ward's fatal

² *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. 1, p. v; my italics.

³ I may add that this last argument rests on the confusion between our standards and measurements of spatio-temporal intervals, and Time and Space in themselves. To use a crude illustration, it is the same as saying that because the quart and the litre are distinctive national standards of capacity, therefore water and all other liquids are only relative to the individual.

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criticism. "There are people," he observes, "who imagine that when they have resolved all that happens into motions of mass-points, traceable by pure mathematical analysis, they have attained to a philosophy of nature." But, he continues, "mechanism is not the one reality behind the veil of phenomena."⁴ All such mathematical devices, in short, indispensable though they are as factors within truly comprehensive knowledge, can never do more than accurately express certain aspects of the entire group of phenomena which are disclosed by their acute analysis. These aspects, of course (apart from exceptions for which a complete theory would itself provide), are all essentially *real*; their being abstract does not mean that they are unreal. For in this connection "abstraction" means merely incompleteness—partialness—even (in a degree) superficiality; none-the-less are the "abstract" elements indispensable within the whole to which they belong.⁵ But to regard them, as is so frequently done, as being the fundamental or the sole realities is as illogical as to equate the analytical program of a great symphony to the musical composition itself, or the outline which enables us to identify the figures in some famous painting to the picture. For while outline and program are certainly essential to our complete understanding of the artistic qualities of the work, they are obviously far from exhausting its nature; indeed, the purely aesthetic elements which they must perforce exclude are far more valuable than they are. In other words, Art may dispense with these devices, highly instructive though they all are; while without color and form, without harmony and beauty, it would utterly perish. But the same principle is still more profoundly true of the Uni-

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol II, p. 67.

⁵ In this respect, Ward's fuller treatment of the problem appears to me somewhat unsatisfactory. He seems to regard the abstractions in question as nothing more than "hypothetical descriptive schemes," pp. 67, *sqq.* They are much more than this in my own opinion, but the point is not directly relevant to his ethics.

verse. It is a universe of essentially concrete reals—of Matter and Energy, Life and Mind, Religion and Law; and while each of these undoubtedly presents abstract aspects which are capable of exact mathematical formulation,⁶ these still remain wholly subordinate elements of the entire situation.

III

Such, then, is the basis of Ward's opposition to all purely mechanical explanations of the nature of Reality—"the world is not fundamentally mechanical";⁷ and the alternative which at once arises has both its ethical and its religious implications. For the non-mechanical or super-mechanical—whichever is its truest designation—must operate by means of other than purely necessitarian agencies; some form of liberty of action—of freedom of choice—thus becomes not only possible but actual; and then the further question arises—Can we comprehend this sphere of being in the same sense that we know the world of Nature? Agnosticism maintained the negative; and even Kant, stern moralist though he was, regarded ethical and religious truths as inherently beyond the range of Pure Reason.⁸ Thus purely materialist Naturalism is repudiated and Agnosticism directly challenged; and Ward's ground is in both instances one and the same—the substitution of the essential unity of experience in the place of the two-fold dualism implied by these systems—first the dualism between matter and mind, and secondly that be-

⁶ As in the complicated statistics of a nation or church, or again—from a slightly different point of view—in the strictly legal aspects of some great constitutional issue such as slavery or prohibition; for while these considerations are of vital importance they can never be primary nor exhaustive.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 67.

⁸ It is, however, frequently forgotten that Kant's *Practical Reason* is equally rational.

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tween the known and the unknown, or between phenomenal and noumenal. The logical force of such a starting point is at once obvious; for this experiential unity is so primal and fundamental that no actual dualism can ever arise; there can never be anything more therefore than a duality of aspects within one unbroken whole—"the duality in unity of subject and object, present alike in cognition, feeling and volition."⁹

But experience, still further, is not only unified; it is also essentially conative—active—self-conservative. In this respect again we discern another inevitable consequence of the swift expansion of nineteenth-century science—its overemphasis on the intellectual activities of consciousness; and it needs but to insist on the equal importance of its volitional expression to introduce, at the very outset, ethical concepts that are just as fundamental as any scientific concepts. Moral philosophy and religion, of course, had always focussed their consideration upon these principles; only, unfortunately, they necessarily lacked a sound basis in the facts of physiology and psychology; the development of these subjects therefore speedily inaugurated that "conflict between science and religion" which will always characterize the speculation of last century. Ward's treatment, however, restores the balance essential to any adequate presentment of the entire issue. He insists that experience must never be mutilated, and that even cognition itself, in actuality, is inherently conational; experience is "life, self-conservation, self-realization."¹⁰ A purely cognitive being, in short, is not human; and thus worth and value, purposes and ends, goodness and evil, all find their place as inexpugnable elements, not only within so-called "human nature" regarded as isolated, subjective or even epiphenomenal, but still more truly within the real universe which, in consonance with the basal principle of

⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 129. Cf., pp. 110, *sqq.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

unity, constitutes the equally indestructible object of all experience. Once this standpoint is accepted the purely abstract character of materialistic naturalism becomes patent, and Huxley's "cosmic process that has no sort of relation to moral ends" reveals itself as the Frankenstein's monster of an over-developed intellectualism.

It is true, of course, that these conational factors undergo an age-long evolution, in precisely the same way that rationality emerges from the instinctive consciousness of animals. No one, and least of all Ward, would maintain that they constitute "innate ideas" explicitly present at the dawn of either individual or social life. This would only revive the crude theories of earlier moral speculation, against which a sane and healthy "naturalism" must always protest. The essential point is that our ruling moral principles and ideals have naturally developed from the primary forms of volition—forms which are, however, so little defined that "volition" can hardly as yet be employed—exactly as our basal scientific concepts have arisen from the perceptual levels of animal experience; so that to accept the second position, while at the same time denying the first, is simply to misread the psychology of the whole situation. But this equivalence both in origin and in development at once carries with it an equivalence of validity; morality, in other words, is just as inherently human as reason.¹¹ The patent fact that moral ideas lack the coherence, the logical necessity, of intellectual principles in no degree invalidates this conclusion. For in the first place it is by no means true as a matter of fact; some broad ethical truths have always commanded a sufficiently universal acceptance, if only as indispensable factors of social well-being; and we need only recall the ignorance and superstitions of the Middle Ages to perceive that scientific logicality enjoys as yet a painfully brief history and a still more

¹¹ Once again, for Kant the "Pure" and the "Practical Reason" were alike rational.

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restricted application. It is only necessary to realize that logical certainty reigns supreme in pure mathematics to recognize that it is the offspring of systematic abstraction. Its lamentable absence in the sphere of ethics, in other words, is not inherent, but is due to nothing more than the extreme intricacy and difficulty of moral experience, dominated as this is by conflicting tendencies and deeply-rooted personal interests. Gradually and painfully, nevertheless, these are becoming subordinated to the control of the same rationality whose swift advance can be plainly discerned in the simpler—because more abstract—sphere of scientific investigation; and within this (to repeat) most easily in the most abstract sciences—in mathematics, mathematical physics and physical chemistry.

IV

The logical implications of these considerations should now be patent. For if ethical principles spring from the same experiential basis as rational truths, and if, still further, their power of controlling behavior is due to an immanent reason, then there can be no such inherent limits to the capacity of human thought as are postulated by agnosticism. Mind—reason—thought—are operative not partially but universally; not only in the realm of knowledge, but equally in aesthetic and in moral experience. And again, simply because it is mind that is thus universal,¹² purely materialistic naturalism proves itself to be just as inadequate as agnosticism. The objection that after all these conclusions can hold good only with regard to experience, but not therefore to the nature of reality, simply cuts the ground from under scientific naturalism itself;

¹² It is a curious fact that (as Ward himself points out) Huxley explicitly recognized this primacy of consciousness; "our one certainty is the existence of the mental world"; *ibid.*, p. 216, *sqq.*

for it plainly implies that logic and rationality—the “Pure Reason” of Kant—are (as indeed Kant himself held them to be) confined to mere phenomena, and so can never attain to the real nature of things; and thus agnosticism invades the realm of science itself and so becomes universal; naturalism, in other words, deliberately commits suicide; “agnosticism” (in Ward’s own words) “proves a treacherous ally for naturalism, and ends by undermining its dogmatic foundations.”¹³

In spite of its patently subjective aspects therefore we must regard the realm of consciousness as being at the least as real as the material world. But conscious experience, still further, is never a matter of merely passive or responsive contemplation, but rather of intense and spontaneous activity which finally attains the level of volitional behavior; and with this we come face to face with what Ward calls “contingency.” It is undeniably unfortunate that “contingency” is almost inseparably associated in general opinion with accident or casualness; Ward, however, expressly rules out these meanings, and connects contingency firstly with freedom and secondly with law. “The contingency is not that of chance, but that of freedom; everything that is is a law in itself, has an end for itself, and seeks the good. In such a world” (it must definitely be noticed) “there is still room for rational necessity. . . . For where rational necessity is supreme, freedom is possible. . . . No sane man resents as a constraint normal laws of thought, normal laws of conduct, normal laws of taste.”¹⁴

At this point I cannot avoid expressing my own opinion that this conclusion, despite its essential truth, is hardly so simple a matter as it is here presented to be. For both the laws of thought and the principles of art are undoubtedly acknowledged far more readily than are the laws of con-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

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duct; and the complete unconsciousness, in this last instance, of any "constraint" whatever is so rare that even the saints proclaim it as an almost impossible ideal. The reason for this remarkable contrast lies in the close concord between both intellectual and aesthetic principles and human desires; we avoid error and ugliness instinctively, so that aesthetics and logic enable us to satisfy these powerful natural tendencies with the minimum of effort. In the sphere of practical conduct, on the contrary, we begin by experiencing a fundamental opposition between natural desires and moral laws. Even if we concede that all desire, as such, must be for the good, still the good that is first desired is rarely the highest form of good; and yet it attracts us so forcibly that to abandon it, even for the sake of a good that reason clearly shows us to be higher, is often difficult and occasionally impossible. Each of these great departments of experience, in other words—knowledge, art, and conduct—is incessantly swayed by the tension between desire and necessity—between the "is" and the "ought"; only in the first two, however, do these categories so naturally agree with one another that the reign of necessity is willingly acknowledged;¹⁵ in the last, on the other hand, the acceptance of what Ward here calls "normal" and "sane" involves a conflict so radical as to be almost disruptive of personality. It was, indeed, just this essential feature of moral experience—this inherent opposition between the sensuous and the rational—that constituted for Kant the very basis of the moral imperative.

All this, however, leaves Ward's fundamental principle unimpaired—that is the activity, equally within conscious experience and throughout the universe,¹⁶ of a necessity

¹⁵ It would be beyond the scope of the present article to develop the further implications of this universal dominance of necessity; it must be sufficient to point out that its operation, particularly in art, is too frequently ignored.

¹⁶ It should, of course, be obvious that there can be no separation between these two categories, since all experience must fall within the universe; still their distinction is a useful one, though it is too frequently misunderstood.

which is a *rational* necessity; a necessity, therefore, which can never be adequately described as material or even, in any crude sense, as mechanical, although the mechanicality of material Nature may still be one of its essential aspects. Its rationality, again, makes it identical with freedom—with that freedom of thought and art which would dominate the whole personality were natural desires but subordinated to its demands.

V

Thus the first series of Gifford Lectures becomes the logical foundation of the second—*The Realm of Ends*. "Mechanism is not the secret of the universe; if it is to have any meaning, it must subserve some end; we accept the spiritualistic standpoint and its Realm of Ends as the more fundamental . . . there is nothing in Nature that is incompatible with a spiritualistic interpretation."¹⁷ I have already observed that the conational aspects of experience are of equal importance to the cognitive, and that the evolution of conation culminates in volition. But this evolution is essentially a natural, and therefore a law-governed, process; the will, on the other hand, is just as essentially free; how then can this apparent antithesis between natural necessity and volitional freedom be overcome? For if this is impossible mankind becomes simply one subdivision of a purely mechanical Nature; "a like necessitation applies both to the events of the so-called physical and to those of the moral world; but that would be tantamount to denying any distinction between them."¹⁸

Kant's familiar elevation of this distinction to the level of the absolute contrast between transcendental moral

¹⁷Pp. 13, 20. "Spiritualistic" here, of course, with its pure philosophic meaning as opposed to materialistic.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 273.

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freedom and phenomenal natural processes is repudiated by Ward as a "splendid failure." "Thorough-going determinism," he insists, "which denies self-determination *in toto*, refutes itself by overshooting the mark and proving too much; by resolving the subject of experience into an abstraction it denies the reality of experience altogether."¹⁹ Human experience, in other words, is unified throughout, and in such a way as to constitute a self which actively determines its own course, responsive though this undoubtedly is to environmental stimuli; so much is neither a postulate nor a dogma, but a plain fact of modern psychology, which is on this point fully as "scientific" as the physics of the electronic atom. The issue, in short, turns not on the *existence* or non-existence of determination, but simply on its *location*—on the *dominance* of selfhood in its relation to its environment. This means that the focus of the final determinative act has been transferred from without the self to within it; and thus freedom, in its only true sense of self-determination, has become an actual agency in universal development.²⁰

I have just observed, however, that human character and conduct still remain "responsive to environmental stimuli." Man's freedom, in other words, in no degree isolates him from the realm of Nature; and at this point we must take into account that fundamental principle which Naturalism, despite all its inadequacies as a final *Weltanschauung*, has indelibly implanted in modern thought—that is the concept of the Universe as ordered—law-governed—systematically interconnected throughout all its being. It is in such a Universe that man must freely direct his own path; not capriciously nor arbitrarily, but always under the sway of laws which his slowly expand-

¹⁹ Pp. 292, 293.

²⁰ Both in its historical and philosophic aspects the identity of the terms "national freedom" and "self-determination" during the Great War is an extremely interesting, because wholly unconscious, proof of this contention.

ing reason more fully reveals to him, and which he finds operating in the sphere of mind and social intercourse just as unswervingly as in the material world. Universal law, that is, is not only natural but is equally ultra-natural—rational and moral just as truly as it is physical—and it is to this spiritual environment, not simply (as with animals) to the more restricted realm of Nature, that man must incessantly respond. It still remains true, of course, that natural and spiritual are essentially continuous—that man, with all his ultra-natural capacities, has uninterruptedly evolved from the animal level.

This evolution, still further, has always followed the line of social order. Not only man as we know him, but also his semi-human and pre-human ancestors, are organized into society; and hence "with society moral order begins and in society moral evil may arise."²¹ It is obviously possible to lay too much stress on these social aspects of human nature—to sever it too absolutely from that wider world which constitutes at once its primary origin and its persistent environment. It must always be remembered therefore that society is but the form under which the universe makes its most direct appeal to each of its individual members—the channel through which its influences flow into each separate personality. To find the ultimate basis of morality, therefore, we must pass beyond society itself to its environing and sustaining universe; "conscience is ever a power working for the righteousness in which alone the world finds its own meaning and its supreme ideal."²²

Thus we reach the conclusion of Ward's analytical survey of man and the Cosmos. "We take the universe to be spiritual—a realm of ends; it is only from the standpoint of Spirit that Nature can be understood."²³ That such an

²¹ *Realm of Ends*, p. 364. Hence, further, "the cardinal principle of moral order is justice: all immorality is injustice"

²² *Ibid.*, p. 373; "moral order is the order of the world," p. 381.

²³ P. 431.

outlook can still be misunderstood and undervalued is due simply to the unfortunate history of the word "spiritual," which still carries with it, along with its finer implications which should never be disregarded, that essentially irrational attitude towards Nature which regards the realm of matter as inherently evil.

Only to the degree that this false interpretation is abandoned in favor of the principle that Nature is the spatio-temporal manifestation of universal Spirit, and the laws of Nature the ordered expression of immanent yet transcendent Reason—only thus can the moral constitution of human nature be properly understood and adequately appreciated. The principles of ethics will then appear as the wholly natural culmination of the evolution of man from animal; not therefore as foreign nor superfluous, but as inherent in the universe as gravitation; and the thought of the future, in my opinion, will ascribe no small part in this reorientation to the work of James Ward.

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A LIST OF THE WRITINGS OF JAMES WARD

A bibliography of the writings of James Ward was prepared by E. B. Titchener and W. S. Foster, with the help of Dr. L. N. Wilson, Librarian of Clark University, and Professor R. M. Yerkes of Harvard University, and printed in the *American Journal of Psychology* for July, 1912, Vol. XXIII, pp. 457-460. The present list is based on this earlier one; but Professor James Ward himself very kindly made some corrections, just before his death, and brought the whole list up to date.

1874

- (1) "Animal Locomotion." *Nature*, IX., 381-2, March 29, 1874.
- (2) "Animal Locomotion." *Nature*, IX., 440, April 9, 1874.

1875

- (1) *The Relation of Physiology to Psychology: an Essay.* 8vo., pp. 63. (Privately printed.)

1876

- (1) "An Attempt to Interpret Fechner's Law." *Mind*, (O. S.) I., 452-466. (Part of a privately published Fellowship Dissertation, written in 1875.)

1878

- (1) *Academy*, March 16, and April 20; Review of G. H. Lewes's *Physical Basis of Mind*.

1879

- (1) "Observations on the Physiology of the Nervous System of the Crawfish." *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, XXVIII., No. 194, March 6, 1879, 379-383. Communicated by M. Foster. Received Feb. 17, 1879. (Summary of the following paper.)
- (2) "Some Notes on the Physiology of the Nervous System of the Freshwater Crayfish." (*Astacus fluviatilis*) *Journal of Physiology*, II., 214-227.

- (3) "Vitality of the Common Snail." *Nature*, XX., 363, August 14, 1879.

1880

- (1) "Herbart." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., XI., 718-720.
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1881

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1882

- (1) "A General Analysis of Mind." *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, XVI., 366-385. (Reprint of a privately published paper.)

1883

- (1) "Psychological Principles." I. "The Standpoint of Psychology." *Mind*, (O. S.) VIII., 153-169.
 (2) "Psychological Principles." II. "Fundamental Facts and Conceptions." *Mind*, (O. S.) VIII., 465-486). (For III. see 1887.)
 (3) "Objects and their Interaction." *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, XVII., 169-179. (One-half of a privately printed paper. Other such papers discussed "Space and Time," pp. 16; "The Law of Relativity," pp. 8.)
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1886

- (1) "Psychology." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., XX., 37-85. Worked up from the material referred to above as (1) and (2), 1883.

1887

- (1) "Psychological Principles." III. "Attention and the Field of Consciousness." *Mind*, (O. S.) VII., 45-67. (For I. and II. see 1883.)

(2) "Mr. F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind." *Mind*, (O. S.) VII., 564-575.

1889

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1890

(1) "The Progress of Philosophy." *Mind*, (O. S.) XV., 213-233.

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(3) "J. S. Mill's Science of Ethology." *International Journal of Ethics*, I., 446-459.

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(1) Critical Notice of James, W., *Text-book of Psychology*, *Mind*, N. S. I., 531-539.

(2) Book-notice (unsigned) of Husserl, E. G., *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, *Mind*, N. S. I., 565f.

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(1) "'Modern' Psychology: A Reflexion." *Mind*, N. S. II., 54-82.

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(3) "A Criticism of a Reply." (By F. H. Bradley, to the writer's review of *Appearance and Reality*, *Mind*, N. S. III., 378-382.

(4) Book-notice of Wundt, W., *Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie*, fourth edition, *Mind*, N. S. III., 142-143.

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(2) "Travestying Herbert Spencer." *The Academy*, LVII., 465, Oct. 21, 1899. (Reply to criticism of previous work; cf. article with same title by Wm. C. McBain, *The Academy*, LVII., 432-434, Oct. 14, 1899.)

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(4) "Editorial Note." (And other editorial matter) in Sidgwick, H., *Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations; an Introductory Course of Lectures*. 8vo. London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Co., pp. xvii., 252.

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(5) "A Note in Reply to Doctor Perry." *The Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods*, I., 325. (Reply to criticism of 1899, (1).)

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(2) "Naturalism." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., XIX., 274-275. (Unchanged from 1902, (1).)

(3) "Psychology." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., XXII., 547-604.

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